Mapping China’s COVID-19 aid footprint

What does China’s billion-dollar campaign tell us about future pandemic diplomacy?

December 19, 2024
Sailor Miao
A health worker prepares a syringe with the Sinovac Biotech's CoronaVac vaccine at the Ospital ng Malabon (Hospital of Malabon) in the Philippines. Photo by Lisa Marie David/IMF via Flickr, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

A health worker prepares a syringe with the Sinovac Biotech's CoronaVac vaccine at the Ospital ng Malabon (Hospital of Malabon) in the Philippines. Photo by Lisa Marie David/IMF via Flickr, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Executive summary

  • AidData finds that China provided over $4.6 billion in COVID-19 aid, surpassing Western donors like the U.S. and Germany.
  • China donated over 239 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, compared to 682 million doses donated by the United States.
  • The high prices of Chinese COVID-19 vaccines, compared to counterparts like Moderna and AstraZeneca, significantly increased the total donation amounts.
  • China’s COVID-19 aid specifically targeted low-income nations, especially in neighboring Asian countries.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, China emerged as the largest donor of COVID-19-related aid to developing countries. How China provided foreign aid during a global pandemic offers crucial insight into China’s potential responses to future emergencies.

Built on AidData’s flagship Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset Version 3.0, our research shows that China donated over $4.60 billion USD worth of medical equipment and vaccines to developing countries from 2020 to 2022. China’s COVID-19 donations far exceeded those of other traditional donors, such as the United States ($4.05 billion), Germany ($3.64 billion), and Japan ($2.50 billion), according to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Through its relentless COVID-19 diplomacy, China secured its position as a global leader in COVID-19 aid.

Previous research on this topic, such as by the Center for Strategic & International Studies’ China Power Project and Bridge Beijing, has provided valuable insights into Chinese COVID-19 diplomacy. However, our effort is the first to provide a granular account of the value and volume of donated goods from over 520 official Chinese donors. For over two years, I worked with AidData staff and our student researchers to painstakingly collect information on Chinese COVID-19 aid.

We assembled 2,700 COVID-19-related aid records, covering six continents and 157 developing countries and territories. Here, I examine over 360 COVID-19 vaccine records and more than 2,000 medical equipment donations to shed light on the vast scale and strategic intent of Chinese COVID-19 aid. (For more on AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology and the methodology used to collect data on COVID-19 donations, see the addendum to this blog).

Beyond China’s $2 billion commitment

During the early days of the pandemic, President Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion in donations to combat COVID-19 in a speech at the WHO General Assembly in May 2020. China aimed to project its soft power and improve its reputation as a provider of public goods. The results are mixed, according to a CSIS study: while China successfully improved its image in some developing countries in Asia and Africa, public opinions in others remained either unchanged or became more negative. According to one AidData study, BRI from the Ground Up, ninety percent of African leaders surveyed on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its COVID-19 response said that Beijing’s pandemic assistance either improved or had no impact on their views of China as a development partner.

Regardless, AidData finds that China has far exceeded its original commitment. Chinese central government ministries—primarily the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA)—donated over $4.31 billion. Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) donated over $174 million, while Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments contributed $59.08 million and $51.51 million, respectively. 

These values likely underestimate the real total, as we excluded 661 records lacking detailed enumeration or prices in the source data. Items whose number or value that could not be estimated include syringes, hand sanitizers, 43 negative pressure ambulances, and containerized isolation rooms.

China’s vaccine donations: 239.1 million doses to the world

By value, Chinese vaccine donations constituted the majority of China’s COVID-19 aid. Our methodology, based on OECD guidance, estimates each dose of Chinese vaccine at $18. Out of the $4.6 billion total COVID-19-related donations, $4.17 billion (or over 239.1 million doses) were vaccines delivered by China. The remaining donations, valued at $420 million, consisted of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). In total, China’s vaccine donations helped provide immunity to over 2.27% of the developing world’s population. 

To enable this first-of-its-kind analysis, we used data from the OECD and the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Emergency Global Supplies Catalogues to estimate the values of commonly donated items, such as Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, N-95 masks, infrared thermometers, ventilators, diagnostic tests, goggles and oxygen concentrators. (For more on our methodology, see the addendum at the bottom of this blog). 

While China exceeded its $2 billion pledge, it remains challenging to accurately determine whether the country has fulfilled another pledge to “provide 2 billion vaccine doses to the world.” That is because it is unclear how many doses China intended to donate versus sell. The U.S. officially pledged to donate 1.1 billion doses, and ultimately shipped over 672 million doses by the end of 2022. 

The implementation channels for China’s donations were unique among other large aid donors. While the United States delivered most vaccines through the multilateral COVAX initiative, China delivered only about 3% (or 7.34 million doses) of its donation through COVAX, opting instead to provide the vast bulk of its aid bilaterally through official channels.

How does China’s COVID-19 diplomacy compare to its overall development finance?

We find there is little overlap between the patterns of China’s COVID-19 aid and those of its general development finance program.

For one, China explicitly targeted low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), especially those that are geographically close to it, in its COVID-19 aid program. The top 20 recipients of Chinese COVID-19 donations (ten of which were low-income countries) received nearly two-thirds (or $2.99 billion) of all of China’s COVID-related aid. This signifies that China prioritized the poorest countries. Conversely, while China also supports low-income countries in its overall development finance program, it places great emphasis on wealthier countries, injecting large amounts of capital to nations such as Russia and Venezuela. Indeed, only two out of the top 20 recipients of overall Chinese official development assistance (ODA) are classified as low-income countries. 

But China’s COVID-19 diplomacy also shows similarities to its global portfolio:  like its development finance strategy, China’s COVID-19 aid concentrated on Asia (totaling $2.25 billion). This regional focus can be partially explained by China seeking to reduce its COVID-19 exposure by boosting immunity in nearby countries, especially those that are destabilized by civil conflicts. Myanmar, for example, received the highest amount of Chinese COVID-19 aid ($488 million). Myanmar’s official COVID-19 fatality rate was 360 per million, significantly lower than that of populous countries like Argentina (2,800 per million) and South Africa (1,700 per million)—although this figure may be an undercount. Yet, the total COVID-19 donations Myanmar received were approximately 24 times higher than the combined amount for Argentina and South Africa.

By leveraging resources from government-controlled institutions at all levels, China positioned itself as the top donor of COVID-19 aid in the Global South. 

AidData’s tracking of COVID-19 donations enabled this first-of-its-kind analysis of China’s COVID-19 diplomacy, providing greater transparency into the country’s aid and revealing its diplomatic priorities. Future research based on this data could be conducted to understand public perceptions of Chinese COVID-19 donations in recipient governments and the long-term effects of Chinese diplomacy.

Acknowledgements

This blog was drafted with assistance from Brooke Escobar, Interim Director of AidData’s Chinese Development Finance Program; Lea Thome, Program Manager; Sarina Patterson, Communications Manager; and Alex Wooley, Director of Partnerships and Communications. The author wishes to thank Rory Fedorochko, Program Manager; Lydia Vlasto, Associate Program Manager; and Brad Parks, Executive Director for their help in the creation of the Methodology. In addition, the author thanks student researchers Colin Mullee and Kevin Leng for their assistance during the data collection process.

Methodology

To enable this groundbreaking data collection and analysis, our team developed a COVID-19 donation methodology, based on our Tracking Underreport Financial Flows (TUFF) 3.0 Methodology

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) donations

First, we distinguished donated products from purchased products by searching for key phrases in Mandarin. Second, we scraped Chinese embassy and consulate websites, as well as state-controlled news media, such as Xinhua News Agency, which often reported only on handover ceremonies that had already occurred. Most of our records describe products that have already been delivered, rather than simply pledged. Leveraging machine learning, and later manual checks by staff, we identified all project records that matched the OECD’s definition for COVID-19-related projects. 

More importantly, our methodology provides reliable estimates for donations that often do not have stated values. Developed by Lydia Vlasto, AidData Junior Program Manager, and Brad Parks, AidData Executive Director, the PPE and vaccine donation estimator allowed us to estimate the values of commonly donated items, such as Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, N-95 masks, infrared thermometers, ventilators, diagnostic tests, goggles and oxygen concentrators during a time range based on the OECD and World Health Organization’s Emergency Global Supplies Catalogues. See an example here.

COVID-19 vaccine donations

There is no publicly available information on real-time prices for Chinese-produced COVID-19 vaccines for every country. UNICEF’s COVID-19 Market Dashboard published price ranges for China’s and others COVID-19 vaccines. According to UNICEF, depending on the specific recipient countries, Sinopharm (Beijing) vaccines cost between $6.90 and $36/dose (with a mean of $16.59); Sinovac vaccines cost between $7 and $32.52/dose (with a mean of $15.87). 

On the other hand, the OECD’s valuation of donations of excess COVID-19 vaccine doses to developing countries in ODA lists both vaccines’ prices as $18/dose, based on UNICEF’s data. Based on our research, Chinese COVID-19 vaccines are generally more expensive than other vaccines, partly due to the differences in technology and production cost. AidData uses $18/dose given by UNICEF as the price for both Chinese vaccines in our database. 

Country inclusion

AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 3.0, includes 164 countries and territories. However, the OECD’s dataset does not include Türkiye, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. To maintain symmetric comparison, these countries and territories are removed from our COVID-19 analysis. In addition, 32 countries and territories included do not contain any data; therefore, AidData has COVID-19 donation data for 125 countries and territories.

Sailor Miao is an Associate Program Manager on AidData's Chinese Development Finance Program team.