EVENT: On Wednesday, February 21st, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and AidData will co-host a presentation and panel discussion on Toward data-driven education systems: What information do education leaders want and need?, with Samantha Custer (AidData), Elizabeth King (Brookings), Tamar Manuelyan Atinc (Brookings), Shaida Badiee (Open Data Watch), Deon Filmer (World Bank), Liesbet Steer (Education Commission), and Nathaniel Heller (Results for Development). A recording will be made available online after the event. RSVP via Brookings or follow the discussion on Twitter with the hashtag #data4education.

AidData Working Paper

How Transparency Affects Distributional Politics: A Field Experiment among Elected Incumbents in Malawi

Date Published

Oct 1, 2017

Authors

Ryan Jablonski, Brigitte Seim

Publisher

Citation

Jablonski, Ryan, and Brigitte Seim. 2017. How Transparency Affects Distributional Politics: A Field Experiment among Elected Incumbents in Malawi. AidData Working Paper #45. Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Accessed at: http://aiddata.org/working-papers.

AidData Working Paper

How Transparency Affects Distributional Politics: A Field Experiment among Elected Incumbents in Malawi

Date Published

Oct 1, 2017

Authors

Ryan Jablonski, Brigitte Seim

Citation

Jablonski, Ryan, and Brigitte Seim. 2017. How Transparency Affects Distributional Politics: A Field Experiment among Elected Incumbents in Malawi. AidData Working Paper #45. Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Accessed at: http://aiddata.org/working-papers.

How does transparency affect distributional politics? We theorize that it conditions how officials choose recipient communities, compelling them to allocate to needy communities rather than to core supporters. We present the results of a field experiment in which 333 elected incumbent councillors in Malawi made real and meaningful decisions about the allocation of NGO-provided development goods to schools in their constituency. Prior to allocating goods, half of the incumbents were informed that letters about their decisions would be sent to local development oversight committees. We find that this transparency treatment caused incumbents to allocate goods to recipient school communities with greater economic need. They were also less likely to allocate to schools with strong political support. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evaluation of theoretical claims about the role of transparency in distributional politics using in-office elected leaders as participants and observing real distributional decisions.

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