

A light gray world map is visible in the background of the page.

# The Marketplace of Ideas for Policy Change

---

*Who do developing world leaders listen to and why?*



# APPENDICES

## Table of Contents

Table A.1: The Sex of Sampling Frame Members, by Level of Participation in Survey.....	2
Table A.2: The Distribution and Number of Sampling Frame Members, Survey Recipients, and Survey Participants by Stakeholder Group.....	2
Figure A1.1: The Distribution of Survey Recipients by Sample Country.....	3
Table A.3: The Distribution and Number of Sampling Frame Members, Survey Recipients, and Survey Participants by Country ..	4
Figure A1.2: Country Size in Participant Sample by Country Size in Recipient Sample.....	8
Table A.4: Positions Held by Survey Participants.....	9
Table A.5: The Distribution of Survey Participants by Years of Experience Working on Policy/Programmatic Issues in our Country of Interest.....	10
Table A.6: Number of Participants Who Reported Experience Interacting with Specific Development Partners .....	11
Table A.7: Impact of Participant Interactions with Development Partners on Perception of External Assessment Influence at Agenda-Setting Stage, Overall and by Participant Stakeholder Group.....	11
Table A.8: Impact of Participant Interactions with Development Partners on Perception of External Assessment Influence at Reform Design Stage, Overall and by Participant Stakeholder Group .....	12
Table A.9: The Development Partner Employment Histories of Survey Participants, by Stakeholder Group.....	12
Table A.10: Where Participants Earned their Highest Degrees, by Stakeholder Group.....	13
Table A.11: Respondent Levels of Education, by Stakeholder Group.....	13
Table A.12: Years Since Participants Earned Highest Degree, by Stakeholder Group.....	14
Table A.13: The Current Employment Locations of Participants, by Stakeholder Group .....	15
Table A.14: The Current Employer or Employment Status of Participants, by Stakeholder Group .....	15
Table A.15: The Distribution and Number of Participants by Survey Language.....	16
<b>Appendix B: Respondent Characteristics and the Likelihood of Survey Completion.....</b>	<b>17</b>
Table B.1: Respondent Characteristics Associated with Unusually High Completion Rates.....	17
Table B.2: Respondent Characteristics Associated with Unusually Low Completion Rates .....	18
Table B.3: Respondent Characteristics with Significant Impacts on the Estimate of Overall Satisfaction with the Amount of Reform Attempted.....	19
<b>Appendix C: Weighting Scheme for Aggregate Statistics.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Appendix D: Sampling Frame Inclusion Criteria and the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey Sample .....</b>	<b>22</b>
Table D.1: Host Government Inclusion Criteria .....	24
Table D.2: Development Partner Inclusion Criteria.....	33
Table D.3: Civil Society and Non-Government Organization Inclusion Criteria .....	36
Table D.4: Private Sector Inclusion Criteria .....	37
Table D.5: Independent Country Expert Inclusion Criteria.....	38
<b>Appendix E: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey Questionnaire.....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Appendix G: Codebook for the “Attributes of External Assessments of Government Performance” Dataset.....</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>Appendix H: Supplemental Information .....</b>	<b>105</b>
Table H.1: The 10 Assessments with the Greatest Increases in Influence between Agenda Setting and Reform Design .....	105
Table H.2: Respondent Familiarity with Assessments: The 10 Most Recognized Assessments .....	106
Table H.3: Respondent Familiarity with Assessments: The 10 Least Recognized Assessments .....	106
Table H.4: Respondent Familiarity with Assessments: The 3 Most Recognized Assessments in Each Policy Domain .....	107
Table H.5: The 3 Most Influential Assessments in Each Policy Domain (Level of Agenda-Setting Influence) .....	111
Table H.6: The 3 Most Influential Assessments in Each Policy Domain (Level of Reform Design Influence) .....	114
Figure H.1 Survey-Based Measure of Success in Reform Implementation and Assessment Influence.....	116
Figure H.2 Track Record of Success in Reform Implementation in Four Policy Areas and Assessment Influence .....	117
<b>Appendix I: References.....</b>	<b>118</b>

## Appendix A: Sampling Frame and Survey Participant Characteristics

Appendix A contains information about members of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* sampling frame compared to survey recipients and survey participants, as well as additional demographic information about survey participants, which we collected via the survey questionnaire.

### *Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Sex*

Table A.1 indicates that the global recipient sample included 30,926 male and 12,513 female survey recipients, a ratio of roughly 247 males per every 10049 females. This ratio, though significantly higher than the 101:100 male-to-female ratio in the general world population, almost certainly reflects the patriarchy of public sector staffing in developing countries (World Bank 2011, 2014). Despite significant differences in male and female participation rates, the male-to-female ratio among survey participants was only slightly higher than that of both sampling frame members and survey recipients. 4,976 males and 1,768 females participated in the survey, yielding a male-to-female ratio among participants of 281:100.

<b>Table A.1: The Sex of Sampling Frame Members, by Level of Participation in Survey</b>						
	Sampling Frame		Recipient Sample		Participants	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Female	15412	28.03%	12513	28.81%	1768	26.22%
Male	39578	71.97%	30926	71.19%	4976	73.78%

### *Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Stakeholder Group*

Table A.2 shows the distribution and number of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants by each of the five stakeholder groups: host government officials, development partner staff, NGO/CSO leaders, private sector representatives, and independent country experts. Analysis of the participant sample vis-à-vis the recipient sample finds that we have lower than expected participation rates among host government officials and private sector representatives, and higher than expected participation rates among development partner staff, CSO/NGO leaders, and independent experts. Despite this, the overall distribution of survey participants by stakeholder group suggests that, at the stakeholder group level, our sample of survey participants is substantively representative of the sampling frame.

<b>Table A.2: The Distribution and Number of Sampling Frame Members, Survey Recipients, and Survey Participants by Stakeholder Group</b>						
	# in Sampling Frame	% of Sampling Frame	# in Recipient Sample	% of Recipient Sample	# of Participants	% of Participants
Overall	54,990		43,439		6,744	
Host Government	33,723	61.33%	25,919	59.67%	3,407	50.52%
Development Partners	9,728	17.69%	8,371	19.27%	1,473	21.84%
CSO/NGO	4,416	8.03%	3,362	7.74%	738	10.94%
Private Sector	3,204	5.83%	2,610	6.01%	319	4.73%

Independent Experts	3,919	7.13%	3,177	7.31%	807	11.97%
---------------------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-----	--------


For example, while 59.6% of the survey recipient sample is made up of host government officials, 50.2% of the participants in the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* are from this same stakeholder group. Whereas development partner officials make up 19.2% of the survey recipient sample, they represent 21.8% of the survey participant sample. A similar pattern is observed among civil society representatives. Additionally, rather than suggest bias, our survey results indicate that we managed to secure the participation of a broad and representative cross-section of development policymakers and practitioners across each of the five different stakeholder groups.

### Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Country

Table A.3 indicates the count and share of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and survey participants by country. As shown in Figure A1.1, the distribution of survey recipients by country demonstrates a roughly normal distribution with a country mean of 345 and a median of 359.5 survey recipients. The five largest sample country strata by survey recipients are diverse; they include Ecuador (784), Afghanistan (768), Indonesia (690), Morocco (667), and Georgia (573). Small islands (e.g., Cape Verde), semi-autonomous states (e.g., Puntland, Somaliland, and Zanzibar), and highly repressive regimes (e.g., Turkmenistan and North Korea) account for the countries with the smallest recipient sample strata.

The distribution of survey participants by country largely mirrors this pattern. The five countries with the largest number of survey recipients include Afghanistan (196), Georgia (132), Jordan (131), Haiti (113), and Liberia (109), while the five countries with the smallest number of survey participants include Zanzibar (3), Puntland (9), Equatorial Guinea (9), Somaliland (12), and Cuba (13). The bivariate correlation between the percent of survey recipients and the percent of survey participants by country is both strong (0.767) and statistically significant.

**Figure A1.1: The Distribution of Survey Recipients by Sample Country**



While there is significant variation in response rates by country, the results in Table A.3 demonstrate that we did obtain relatively high numbers of responses from nearly all sample countries. Between the overall survey recipient and participant samples, the coefficient of variation in country-specific sample size increases from 44.18% to 55.46%; however, we find no evidence that this result owes its explanation to low levels of response in smaller sample countries.<sup>1</sup> Nor do we find that the variation in participant country sample size is attributable to unusually high levels of response from already large sample countries.

The data provided in Table A.3 indicate that countries with unusually high response rates vary in sample size, as do countries with unusually low response rates.<sup>2</sup> We do find greater variation in the number of survey participants from mid-size sample countries than from either the smallest or largest sample countries (see Figure A1.2). This helps to explain the increase in the coefficient of variation among country-specific samples without suggesting that it is due to either unusually low response rates in small sample countries or unusually high response rates in large sample countries.

ISO-3	Country	# in Sampling Frame	% of Sampling Frame	# of Recipients	% of Recipients	# of Participants	% of Participants	% Change : Sampling Frame to Participants
AFG	Afghanistan	927	1.69%	768	1.77%	196	2.91%	+72.40%
ALB	Albania	505	0.92%	373	0.86%	59	0.87%	-4.74%
DZA	Algeria	365	0.66%	298	0.69%	40	0.59%	-10.64%
AGO	Angola	504	0.92%	365	0.84%	46	0.68%	-25.58%
ARM	Armenia	532	0.97%	414	0.95%	93	1.38%	+42.54%
AZE	Azerbaijan	500	0.91%	364	0.84%	45	0.67%	-26.61%
BGD	Bangladesh	550	1.00%	466	1.07%	68	1.01%	+0.81%
BLR	Belarus	210	0.38%	206	0.47%	25	0.37%	-2.93%
BLZ	Belize	225	0.41%	163	0.38%	39	0.58%	+41.33%
BEN	Benin	440	0.80%	338	0.78%	40	0.59%	-25.87%
BTN	Bhutan	251	0.46%	192	0.44%	43	0.64%	+39.69%
BOL	Bolivia	511	0.93%	487	1.12%	63	0.93%	+0.53%

<sup>1</sup> An insignificant Pearson's correlation coefficient of -0.144 between the relative size of a sample country recipient stratum and that country's response rate—and examination of an accompanying scatterplot—suggests that, although variation in sample size between countries increases among survey participants, smaller sample countries did not, on average, have lower response rates than other sample countries. Country-specific sample sizes in both the overall survey recipient and participant samples were measured by survey participant and recipient counts.

<sup>2</sup> The average over-sampled country had 448.33 sampling frame members, while the average under-sampled country had 509.88 sampling frame members. A difference in means test between the two groups of sample countries resulted in an insignificant p-value of 0.869.

<sup>3</sup> Green shading indicates a higher than expected receipt rate or participation rate at  $p < 0.05$ , based on the overall receipt and participation rates of 78.99% and 12.26%, and given the country distribution of sampling frame members. Red shading indicates a lower than expected receipt or participation rate.

BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	501	0.91%	417	0.96%	78	1.16%	+26.95%
BWA	Botswana	272	0.49%	249	0.57%	24	0.36%	-28.05%
BRA	Brazil	568	1.03%	461	1.06%	53	0.79%	-23.92%
BGR	Bulgaria	410	0.75%	365	0.84%	54	0.80%	+7.39%
BFA	Burkina Faso	537	0.98%	415	0.96%	64	0.95%	-2.82%
BDI	Burundi	497	0.90%	366	0.84%	54	0.80%	-11.41%
KHM	Cambodia	713	1.30%	529	1.22%	98	1.45%	+12.07%
CMR	Cameroon	453	0.82%	361	0.83%	38	0.56%	-31.60%
CPV	Cape Verde	306	0.56%	255	0.59%	31	0.46%	-17.39%
CAF	Central African Republic	331	0.60%	259	0.60%	30	0.44%	-26.10%
TCD	Chad	286	0.52%	208	0.48%	24	0.36%	-31.58%
CHN	China	467	0.85%	360	0.83%	29	0.43%	-49.37%
COL	Colombia	586	1.07%	562	1.29%	68	1.01%	-5.38%
COM	Comoros	292	0.53%	237	0.55%	26	0.39%	-27.40%
COD	DRC	546	0.99%	406	0.93%	67	0.99%	+0.06%
COG	Congo	327	0.59%	255	0.59%	24	0.36%	-40.15%
CIV	Côte D'Ivoire	463	0.84%	359	0.83%	38	0.56%	-33.08%
CUB	Cuba	210	0.38%	205	0.47%	13	0.19%	-49.52%
DJI	Djibouti	256	0.47%	204	0.47%	22	0.33%	-29.93%
DOM	Dominican Republic	393	0.71%	376	0.87%	64	0.95%	+32.79%
ECU	Ecuador	801	1.46%	784	1.80%	45	0.67%	-54.19%
EGY	Egypt	548	1.00%	454	1.05%	71	1.05%	+5.64%
SLV	El Salvador	316	0.57%	303	0.70%	53	0.79%	+36.76%
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	110	0.20%	106	0.24%	9	0.13%	-33.29%
ERI	Eritrea	194	0.35%	142	0.33%	22	0.33%	-7.53%
ETH	Ethiopia	626	1.14%	469	1.08%	85	1.26%	+10.72%
FJI	Fiji	259	0.47%	148	0.34%	31	0.46%	-2.40%
GMB	Gambia	365	0.66%	283	0.65%	46	0.68%	+2.76%
GEO	Georgia	714	1.30%	573	1.32%	132	1.96%	+50.74%
GHA	Ghana	758	1.38%	557	1.28%	83	1.23%	-10.72%
GTM	Guatemala	352	0.64%	332	0.76%	64	0.95%	+48.25%
GIN	Guinea	498	0.91%	359	0.83%	34	0.50%	-44.33%
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	244	0.44%	187	0.43%	31	0.46%	+3.59%
GUY	Guyana	273	0.50%	222	0.51%	39	0.58%	+16.48%
HTI	Haiti	611	1.11%	492	1.13%	113	1.68%	+50.80%
HND	Honduras	539	0.98%	511	1.18%	75	1.11%	+13.46%
IND	India	486	0.88%	427	0.98%	47	0.70%	-21.15%
IDN	Indonesia	832	1.51%	690	1.59%	108	1.60%	+5.84%

IRN	Iran	514	0.93%	393	0.90%	36	0.53%	-42.89%
IRQ	Iraq	510	0.93%	428	0.99%	99	1.47%	+58.28%
JAM	Jamaica	281	0.51%	213	0.49%	44	0.65%	+27.68%
JOR	Jordan	694	1.26%	519	1.19%	131	1.94%	+53.91%
KAZ	Kazakhstan	391	0.71%	378	0.87%	26	0.39%	-45.78%
KEN	Kenya	670	1.22%	488	1.12%	72	1.07%	-12.38%
KIR	Kiribati	120	0.22%	83	0.19%	20	0.30%	+35.90%
PRK	North Korea <sup>4</sup>	121	0.22%	94	0.22%	23	0.34%	+54.99%
XKX	Kosovo	547	0.99%	336	0.77%	87	1.29%	+29.69%
KUI	Kurdistan	125	0.23%	106	0.24%	27	0.40%	+76.12%
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	515	0.94%	474	1.09%	79	1.17%	+25.08%
LAO	Laos	385	0.70%	274	0.63%	37	0.55%	-21.64%
LSO	Lesotho	289	0.53%	170	0.39%	19	0.28%	-46.39%
LBR	Liberia	653	1.19%	512	1.18%	109	1.62%	+36.11%
MKD	Macedonia	527	0.96%	418	0.96%	71	1.05%	+9.85%
MDG	Madagascar	551	1.00%	408	0.94%	91	1.35%	+34.67%
MWI	Malawi	619	1.13%	492	1.13%	96	1.42%	+26.46%
MDV	Maldives	281	0.51%	207	0.48%	28	0.42%	-18.75%
MLI	Mali	520	0.95%	415	0.96%	62	0.92%	-2.78%
MHL	Marshall Islands	154	0.28%	126	0.29%	26	0.39%	+37.66%
MRT	Mauritania	449	0.82%	364	0.84%	56	0.83%	+1.70%
FSM	Micronesia	130	0.24%	86	0.20%	20	0.30%	+25.44%
MDA	Moldova	545	0.99%	378	0.87%	94	1.39%	+40.64%
MNG	Mongolia	490	0.89%	304	0.70%	48	0.71%	-20.12%
MNE	Montenegro	387	0.70%	288	0.66%	41	0.61%	-13.61%
MAR	Morocco	839	1.53%	667	1.54%	77	1.14%	-25.17%
MOZ	Mozambique	739	1.34%	553	1.27%	67	0.99%	-26.07%
MMR	Myanmar	341	0.62%	277	0.64%	58	0.86%	+38.69%
NAM	Namibia	531	0.97%	395	0.91%	49	0.73%	-24.76%

<sup>4</sup> We collected the contact information of North Korean government officials and of other stakeholder group representatives physically located in North Korea. However, due to safety considerations, we intentionally removed each of these cohorts from the final sampling frame. Thus, the North Korean segment of final sampling frame includes only those development partner staff and officials, CSO/NGO representatives, private sector representatives, and independent country experts who we identified as working outside of North Korea at the time of the survey. It does not include North Korean government officials or any other individuals physically located in North Korea.




NPL	Nepal	595	1.08%	444	1.02%	95	1.41%	+30.19%
NIC	Nicaragua	516	0.94%	483	1.11%	68	1.01%	+7.45%
NER	Niger	544	0.99%	404	0.93%	51	0.76%	-23.56%
NGA	Nigeria	756	1.37%	557	1.28%	77	1.14%	-16.95%
PAK	Pakistan	509	0.93%	414	0.95%	65	0.96%	+4.13%
PSE	Palestine	432	0.79%	348	0.80%	95	1.41%	+79.31%
PNG	Papua New Guinea	289	0.53%	196	0.45%	21	0.31%	-40.75%
PRY	Paraguay	330	0.60%	318	0.73%	51	0.76%	+26.02%
PER	Peru	530	0.96%	513	1.18%	73	1.08%	+12.31%
PHL	Philippines	569	1.03%	439	1.01%	98	1.45%	+40.44%
PSM	Puntland	88	0.16%	62	0.14%	9	0.13%	-16.61%
ROU	Romania	397	0.72%	308	0.71%	40	0.59%	-17.84%
RWA	Rwanda	633	1.15%	530	1.22%	58	0.86%	-25.29%
WSM	Samoa	229	0.42%	197	0.45%	32	0.47%	+13.94%
STP	Sao Tome and Principe	188	0.34%	156	0.36%	20	0.30%	-13.26%
SEN	Senegal	548	1.00%	453	1.04%	53	0.79%	-21.14%
SRB	Serbia	472	0.86%	229	0.53%	46	0.68%	-20.53%
SLE	Sierra Leone	479	0.87%	356	0.82%	52	0.77%	-11.48%
SLB	Solomon Islands	260	0.47%	208	0.48%	27	0.40%	-15.32%
SOM	Somalia	332	0.60%	256	0.59%	54	0.80%	+32.62%
SSM	Somaliland	52	0.09%	42	0.10%	12	0.18%	+88.17%
ZAF	South Africa	630	1.15%	520	1.20%	52	0.77%	-32.70%
SSD	South Sudan	290	0.53%	220	0.51%	26	0.39%	-26.90%
LKA	Sri Lanka	431	0.78%	330	0.76%	44	0.65%	-16.76%
SDN	Sudan	426	0.77%	315	0.73%	58	0.86%	+11.02%
SUR	Suriname	253	0.46%	210	0.48%	31	0.46%	-0.09%
SWZ	Swaziland	234	0.43%	196	0.45%	17	0.25%	-40.76%
SYR	Syria	592	1.08%	374	0.86%	73	1.08%	+0.55%
TJK	Tajikistan	369	0.67%	348	0.80%	53	0.79%	+17.12%
TZA	Tanzania	745	1.35%	515	1.19%	55	0.82%	-39.80%
THA	Thailand	664	1.21%	538	1.24%	41	0.61%	-49.65%
TLS	Timor-Leste	571	1.04%	448	1.03%	73	1.08%	+4.24%
TGO	Togo	336	0.61%	268	0.62%	38	0.56%	-7.78%
TON	Tonga	219	0.40%	143	0.33%	26	0.39%	-3.20%
TUN	Tunisia	377	0.69%	333	0.77%	45	0.67%	-2.67%
TUR	Turkey	545	0.99%	439	1.01%	53	0.79%	-20.71%
TKM	Turkmenistan	83	0.15%	73	0.17%	17	0.25%	+67.01%



TUV	Tuvalu	156	0.28%	100	0.23%	23	0.34%	+20.22%
UGA	Uganda	709	1.29%	520	1.20%	71	1.05%	-18.35%
UKR	Ukraine	440	0.80%	328	0.76%	49	0.73%	-9.20%
UZB	Uzbekistan	286	0.52%	226	0.52%	40	0.59%	+14.04%
VUT	Vanuatu	228	0.41%	165	0.38%	50	0.74%	+78.81%
VNM	Vietnam	451	0.82%	362	0.83%	39	0.58%	-29.49%
YEM	Yemen	565	1.03%	455	1.05%	105	1.56%	+51.53%
ZMB	Zambia	737	1.34%	534	1.23%	77	1.14%	-14.81%
EAZ	Zanzibar	52	0.09%	37	0.09%	3	0.04%	-52.96%
ZWE	Zimbabwe	475	0.86%	361	0.83%	51	0.76%	-12.45%
Coefficient of Variation		42.94%		44.18%		55.46%		

**Figure A1.2: Country Size in Participant Sample by Country Size in Recipient Sample**



Note: The R value of 0.844 indicates a very strong, positive linear relationship between an average country's recipient sample size and participant sample size.

#### Survey Recipient and Participant Distribution by Institution Type

In Tables D.1-D.5, readers will note that the percentages in the “% of [Stakeholder Group] Recipients” column and the “% of [Stakeholder Group] Participants” closely mirror each other. For example, while 2.40% of the host government individuals in the sampling frame (that received an email invitation) worked for a host government anti-corruption institution, 2.61% of host government survey participants worked for an anti-corruption institution. The statistically significant Pearson’s correlation coefficient between these two indicators (measured at the level of the institution type) is 0.9855, which suggests that the distribution

of survey participants is broadly representative of the distribution of survey recipients, especially after controlling for stakeholder group effects on the likelihood of survey participation.<sup>5</sup>

### The Professional Backgrounds of Survey Participants

We also collected a significant amount of demographic data from those individuals who participated in the survey. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable demographic data for our non-participants that would allow us to draw inferences about the representativeness of our sample on these dimensions. However, it is important to understand the attributes of the survey participants in our sample, irrespective of the question of whether and to what degree they are representative of the individuals in the master sampling frame.

#### *Positions Held by Survey Participants*

<b>Table A.4: Positions Held by Survey Participants</b>		
Position	# of Participants	% of Stakeholder Group
<b>Host Government</b>		
Head of State or Government	47	1.67%
Vice Head of State or Government	18	0.64%
Chief of Staff, Adviser, or Assistant to Head of State or Government or Vice Head of State or Government	59	2.10%
Head of a Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	249	8.86%
Vice Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Minister, State Minister, Joint Secretary, Deputy Commissioner	139	4.94%
Secretary General, Permanent Secretary, or Director General	193	6.87%
Chief of Staff, Chief of Cabinet, Adviser/Assistant to Head of a Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	83	2.95%
Director/Head of Technical Unit, Department, or Office Within the Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	999	35.49%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	444	15.80%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	264	9.39%
Other	260	9.25%
Don't Know	59	2.10%
<b>Development Partners</b>		
Head of Organization	28	2.24%
Chief of Staff, Adviser, or Assistant to Head of Organization	43	3.44%
Ambassador, Mission Director, Country Director, Country Representative, Head of Mission/Country Office	242	19.34%
Chargé, Deputy Chief of Mission, Deputy/Assistant Resident Representative, Deputy/Assistant Country Director, Deputy Country Representative, Deputy Head of Mission/Country Office	107	8.55%
Director/Head of Technical Unit, Department, or Office within	138	11.03%

<sup>5</sup> Alternatively, one can examine the representativeness of the survey participant sample vis-à-vis the master sampling frame (i.e. individuals in the master sampling frame who received an email invitation to participate in the survey *and* individuals in the master sampling frame who we were unable to reach via email). A comparison between these two groups is available upon request.

the Mission/Embassy/Country Office		
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	226	18.05%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	329	26.30%
Country Desk Officer or Specialist at Development Partner Headquarters	43	3.44%
Other	83	6.63%
Don't Know	11	0.88%
<b>CSO/NGO</b>		
Leader of the Organization	373	57.92%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	63	9.78%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	142	22.05%
Other	57	8.85%
Don't Know	7	1.09%
<b>Private Sector</b>		
Chairperson, CEO	118	51.08%
Board Member	41	17.75%
Technical Specialist, Adviser, or Consultant	18	7.79%
Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	24	10.39%
Other	24	10.39%
Don't Know	5	2.16%

**Table A.5: The Distribution of Survey Participants by Years of Experience Working on Policy/Programmatic Issues in our Country of Interest**

Years	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
0-4 years	1005	15.25%	247	7.45%	626	43.29%	43	5.87%	50	16.45%	39	4.93%
5-9 years	1394	21.16%	588	17.73%	437	30.22%	154	21.04%	77	25.33%	138	17.45%
10-14 years	1287	19.53%	645	19.45%	200	13.83%	201	27.46%	74	24.34%	167	21.11%
15-20 years	1066	16.18%	577	17.40%	105	7.26%	164	22.40%	48	15.79%	172	21.74%
20 years or more	1837	27.88%	1259	37.97%	78	5.39%	170	23.22%	55	18.09%	275	34.77%

World Bank (2721)	SIDA (255)	Embassy of Austria (69)
EU (2533)	Embassy of the Netherlands (249)	NZAID (66)
UNDP (2400)	Embassy of Norway (187)	AMF (65)
USAID (2196)	JBIC (186)	Embassy of Denmark (65)
UN (2111)	OFID (181)	Embassy of Qatar (61)
US Embassy (1499)	Embassy of South Africa (181)	Ex-Im Bank of India (56)
UNICEF (1317)	BTC (180)	Caribbean Development Bank (55)
JICA (1286)	KOICA (178)	IFAD (51)
GIZ (1261)	TIKA (167)	Embassy of Libya (41)
IMF (1250)	SDC (164)	Embassy of Venezuela (41)
DFID (1160)	Embassy of Belgium (157)	Embassy of Russia (40)
Embassy of France (1013)	China Ex-Im Bank (149)	Embassy of New Zealand (39)
British Embassy (1004)	Embassy of South Korea (139)	Embassy of Greece (33)
CIDA (911)	KFAED (138)	Finland Embassy (31)
Germany Embassy (898)	Global Fund (131)	Taiwan Embassy (30)
AfDB (813)	Sweden Embassy (120)	BNDES (27)
Japan Embassy (762)	GEF (112)	PetroCaribe (26)
AFD (724)	BADEA (110)	LuxDev (23)
AsDB (677)	ABC (105)	LFADA (19)
MCC (659)	Switzerland Embassy (101)	GAVI Alliance (16)
Canada Embassy (628)	Saudi Arabia Embassy (99)	Luxembourg Embassy (14)
KfW (597)	Danida (94)	Ireland Embassy (12)
AusAID (585)	UAE Embaasy (89)	Irish Aid (10)
China Embassy (585)	Norad (87)	BANDES (9)
Australia Embassy (434)	China Development Bank (84)	AFESD (7)
IADB (409)	CAF (83)	Hellenic Aid (6)
AECID (327)	CABEI (80)	Taiwan ICDF (5)
India Embassy (284)	Kuwait Embaasy (80)	Norfund (4)
EBRD (280)	ADA (79)	Poland Embassy (4)
Turkey Embassy (279)	Iran Embassy (78)	Bulgaria Embassy (2)
Spain Embassy (278)	Portugal Embassy (74)	ALBA (1)
IsDB (273)	SFD (71)	Bank of the South (0)
Brazil Embassy (259)	ADFD (70)	

	Overall	Host Government	Development Partners	CSO/NGO	Private Sector
Pearson	-0.0037	0.0360	-0.0404	0.1141	0.2601
Participants	2910	1653	743	397	117

<sup>6</sup> This data is based on responses to survey question 12.

P-value	0.871	0.145	0.276	0.023	0.005
---------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

**Table A.8: Impact of Participant Interactions with Development Partners on Perception of External Assessment Influence at Reform Design Stage, Overall and by Participant Stakeholder Group**

	Overall	Host Government	Development Partners	CSO/NGO	Private Sector
Pearson	-0.0218	0.0315	-0.0658	0.1124	0.1984
Participants	2810	1629	691	381	109
P-value	0.265783	0.205273	0.087755	0.028256	0.038632

**Table A.9: The Development Partner Employment Histories of Survey Participants, by Stakeholder Group<sup>7</sup>**

Rank	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	Organization	% of Group	Organization	% of Group	Organization	% of Group	Organization	% of Group	Organization	% of Group	Organization	% of Group
1	World Bank	24.3%	World Bank	23.2%	UNDP	27.1%	World Bank	20.6%	USAID	30.9%	World Bank	28.3%
2	UNDP	23.5%	UNDP	22.4%	World Bank	26.0%	UNDP	19.3%	UNDP	27.4%	UNDP	24.2%
3	USAID	17.5%	USAID	13.9%	USAID	24.1%	USAID	15.7%	World Bank	26.7%	USAID	18.6%
4	UN	13.4%	EU	12.2%	UN	15.5%	UN	12.8%	EU	16.9%	UN	14.5%
5	EU	12.7%	UN	12.2%	US Embassy	15.3%	EU	11.5%	UN	14.0%	EU	13.5%
6	US Embassy	8.57%	GIZ	7.25%	EU	13.2%	UNICEF	7.58%	GIZ	11.9%	US Embassy	10.3%
7	GIZ	7.38%	UNICEF	7.04%	DFID	8.01%	GIZ	7.16%	UNICEF	8.45%	DFID	9.44%
8	UNICEF	6.99%	US Embassy	5.81%	GIZ	6.82%	DFID	7.16%	US Embassy	7.75%	UNICEF	8.37%
9	DFID	6.26%	AfDB	4.94%	UNICEF	5.50%	US Embassy	6.53%	AsDB	6.34%	GIZ	7.73%
10	AsDB	4.58%	DFID	4.52%	CIDA	5.02%	CIDA	5.05%	DFID	6.34%	AsDB	6.44%
11	AfDB	4.32%	AsDB	4.42%	AfDB	4.55%	AsDB	3.79%	CIDA	5.63%	AusAID	6.01%
12	CIDA	3.83%	IADB	3.44%	AsDB	4.07%	JICA	3.37%	IADB	4.93%	CIDA	4.94%
13	MCC	3.23%	MCC	3.44%	AusAID	3.71%	MCC	2.95%	MCC	4.93%	IMF	4.08%
14	JICA	3.11%	JICA	3.24%	MCC	3.47%	IADB	2.74%	KfW	4.23%	AfDB	3.86%
15	IADB	3.08%	IMF	3.19%	UK Embassy	2.63%	AusAID	2.53%	IMF	4.23%	JICA	3.65%
16	IMF	2.95%	CIDA	2.62%	JICA	2.27%	UK Embassy	2.53%	SDC	4.23%	IADB	3.00%
17	AusAID	2.92%	AusAID	1.90%	IADB	2.15%	AfDB	2.11%	AfDB	3.52%	UK Embassy	2.79%
18	UK	1.76%	AFD	1.65%	IMF	2.03%	Germany	2.11%	AusAID	3.52%	MCC	1.72%

<sup>7</sup> This data is based on all responses to survey question 47.

	Embassy	%		%		%	Embassy	%		%		%
19	KfW	1.71%	KfW	1.39%	KfW	1.91%	KfW	2.11%	AFD	3.52%	Canada Embassy	1.50%
20	AFD	1.58%	France Embassy	0.98%	France Embassy	1.44%	IMF	2.11%	JICA	3.52%	KfW	1.50%

### The Educational Backgrounds of Survey Participants

More than two-thirds of all survey participants who completed the survey indicated that they received their highest degree from a university outside of the country about which we asked them survey questions. While this is perhaps not surprising for development partner participants and independent country experts, it is surprising that nearly two-thirds of host government officials and private sector representatives are also foreign-educated (see Table A.10 for a detailed breakdown of where participants earned their highest degree, by stakeholder group).<sup>8</sup>

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
In [Country]	1299	32.65%	798	39.92%	66	7.76%	253	55.00%	52	35.62%	13	24.90%
Out of [Country]	2679	67.35%	1201	60.08%	785	92.24%	207	45.00%	94	64.38%	39	75.10%

Further examination of Table A.11 reveals that a majority of survey participants (56.91%) possess a terminal postgraduate degree, but not a doctorate. This percentage is highest among development partner (67.15%) and host government officials (60.74%), and lowest among independent experts (34.49%), who are significantly more likely to possess a doctoral degree (52.92%). Our survey participants are, on average, highly educated—78.50% possess at least a terminal postgraduate degree—and this high level of education helps to explain the predominantly foreign nature of their education. A plausible explanation for this pattern is that universities located within the low income and lower-middle income countries in our sample do not offer many (desirable) advanced degrees. As such, the foreign nature of respondent education likely reflects the high level of education found across the sampling frame as a whole, rather than non-response bias resulting from the lower levels of participation by locally-educated sampling frame members.

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Primary	2	0.05%	1	0.05%	1	0.11%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Secondary	13	0.31%	6	0.29%	1	0.11%	4	0.80%	1	0.64%	1	0.18%

<sup>8</sup> The high percentage (92.4%) of development partner participants with a foreign education likely reflects a tendency for development partner officials in senior positions to be expatriates, rather than local hires. This interpretation is further supported by the relatively low levels of in-country experience among development partner participants, shown in Table A.5.

Technical/Vocational	49	1.17%	14	0.67%	6	0.67%	20	3.98%	5	3.21%	4	0.73%
College/University	835	19.97%	426	20.42%	111	12.49%	172	34.19%	62	39.74%	64	11.68%
Postgraduate	2380	56.91%	1267	60.74%	597	67.15%	250	49.70%	77	49.36%	189	34.49%
Doctorate	903	21.59%	372	17.83%	173	19.46%	57	11.33%	11	7.05%	290	52.92%

Table A.12 presents the number of years since participants' highest degrees were conferred; as a proxy for survey participant age, underscores the exceptional professional experience of survey participants. More than two-fifths of all survey participants received their highest degree at least 15 years ago, while another 17.57% received their degree no later than 2004. Additionally, the distribution of survey participants by years-since-degree largely follows the same pattern as years of in-country experience (shown in Table A.5), with one notable exception. Development partners were the stakeholder group with the highest share of participants that received their highest degree at least 10 years ago (87.22%). When this finding is considered in light of the exceptionally high level of education and uniquely low level of in-country experience among participants from the development partner stakeholder group, it further highlights the fleeting nature of country-specific work by donor, international organization, and foreign embassy personnel. By contrast, the next youngest stakeholder group was the private sector, with 81.51% of participants having received their highest degree at least 10 years ago.

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
0-4 years	399	9.97%	220	10.90%	39	4.57%	68	14.69%	12	8.22%	60	11.49%
5-9 years	596	14.89%	354	17.54%	70	8.21%	75	16.20%	5	10.27%	82	15.71%
10-14 years	703	17.57%	387	19.18%	131	15.36%	76	16.41%	25	17.12%	84	16.09%
15-19 years	583	14.57%	294	14.57%	139	16.30%	72	15.55%	20	13.70%	58	11.11%
20 or more years	1721	43.00%	763	37.81%	474	55.57%	172	37.15%	74	50.68%	238	45.59%

### *The Current Employment of Survey Participants*

Towards the end of the survey questionnaire, we asked survey participants to indicate their current location of employment. We were surprised to find that over 70% of survey participants still work in the country about which we asked them survey questions, while just over a quarter report working in another country. Further breakdown of the location of respondent work by stakeholder group follows expected patterns. Around 90% of host government, CSO/NGO, and private sector survey participants current work in their country of study, followed by 58.39% of independent experts (still a reasonably high percentage) and just over 30% of development partner staff.



**Table A.13: The Current Employment Locations of Participants, by Stakeholder Group**

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
In Country	269	73.33	161	89.23	24	30.86	42	92.46	13	92.86	28	58.39
Out of Country	7	%	5	%	1	%	9	%	0	%	2	%
	981	26.67	195	10.77	54	69.14	35	7.54%	10	7.14%	20	41.61
		%		%	0	%					1	%

We also asked participants to indicate the nature of their current work. As indicated in Table A.14, a smaller proportion of survey participants currently work for a host government institution or program (30.13%) than indicated in the global sampling frame (61.33%) or the survey participant sample (50.52%). This decline seems largely driven by the movement of host government participants into development organizations, NGOs, CSOs, universities, and retirement. Indeed, this movement seems in part to have resulted in a slight increase in CSO and NGO employment and affiliation—from 8.03% of the global sampling frame and 10.94% of the participant sample up to a current proportion of 12.58%.

The data highlighted in green in Table A.14 also underscores the “revolving door” nature of public sector work in the developing world. Since holding the positions about which we asked participants questions, at least 10.35% of government officials have transitioned into employment at a development partner institution, while 31.05% of development partner staff now work for their (former) counterpart governments. This revolving door also extends to the private sector: 10.48% of private sector participants now work as host government officials.

**Table A.14: The Current Employer or Employment Status of Participants, by Stakeholder Group**

	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Government institution or program	179	30.13	127	42.71	34	31.05						
	4	%	5	%	5	%	81	9.87%	26	10.48	66	8.37%
Development partner	892	14.98	309	10.35	44	39.78	70	8.53%	20	8.06%	51	6.46%
		%		%	2	%						
Civil society program	414	6.95%	146	4.89%	30	2.70%	16	20.34	19	7.66%	52	6.59%
		%		%			7	%				
Non-governmental organization	749	12.58	256	8.58%	55	4.95%	27	32.89	42	16.94	12	15.97
		%		%			0	%		%	6	%
Private sector council, chamber, or association	399	6.70%	216	7.24%	37	3.33%	34	4.14%	80	32.26	32	4.06%
		%		%						%		
Labor union or workers association	74	1.24%	36	1.21%	4	0.36%	17	2.07%	7	2.82%	10	1.27%
		%		%								
The media	200	3.36%	52	1.74%	11	0.99%	44	5.36%	11	4.44%	82	10.39
		%		%								%
University or think tank	870	14.61	382	12.80	69	6.21%	95	11.57	23	9.27%	30	38.15
		%		%				%			1	%
In School	11	0.18%	5	0.17%	3	0.27%	2	0.24%	1	0.40%	0	0.00%
		%		%								
Retired	434	7.29%	235	7.87%	2	9.18%	30	3.65%	15	6.05%	52	6.59%
		%		%	10							
Unemployed/Unknown	118	1.98%	73	2.45%	13	1.17%	11	1.34%	4	1.61%	17	2.15%
		%		%								

### Survey Questionnaire Language

The *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* online questionnaire was distributed in five languages, including English, French, Spanish, Russian, and Portuguese. As Table A.15 indicates, nearly 95% of all survey participants chose to take the survey in English, French, or Spanish, while fewer than 6.5% took it in Russian or Portuguese. This pattern not only reflects the distribution of sample countries by language of government, but also the internationalization of our survey participants. Even within the stakeholder group with the lowest percentage of English language survey participants (CSO/NGO leaders), 64.91% of survey participants opted for the English-language questionnaire. Not surprisingly, the stakeholder group with the highest share of English language survey participants was development partner staff, with 90.69% of surveys taken in English.

Language	Overall		Host Government		Development Partners		CSO/NGO		Private Sector		Independent Experts	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
English	5032	74.61%	2294	67.27%	1334	90.69%	479	64.91%	234	73.58%	691	85.63%
French	826	12.25%	549	16.10%	81	5.51%	111	15.04%	38	11.95%	47	5.82%
Spanish	457	6.78%	293	8.59%	31	2.11%	66	8.94%	32	10.06%	35	4.34%
Russian	234	3.47%	127	3.72%	16	1.09%	56	7.59%	10	3.14%	25	3.10%
Portuguese	195	2.89%	147	4.31%	9	0.61%	26	3.52%	4	1.26%	9	1.12%

## Appendix B: Respondent Characteristics and the Likelihood of Survey Completion

Despite a reasonably high survey completion rate of 62.72%, not all survey participants were equally likely to complete the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*. It is therefore important to examine the factors contributing to survey attrition and completion. Additionally, while many characteristics of our non-respondent sample are unknown, we did uncover some initial evidence that the determinants of survey completion can be used as proxies to estimate the causes of survey response and non-response.<sup>9</sup>

We undertook a large battery of tests to determine whether any of the following respondent-level characteristics were statistically associated with survey completion and non-completion: sex; stakeholder group; number of years of in-country experience; formal position type; role(s) played in the policy process; number of roles played; political, technical, or administrative focus; level of education; foreign or domestic education; number of years since conferral of highest degree; foreign or domestic location of current work; type of current work; survey questionnaire language; whether or not a respondent used a write-in organization; perception of the amount of reform attempted; and satisfaction with the amount of reform attempted.

Tables B.1 and B.2 list the respondent characteristics that were significantly associated with an increased or decreased likelihood of survey completion. There are several notable findings. First, many of these traits mirror the distribution of survey participant characteristics described in the main body of the report. For example, those who elected to take the survey in Spanish were more likely than an average respondent to complete the survey than those who took the survey in other languages. By contrast, those who selected Portuguese were less likely to complete the survey. Similarly, participants with 10-14 years of in-country experience were more likely to complete the survey, while those with fewer than five years' experience were less likely.

Second, many determinants of survey completion seem to reflect higher and lower levels of salience of the survey's content among different sample subgroups. The *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* was designed to collect information about the causes and consequences of reform efforts in developing countries. It is therefore not too surprising that those more involved with policy formulation and evaluation and those responsible for the implementation and oversight of programs were most likely to complete the survey questionnaire. As seen in Tables B.1 and B.2, chiefs of staff, advisers to heads of government, and program and project managers were more likely to complete the survey than heads of state. Additionally, those involved in agenda setting, advocacy, policy formulation, and monitoring and evaluation were significantly more likely to complete the survey questionnaire than the average survey respondent.

<b>Table B.1: Respondent Characteristics Associated with Unusually High Completion Rates</b>							
Question/Vari- able	Group	Response/Value	Participa- nts	Completi- ons	Comple- tion Rate	vs. Others in Group	vs. Group Mean
Survey Language	Overall	Spanish	457	312	68.27%	+5.92 %	+5.52 %
Stakeholder	Overall	CSO/NGO	737	505	68.52%	+6.48	+5.77

<sup>9</sup> There are significant positive correlations between the response rates and completion rates of individual stakeholder groups within specific sample countries. On average, the higher the response rate of a stakeholder group in a given country, the higher its completion rate, and vice versa.

Group						%	%
Stakeholder Group	Overall	Independent Expert	807	552	68.40%	+6.42%	+5.65%
Years of in-Country Experience	Overall	10-14 years	1287	861	66.90%		+3.10%
Position	Host Government	Chief of Staff, Chief of Cabinet, Adviser/Assistant to Head of a Government Ministry/Agency/Commission	83	65	78.31%	+10.55%	+10.24%
Position	Host Government	Program Manager, Project Manager, Program Coordinator, Project Coordinator	264	197	74.62%	+7.22%	+6.54%
Position	CSO/NGO	Don't Know	7	7	100.00%	+26.77%	+26.48%
Roles	Overall	Agenda setting	2861	2059	71.97%		+1.98%
Roles	Overall	Advocacy	2422	1755	72.46%		+2.47%
Roles	Overall	Policy formulation	3276	2347	71.64%		+1.65%
Roles	Overall	Policy monitoring and evaluation	2944	2114	71.81%		+1.82%
Roles	Overall	Program design	3054	2203	72.13%		+2.15%
Amount of Reform Attempted	Overall	No Reform At All <sup>10</sup>	241	218	90.46%	+13.91%	+13.28%
Satisfaction with Amount of Reform Attempted	Overall	Too Little	2611	2058	78.82%	+2.24%	+1.14%

Question/Variable	Group	Response/Value	Participants	Completions	Completion Rate	vs. Others in Group	vs. Group Mean
Survey Language	Overall	Portuguese	195	108	62.97%	7.59%	7.37%
Stakeholder Group	Overall	Private Sector	318	159	50.00%	13.38%	12.75%
Years of in-	Overall	0-4 years	1005	590	58.71%		-

<sup>10</sup> Those who selected the response options "No Reform At All" were routed forward to the last substantive section of the survey, on the national policy environment.

Country Experience								5.10%
Position	Host Government	Head of State or Government	46	25	54.35%	-	13.96%	
Position	Host Government	Other	260	156	60.00%	-	8.90%	8.08%
Position	Host Government	Don't Know	59	27	45.76%	-	22.79%	22.31%
Position	Development Partners	Other	83	45	54.22%	-	14.16%	13.22%
Amount of Reform Attempted	Overall	No Response Provided	106	42	39.62%	-	38.31%	37.55%
Satisfaction with Amount of Reform Attempted	Overall	Don't Know/Not sure	356	257	72.19%	-	5.89%	5.49%
Satisfaction with Amount of Reform Attempted	Overall	Refusal	95	43	45.26%	-	33.01%	32.42%

Nevertheless, we have not yet uncovered much evidence that these discrepancies in survey completion rates introduced any consistent pro- or anti-reform biases into our survey results. Consider Table B.3, which provides a list of the variables that influenced both the likelihood of survey completion and a respondent's reported satisfaction with the amount of reform that was attempted in his or her country (a proxy for pro- or anti-reform bias).

**Table B.3: Respondent Characteristics with Significant Impacts on the Estimate of Overall Satisfaction with the Amount of Reform Attempted**

Question/ Variable	Response/Value	Impact on Completion	Difference from Expected Satisfaction	P-value	Impact on Global Statistic	# of Participants	% of Participants
Roles	Advocacy	+	-0.05	0.000	Underestimate of reform satisfaction	2422	48.07%
Roles	Policy formulation	+	0.02	0.025	Overestimate of reform satisfaction	3276	65.03%
Activities	Policy monitoring and evaluation	+	0.03	0.001	Overestimate of reform satisfaction	2944	58.44%
Survey Language	Portuguese	-	0.33	0.000	Underestimate of reform satisfaction	195	2.89%
Years of In-Country Experience	0-4 years	-	-0.11	0.000	Overestimate of reform satisfaction	1005	15.25%

The results reported in this table are noteworthy for three reasons. First, out of the 24 respondent characteristics related to abnormally high and low completion rates, only five are associated with a significantly high or low reform satisfaction. Second, the magnitude of the impact of these five characteristics on reform satisfaction, though statistically significant, is small. On a possible response scale of -1 = “Too little reform [was attempted]” to 1 = “Too much reform [was attempted]”, only two respondent characteristics are associated with a change from the expected response value that is greater in magnitude than 0.1. Third, these characteristics, on the whole, are not associated with an abnormally large share of survey participants. It is therefore stands to reason that—even though five respondent characteristics are associated with some measure of pro- and anti-reform bias—our final sample of survey completers is not substantially more or less reform-oriented than that of non-completers.<sup>11</sup>

In fact, in combination with their impacts on survey completion rates, the five respondent characteristics associated with pro- or anti-reform bias have countervailing impacts on the global estimate of respondent satisfaction with the amount of reform attempted. While a high completion rate among advocates and a low completion rate among Lusophone participants is associated with an underestimate in the reform satisfaction of the overall sample, the remaining three characteristics are associated with an overestimate in overall reform satisfaction. It is likely that few the identifiable sources of pro- or anti-reform bias cancel each other out, and there is little, if any, remaining evidence of consistent bias in the overall sample.

Additional testing for sources of non-response bias is ongoing and will most likely be included in an additional note, to be published in 2015.

---

<sup>11</sup> Though participants who selected “Too little reform [was attempted]” were 2.24% more likely to complete the survey than other participants, on the whole there is not a consistent trend that suggests survey completers are systematically more pro- or less anti-reform than survey non-completers. The only other response option that had a significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) impact on the likelihood of completion is “Don’t know/Not sure”. It is not surprising that participants who were hesitant or unable to provide an opinion on satisfaction with the amount of reform attempted were also less likely to complete the survey in its entirety. Responses of “Too much reform” or “About the right amount” did not have significant impacts on the likelihood of survey completion.

## Appendix C: Weighting Scheme for Aggregate Statistics

In order to generate unbiased and comprehensive aggregate statistics based on the individual respondent-level data, we employ a two-stage weighting scheme, as needed. The purpose of the weighting process is to give equal weight to every country-policy area (i.e. economic, governance, social and environmental, and general) pair in all aggregate statistics.

Unweighted statistics based on raw response data would likely exhibit bias in favor of Western donors, assessments, and ideas and against non-Western donors, assessments, and ideas. This is due to (1) uneven participant counts by country and (2) the construction of the sampling frame itself: non-Western donor staff and officials from closed and autocratic states proved more difficult to identify and contact. We expect that an average survey participant has more interaction and socialization with Western donors than the overall population and tends to work in countries and policy areas in which Western donors have had relatively higher presence and influence.

Pro-Western bias aside, response counts vary greatly between countries and policy areas. A dual purpose of the weighting scheme is to ensure that our global statistics reflect the true global influence and effects of each external assessment, rather than its outsized impact on policy-making in only a subset of countries or policy areas.

Here is a specific example. To counteract expected pro-Western bias and provide truly global assessment influence statistics, we conduct a separate, two-stage weighting process using data and response counts specific to each individual assessment. In the first stage, we up-weight all responses so that each country receives equal weight in the calculation of our global statistics. These country-level weights are calculated by finding the inverse proportion of the number of responses from a country against the maximum number of responses found in a single country across all sample countries.

In the second stage, we give equal weight to all policy area responses within each sample country. In-country policy area weights are calculated using the inverse proportion of the number of responses from a policy area within a country against the maximum number of responses found in a single policy area in that same country. In-country policy area weights are then incorporated into global statistics via a two-step procedure. First, they are multiplied by the appropriate country-level weights from the first stage of the overall weighting process. Then the product of the two weights is rescaled to ensure that countries still receive equal weight in our global statistics.

Some levels of data aggregation below the global level require country-level weighting or in-country policy area weighting, but not both. Statistics unique to each policy area or each specific policy domain do not combine data from multiple policy areas and, therefore, only involve country-level weighting. Country-specific statistics, on the other hand, do not combine data from multiple countries and, therefore, only involve in-country policy area weighting.



## Appendix D: Sampling Frame Inclusion Criteria and the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey Sample

Few efforts had been made to conduct large-*n* cross-country elite survey research in a systematic manner. In a recent literature review, Hoffmann-Lange (2007) notes that while “elite” and “opinion leader” surveys abound only three “truly comparative elite surveys” have ever been conducted and even these studies disclose little information about the composition of their samples or sampling frames.

As such, defining the population of interest for inclusion in the sampling frame for the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* was a crucial first step to provide a basis for evaluating the representativeness of our sample.<sup>12</sup> If appropriate care had not been taken to ensure that survey population strata were comparable, our research team could have easily introduced a significant source of bias (i.e. coverage error).

Our research team sought to improve upon previous efforts by carefully constructing sampling frames for each country that applied a standardized and explicit set of inclusion criteria (detailed below in Tables D.1-D.5), while accounting for the fact that every government and non-governmental organization has a unique set of organizational structures and leadership positions.

We focused on identifying “functional equivalents” at both the institution and leadership position level. For example, almost every country in the world has some version of a “supreme audit institution” that oversees the government’s management of public finances, yet there is significant diversity in how institutions are structured to perform this function. Some countries have an independent Auditor General that periodically submits audit reports to a Public Accounts Committee in the legislature. Other countries have a Court of Accounts within the judicial branch that oversees the use of public funds and operates independently of the executive and legislative. Still other countries use a Board or Collegiate model in which some type of governing board or “college” produces and submits audit reports to Parliament. For the purposes of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*, our objective was to identify institutional functional equivalents and map them across the 126 countries included in our sample. Tables 29-33 provide a list of the “ideal type” institutions to which country-specific institutions were mapped.

We also sought to identify functionally equivalent leadership positions within these institutions. For example, in most developing countries, every line ministry has a non-partisan senior civil servant—usually called a “Permanent Secretary” or “Secretary General”—who is responsible for day-to-day management and leading the ministry during times of government transition. However, in other countries, no such position exists and a “Deputy Minister” or “Vice Minister” effectively performs this function. We therefore sought to map job titles—as best as possible—to functional responsibilities. Finally, with support from 15 regional and country specialists, we drew on a wide variety of print and web-based information sources to identify the individuals who met the inclusion criteria. These sources, detailed in Tables D.1-D.5, include the 2004-2013 editions of the *Country Background Notes* produced by the U.S. Department of State, the 2004-2013 editions of the *Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments* published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Confidential’s *Who’s Who* Database, various editions of the *International Who’s Who* publication, and the U.S. Department of State’s Staff Directory.

Another innovation of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey is its scope. Rather than drawing a random sample, we have sought to survey all individuals in the master sampling frame (i.e., the entire identifiable

---

<sup>12</sup> All of the analysis provided in this report relies on the 1.0 version of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* dataset. Future analysis will rely on the 1.1 version of the dataset, which contains small adjustments and corrections resulting from (a) small numbers of missing values for codes pertaining to specific questions, and (b) small numbers of participants with missing response data, and (c) errors that occurred when exporting coded response data. We have made every reasonable effort to ensure that the main findings presented in this report do not reflect any errors or omissions found in the 1.0 version of the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey* dataset.

population), which we believe will significantly strengthen the generalizability of our empirical claims. Five primary stakeholder groups comprise the sampling frame for each of the 126 countries included in the survey: (1) senior and mid-level executive branch government officials (e.g. ministers, vice ministers, chiefs of staff, secretary generals, special assistants and advisors) who formulate and execute policies and programs in a specific set of policy areas; (2) representatives of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and foreign embassies (DFID, World Bank, UNDP, IADB, USAID, etc.) who maintain a policy and programmatic dialogue with government authorities; (3) leaders of domestic civil society organizations (CSOs); (4) leaders and members of business associations who are knowledgeable about government programs and the domestic policy-making process; and (5) independent country experts who monitor reform patterns and processes and donor relationships with host governments. The population was further restricted to individuals who occupied such positions between 2004 and 2013.

We believe that this methodological approach represents a significant improvement over previous cross-country elite surveys in that it is more transparent, systematic, and replicable. However, we also acknowledge that it is not possible to make definitive claims about the representativeness of our sample or sampling frame. Though we took great care to clearly define a population of interest, identifying the entire true (unobservable) population of development policymakers, practitioners, and experts (i.e. constructing a truly comprehensive sample frame without any errors of omission or commission) is almost certainly not possible. At the same time, we believe the methodological approach outlined here offers several major advantages—most notably, the transparent and systematic manner in which the sampling frame was constructed (to ensure some minimum level of representativeness within and across countries).

<b>Table D.1: Host Government Inclusion Criteria</b>						
Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Recipient Sample	% of Host Government Recipients	# of Survey Participants	% of Host Government Participants
Overall			25,919		3,407	
Ministry of Finance/Economy	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Accountant General, Deputy Accountant General, Head of Department (e.g. Tax, Customs, Budget, Debt Management, Public Procurement, Internal Audit, Public Investment, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis, Public Enterprise Reform)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Government, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Register of participants World Bank/IMF, AsDB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; The International Association of Treasury Services (AIST) Conference Records; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	3,316	12.79%	431	12.65%
Ministry of Planning/National Planning Commission	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Director General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Head of Department (e.g. External Finance and International Cooperation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Policy and Research)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; various Ministry and National Planning Commission websites	1,551	5.98%	229	6.72%
Ministry of Health	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Public Health Officer, Head of Department (e.g. Primary Health Care, Health Systems Reform, Epidemiology and Immunization, Research and Policy Analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation, HIV/AIDS, Malaria); Focal Point for National Health Accounts	Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) “Key Contacts”; WHO Ministerial Conference Records; U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,504	5.80%	229	6.72%
Ministry of Industry/Trade/Commerce/Competitiveness	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, WTO Accession Focal Point; Head of Department (e.g. Customs, Business Environment Reform Unit); Director of Commerce, Director of Industry	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; WTO National Focal Points, various editions; Participants in	1,413	5.45%	193	5.66%

		Ministerial Conferences on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation; Participants in World Export Development Forum; Participants in International Workshop on Public Private Dialogue; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites				
Office of President/Prime Minister	President, Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Secretary General of Government, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chef de Service, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; List of Delegations to the annual UN General Assembly, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Office of the Presidency National Websites; Office of the Prime Minister National Websites	1,337	5.16%	179	5.25%
Central Bank	Governor, Vice Governor, Head of Operations, Head of Department (e.g. Operations, Research and Policy Analysis) Department, Senior Advisors	Register of participants from World Bank/IMF, AsDB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Members of the Central Bank Governance Forum; Conference records from annual meetings of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB); Members of Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance Ministries; various central bank websites (from the Bank for International Settlements' "Central Bank Hub")	1,037	4.00%	168	4.93%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/International Cooperation	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. North America, Europe, IFIs, United Nations, International Organizations, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis)	UN General Assembly Conference Records; U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,549	5.98%	167	4.90%
Ministry of Natural Resources/Environment	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and Policy Analysis), UNFCCC Designated National Authority, CBD National Contact, GEF Political Focal Point, GEF Operational Focal Point	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) National Contacts; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Designated National Authorities); Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database	1,586	6.12%	160	4.70%

		of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; various ministry websites				
Ministry of Education	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Early Childhood Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Tertiary Education), EFA National Coordinator, UNESCO Representative	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; UNESCO Directory of National "Education for All" (EFA) Directors; Participants in High Level Group Meetings on Education For All (HLG5); Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	974	3.76%	129	3.79%
Ministry of Labor/Social Security/Social Welfare/Social Protection	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	1,042	4.02%	125	3.67%
National Statistical Office	Director General, Deputy Director General, Senior Advisor	International Statistical Institute's (ISI) Directory of Official Statistical Agencies & Societies; National Statistical Office information from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) website; Managing for Development Results (MFDR) network of experts; statistical experts associated with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); United Nations Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific (SIAP); the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21); The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRI); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); and	676	2.61%	116	3.40%

		Observatoire économique et statistique d'Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); various Statistical Office websites				
Ministry of Agriculture/Rural Development/Land Reform/Food Security	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	982	3.79%	111	3.26%
Ministry of Justice/ Office of the Attorney General	Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisors, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Prosecutor General/Chief Prosecutor, Solicitor General	Membership directory of The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP); Participants in various Third World Summits of Prosecutor Generals, Attorney Generals, and Chief Prosecutors; Ibero-American Association of Prosecutor's Offices; Participants in the Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; List of participants in International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Members of the Ibero-American Legal Assistance Network (IberRed); various Ministry of Justice and Attorney General websites	869	3.35%	100	2.94%
Civil Service Agency/Commission	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Department Head, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Membership lists from the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration (UNPAN); the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD); African Management Development Institutes' Network (AMDIN); the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Regional School of Public Administration (RESPA); Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative; UN Program for Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (INNOVMED); the Arab Administrative Development Organization (ARADO); Eastern	670	2.58%	95	2.79%

		Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD); The Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP); various government agency websites				
Aid Effectiveness and Coordination Units/Directorates	Head of Unit/Directorate; Senior Advisors	Participants in the OECD Aid Effectiveness Working Group, various years; Participants in OECD Surveys on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, various years; List of Accra High-Level Conference Participants; Members of African Community of Practice (AfCoP) and the Asian Pacific Community of Practice (CoP-MfDR Asia Pacific) on Managing for Development Results (MfDR); various ministry websites	483	1.86%	94	2.76%
Anti-Corruption Agency/Ministry / Commission/Council/ Task Force	Minister, Deputy Minister, Executive Director, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Adviser, Head of Department (e.g. Investigations, Corruption Prevention and Education, Income and Asset Verification, Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering)	Membership registry of International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies (IAACA); List of participants in various International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Participants in Global Forum V on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity; UNCAC Conference Records; Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; Participants in AsDB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific; International Center for Asset Recovery Country Profiles; Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAM) National Contact Points; Members of the East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA); National Focal Points for Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO); Members of Research Network of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ANCORAGE-NET); Members of OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies; various anti-corruption institution websites	622	2.40%	89	2.61%
Ministry of Energy/Oil/Mine/ral Resources	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, National EITI Focal Point; Member of EITI Steering	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,; Participants in IAEA annual meetings, various	722	2.79%	87	2.55%



	Committee	editions; EITI online register of National EITI Focal Points and Steering Committee Members; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites				
Local Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Implementation Units and Eligibility Task Forces	CEO, Deputy CEO, Project Director, Government Board Member, Head of MCC Eligibility Task Forces	MCC website; MCA country websites	376	1.45%	77	2.26%
Ministry of Public Works/Transport	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	780	3.01%	73	2.14%
Investment Promotion Agency	Head of the Agency, Deputy Head of the Agency, Senior Advisor	Membership records from World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA); Participants in the Investment Committee For South East Europe Working Group on Investment Promotion; Participants in various World Export Development Forum meetings; various national investment promotion agency websites	447	1.72%	70	2.05%
Ministry of Family/Gender	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites	441	1.70%	52	1.53%
Ministry of Interior	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Economic and	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions;	412	1.59%	50	1.47%

	Financial Crimes, Criminal Investigations, Anti-Human Trafficking)	International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank's PPMS (Project Performance Management System) Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential's "Who's Who" Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites				
Embassy officials stationed at the United Nations in New York or Geneva	Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Deputy Permanent Representative, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisors	United Nations Office of Protocol "List of Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations in New York"; Permanent Mission websites at www.un.org	507	1.96%	48	1.41%
Embassy officials stationed in the United States	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary/Counselor, Third Secretary/Counselor, Senior Advisor	Various Editions of the "Diplomatic List" from the U.S. State Department's Office of the Chief of Protocol	497	1.92%	45	1.32%
Public Procurement Agency	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Senior Advisor	The European Public Procurement Network (PPN); Commonwealth Public Procurement Network (CPPN); Asia Pacific Procurement Forum; National Partners of the United Nations Procurement Capacity Development Centre; various public procurement agency websites	257	0.99%	44	1.29%
Supreme Audit Institution	Auditor/Inspector General, Deputy Auditor/Inspector General, Comptroller, Head of the Court of Account, Deputy Head of the Court of Account, Member of the Public Accounts Committee, Senior Advisor	Membership list from the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the African Organization of English-Speaking Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAL-E), The Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS), European Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (EUROSAL), South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (SPASAI), Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI), The Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), and The Arab Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ARABOSAI); various Supreme Audit Institution websites	374	1.44%	43	1.26%
Ministry of Lands/Property Registrar	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, Property Registrar, Deputy Property Registrar	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes," various editions; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Doing Business Online Database of Local Partners; UN-HABITAT annual conference registration	251	0.97%	43	1.26%

		records; various Ministry and Property Registrar websites				
Ministry of Public Service/Public Administration	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Membership lists from the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration (UNPAN); the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD); African Management Development Institutes' Network (AMDIN); the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Regional School of Public Administration (RESPA); Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative; UN Program for Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (INNOVMED); the Arab Administrative Development Organization (ARADO); Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD); The Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP); Red de Líderes de Gobierno Electrónico de América Latina y El Caribe (Red GEALC); various ministry websites	243	0.94%	41	1.20%
Independent Human Rights Commission/Office of the Ombudsman	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, Head of Department	Membership Directory of International Ombudsman Association; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions, including the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions, the Ibero American Federation of the Ombudsman (FIO); OmbudsNet (Sistema Integrado de Información y Comunicación para las oficinas de Ombudsman en América Latina y el Caribe), La Red de Instituciones Nacionales para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos del Continente Americano (Rindhca), and the European Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions; List of Participants in OSCE Human	344	1.33%	37	1.09%

		Dimension Implementation Meetings; various Human Rights Commission and Ombudsman websites				
Independent Electoral Institution	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Director of Elections, Deputy Director of Elections	Members of ACE Electoral Knowledge Network; various election commission websites	234	0.90%	26	0.76%
Poverty Reduction Units/Directorates	Head of Unit/Directorate; Senior Advisors	Participants in the OECD Aid Effectiveness Working Group, various years; List of Accra High-Level Conference Participants; Forum on National Plans as Poverty Reduction Strategies in East Asia; Members of African Community of Practice (AfCoP) and the Asian Pacific Community of Practice (CoP-MfDR Asia Pacific) on Managing for Development Results (MfDR); various ministry websites	186	0.72%	24	0.70%
Business Registration Office	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	State Department Investment Climate Statements; U.S. Country Commercial Guide; Doing Business Online Database of Local Partners; Participants in International Workshops on Public Private Dialogue; Business registry websites	126	0.49%	20	0.59%
Office of the Vice President/Deputy Prime Minister	Vice President, Secretary General, Minister without Portfolio, Charge de Mission, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; List of Delegations to the annual UN General Assembly; International Who's Who Publication, various editions; Office of the Vice Presidency National Websites	111	0.43%	12	0.35%

<b>Table D.2: Development Partner Inclusion Criteria</b>						
Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Recipient Sample	% of Development Partner Recipients	# of Participants	% of Development Partner Participants
Overall			8,371		1,473	
U.S. Embassy Staff	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Political/Econ Chief, Political Officer, Economic Officer	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes,"; Council of American Ambassadors Membership Records; US Embassy websites	1,532	18.30%	338	22.95%
UNDP/United Nations Missions	Country Director, Resident Representative, Deputy Resident Representative, Project Manager, Lead Economist, Adviser, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General; Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	1,488	17.78%	234	15.89%
World Bank	Country Director, Country Manager, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist, Desk Economist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; World Bank website	1,030	12.30%	188	12.76%
USAID	Mission Director, Deputy Mission Director, Office Director, Senior Advisor, Program Officer	U.S. State Department "Country Background Notes"; Federal Executive Yellow Book; USAID Mission websites	1,182	14.12%	172	11.68%
Other Foreign Embassies, International Organizations, and Development Finance Institutions with an In-country Presence	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	Various Development Partner websites	626	7.48%	119	8.08%
European Commission	Head of the EC Delegation, Project Director, Adviser	EC Website	341	4.07%	79	5.36%
UK Embassy/DFID	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Economist, Adviser	UK Online Directory of Overseas Missions; various DFID websites	384	4.59%	62	4.21%
German Embassy/GIZ/GTZ/KfW	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director,	GTZ, BMZ, and KfW websites	226	2.70%	43	2.92%

	Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist					
State Department Headquarters/National Security Council Staff	Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office Director, Desk Officer	Federal Executive Yellow Book; State Department website; various conference proceedings	219	2.62%	34	2.31%
MCC	Resident Country Director, Deputy Resident Country Director, Program Officer	Federal Executive Yellow Book; MCC website	128	1.53%	28	1.90%
WHO/PAHO	Country Representative, Adviser	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	263	3.14%	23	1.56%
Australian Embassy/AUSAID/DFAT	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	AUSAID, Embassy/DFAT websites	96	1.15%	21	1.43%
AsDB	Country Director, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; AsDB website	71	0.85%	21	1.43%
AfDB	Country Director, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist	AfDB website	60	0.72%	20	1.36%
IADB	Country Representative, Lead Economist, Sector Specialist, Desk Economist	IADB website	52	0.62%	20	1.36%
IMF	Resident Representative, Lead Economist, Special Advisor to the Government, Desk Economist	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database; IMF website	156	1.86%	19	1.29%
JICA/JBIC/Japanese Embassy	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Country Representative, Deputy Country Representative, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist	Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website and	192	2.29%	15	1.02%
French Embassy/AFD	Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission,	Various French Embassy and AFD websites	205	2.45%	13	0.88%

	Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Project/Program Director, Adviser, Country Economist					
UNESCO	Country Representative, Adviser	United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Country Team Database	97	1.16%	12	0.81%
EBRD	Country Director, Economist	EBRD website	23	0.27%	12	0.81%

<b>Table D.3: Civil Society and Non-Government Organization Inclusion Criteria</b>						
Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Recipient Sample	% of CSO/NGO Recipients	# of Participants	% of CSO/NGO Participants
Overall			3,362		738	
Social Sector NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Global Fund CCM Country websites; Membership records of national consortium/association of NGOs	1,185	35.25%	210	28.46%
Democracy and Human Rights NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IDEA) NGO Directory; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions; Membership records of national consortium/association of NGOs	788	23.44%	209	28.32%
Anti-Corruption and Transparency NGOs	Executive Director, Country Director, Program Manager, and Country Expert	Transparency International Annual Reports; national Transparency International chapter websites; Open Budget Partnership's Country Researchers; Publish What You Fund National Contacts; Open Society Institute (OSI) Directory of Experts; Soros Foundation Directory of Experts; Asia Foundation Directory of Experts	598	17.79%	161	21.82%
Environmental NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Environment Encyclopedia and Directory (multiple editions); Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN); GEF and World Bank conference proceedings	294	8.74%	62	8.40%
Independent Journalist Associations	Executive Director, Secretary General	Country-specific press unions (e.g. Union Des Journalistes Privés Nigériens, Gambia Press Union); CIA Factbook list of "political pressure groups and leaders"; State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices	277	8.24%	51	6.91%
National Coalition/Consortium/Association of NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	CIA Factbook list of "political pressure groups and leaders"; World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations; International Forum of National NGO Platforms; Local Newspapers; country-specific online sources	220	6.54%	45	6.10%



<b>Table D.4: Private Sector Inclusion Criteria</b>						
Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Recipient Sample	% of Private Sector Recipients	# of Participants	% of Private Sector Participants
Overall			2,610		319	
National Chambers of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	World Bank Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; Participants in International Workshops on Public Private Dialogue	542	20.77%	69	21.63%
Sectoral Business Associations/Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Sectoral Business (e.g. textiles, agriculture, manufacturing) Association Websites	369	14.14%	42	13.17%
Finance and Banking Associations/Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Finance and Banking Association Websites	390	14.94%	39	12.23%
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	U.S. Commercial Service “Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies”; Local U.S. Chamber of Commerce chapter websites	229	8.77%	39	12.23%
Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations	156	5.98%	22	6.90%
Labor Unions and Workers Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Labor Unions and Workers Associations	133	5.10%	22	6.90%
Western European Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	World Bank Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; various websites	182	6.97%	19	5.96%
International Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	International Chamber of Commerce websites	163	6.25%	19	5.96%
Women’s Business Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Women’s Business Associations	127	4.87%	17	5.33%
Export-Import Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Export-Import Association Websites	183	7.01%	15	4.70%
Other Domestic Private Sector Organizations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Various websites	105	4.02%	9	2.82%
Other International Private Sector Organizations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Various websites	31	1.19%	7	2.19%

<b>Table D.5: Independent Country Expert Inclusion Criteria</b>						
Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources	# in Recipient Sample	% of Independent Expert Recipients	# of Participants	% of Independent Expert Participants
Overall			3,177		807	
In-Country Think Tanks, Policy Institutes, and Universities	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Professor, Research Fellow, Analyst	Freedom House Directory of Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe; Think Tank Initiative Directory; NIRA's World Directory of Think Tanks (NWDTT), Harvard Library's Think Tank Search, Various University Websites	1,866	58.73%	447	55.39%
International Think Tanks, Policy Institutes, Risk Rating Agencies and Universities	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Professor, Research Fellow, Senior Analyst, Analyst	Country researchers and policy analysts from the Bertelsmann Foundation; Eurasia Group, Inter-American Dialogue, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Congressional Research Service, Economist Intelligence Unit, International Crisis Group, Global Insight, Freedom House, Global Integrity; Human Rights Watch, the Atlantic Council, Middle East Policy Council; Royal Institute of International Affairs; Chatham House; Various University Websites	1,311	41.27%	360	44.61%

## Appendix E: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey Questionnaire<sup>13</sup>

**Q1** Over your entire career, for approximately how many years have you worked with or for the Government <<of.countrylong>>?

- 0-4 years (1)
- 5-9 years (2)
- 10-14 years (3)
- 15-20 years (4)
- 20 or more years (5)

---

<sup>13</sup> The questionnaire text provided in Appendix D corresponds to that seen by the average Host Government survey respondent. Please contact the research team for information concerning the alternative questions wordings and/or additional questions provided to members of other surveyed stakeholder groups. Red text indicates a questionnaire item number (i.e., question, sub-question, response option, etc.), while green text refers to personal information pulled from the sampling frame and purple text refers to text provided by the respondent in response to another, earlier survey question. Page breaks have been preserved and reflect those shown to the respondent.

Q2 It is our understanding that, since 2004, you have held at least one position with <<Org.l.1>> <<in.countryshort>>. Are our records correct that you have held at least one position with <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**Q3** We believe the experiences you gained while working with <<Org.s.1>> give you an important perspective on policies and programs <<in.countryshort>>. Do you feel that you are able to accurately answer questions about your time with <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**Q4** Thinking of all of the professional assignments you have held <<in.countryshort>> since 2004, are you able to answer questions about your experience with a government institution or program other than <<Org.s.1>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**Q5** Please write the full name of this other institution or program in the space below.  
(Do not provide an acronym.)

---

—

Q6 While with <<Org.s.1>>, did you work with any development partners (i.e., international organizations, foreign embassies, and development finance agencies)?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**Q7** Please think of the one position you held with <<Org.s.1>> in which you had the most interaction with development partners working <<in.countryshort>>.

*(The questions in this survey will ask you about the experiences you gained while working in this position.)*

(1) What was the name of this position? (E.g., Director)

---

—

(2) In which of the following years did you hold this position?

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- 2004 (1)
- 2005 (2)
- 2006 (3)
- 2007 (4)
- 2008 (5)
- 2009 (6)
- 2010 (7)
- 2011 (8)
- 2012 (9)
- 2013 (10)



Q9 Thinking of your time spent working as <<pos.Q7.1>> with <<Org.s.1>>, which of the following best describes your primary area of focus?

*(Please select one issue area.)*

- Macroeconomic management (1)
- Finance, credit, and banking (2)
- Trade (3)
- Business regulatory environment (4)
- Investment (5)
- Health (6)
- Education (7)
- Family and gender (8)
- Social protection and welfare (9)
- Labor (10)
- Environmental protection (11)
- Agriculture and rural development (12)
- Energy and mining (13)
- Land (14)
- Infrastructure (15)
- Decentralization (16)
- Anti-corruption and transparency (17)
- Democracy (18)
- Public administration (19)
- Justice and security (20)
- Tax (21)
- Customs (22)
- Public expenditure management (23)
- Foreign policy (24)
- I did not have a particular area of focus. (25)

Q10 Thinking of an average day working as <<pos.Q7.1>>, did you usually participate in each of the following activities?

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- Research and analysis (1)
- Agenda setting (2)
- Advocacy (3)
- Consultation (4)
- Coordination (5)
- Resource mobilization (6)
- Policy formulation (7)
- Policy implementation (8)
- Policy monitoring and evaluation (9)
- Program design (10)
- Program implementation (11)
- Program monitoring and evaluation (12)

Q11 On an average day working as <<pos.Q7.1>>, approximately what percentage of your time would you say was spent on each of the following:

Political matters (1)  
\_\_\_\_\_

Technical issues (2)  
\_\_\_\_\_

Administrative tasks (3)  
\_\_\_\_\_

-----  
Total (*Values must sum to 100.*)  
\_\_\_\_\_

The remaining questions in this survey refer to the period of time you spent as <<pos.Q7.1>> with <<Org.s.1>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

Q12 Thinking of your time as <<pos.Q7.1>>, please select all of the development partners (i.e., international organizations, foreign embassies, and development finance agencies) that you worked directly with on <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>.

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- <<Organization 1>> (1)
- <<Organization 2>> (2)
- ...
- <<Organization N>> (n)
- Other (*Please indicate*): (n+1 to n+3)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+1)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+2)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+3)
- I did not work with any development partners. (n+4)

**Q13** During your time as <<pos.Q7.1>>, approximately how often did you communicate with each of the following development partners about <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>? We are interested in any of the following forms of communication: phone, video, email, or face-to-face.

*(Please refer to the year(s) in which you communicated most often with each development partner.)*

	<u>Once a year or less (1)</u>	<u>2 or 3 times a year (2)</u>	<u>About once a month (3)</u>	<u>2 or 3 times a month (4)</u>	<u>About once a week (5)</u>	<u>Almost daily (6)</u>
<<Organization 1>> (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<<Organization 2>> (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
...	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<<Organization N>> (n+3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Q14** Please take a moment to think about any advice that you may have received from each of the following development partners on issues related to <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>>. Approximately how often did this advice contain useful information about ways to address <<issue domain 16>> <<in.countryshort>>?

	<u>Almost never</u> (1)	<u>Less than half the time</u> (2)	<u>About half the time</u> (3)	<u>More than half the time</u> (4)	<u>Almost always</u> (5)
<<Organization 1>> (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<<Organization 2>> (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
...	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<<Organization N>> (n+3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Q15** To what extent did development partners coordinate their positions on specific policy issues with those of other development partners?

*(Please select the statement that best reflects your views.)*

- Development partners **never** made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners. **(1)**
- Development partners **occasionally** made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners, but were **rarely** able to do so because of conflicting interests. **(2)**
- Development partners **often** made efforts to coordinate their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners, but were **only sometimes** able to do so because of conflicting interests. **(3)**
- Development partners **consistently** coordinated their positions on policy issues with those of other development partners. **(4)**



Before you move on to the next section of the survey, we would like to ask you a couple a brief questions about the specific activities of <<Org.s.1>> <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.b>> and <<endyear.Q7.b>> / in <<startyear.Q7.b>>.

**Q16** You have indicated that you were in regular communication with <<Organization A>>. Between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / In <<startyear.Q7.2>>, how often did <<Organization A>> do the following:

	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Frequently (3)	Almost always (4)	Don't know / Not sure (5)
Provide the Government <<of.countryshort>> with information about the successful <<issue domain 4>> adopted by other countries (1a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Provide the Government <<of.countryshort>> with data or empirical evidence for use in decision-making (1b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Provide Government <<of.countryshort>> staff and officials with professional training opportunities (2a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Invest in the creation of new positions for additional government staff (2b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Modernize the government's technical equipment and information systems (2c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Contract with local experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Contract with international experts to provide short-term technical assistance to the government (3b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hire local experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hire international experts to provide long-term technical assistance to the government (3d)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Provide general budget support to the Government <<of.countryshort>> (4a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Deliver program funds through the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s public procurement or financial management systems (4b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Never (1)	Rarely (2)	Frequently (3)	Almost always (4)	Don't know / Not sure (5)
Ensure that the <<issue domain 4>> supported by <<Organization A>> aligned with the government's national development strategy (5a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Pay the government upon the achievement of pre-agreed outputs or outcomes (5b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Request that the government set up a separate unit in charge of program implementation (5c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ask the government to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ask local communities to identify problems that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Seek government input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Seek local community input during the design of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6d)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Involve the government in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6e)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Involve local communities in the implementation of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6f)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Q17** How useful do you think each of the following practices were to the development efforts of <<Organization A>> <<in.countryshort>>?

*(Please use the slider to answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all useful and 5 means extremely useful. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ Providing the Government <<of.countryshort>> with information about the successful <<issue domain 4>> adopted by other countries (1a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Providing the Government <<of.countryshort>> with data or empirical evidence for use in decision-making (1b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Providing Government <<of.countryshort>> staff and officials with professional training opportunities (2a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Investing in the creation of new positions for additional government staff (2b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Modernizing the government's technical equipment and information systems (2c)

\_\_\_\_\_ Contracting with **local** experts to provide **short-term** technical assistance to the government (3a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Contracting with **international** experts to provide **short-term** technical assistance to the government (3b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Hiring **local** experts to provide **long-term** technical assistance to the government (3c)

\_\_\_\_\_ Hiring **international** experts to provide **long-term** technical assistance to the government (3d)

\_\_\_\_\_ Providing general budget support to the Government <<of.countryshort>> (4a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Delivering program funds through the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s public procurement or financial management systems (4b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Ensuring that the <<issue domain 4>> supported by <<Organization A>> were aligned with the government's national development strategy (5a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Paying the government upon the achievement of pre-agreed outputs or outcomes (5b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Requesting that the government set up a separate unit in charge of program implementation (5c)

\_\_\_\_\_ Asking the **government** to **identify problems** that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6a)

\_\_\_\_\_ Asking **local communities** to **identify problems** that <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> should try to solve (6b)

\_\_\_\_\_ Seeking **government** input during the **design** of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6c)

\_\_\_\_\_ Seeking **local community** input during the **design** of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6d)

\_\_\_\_\_ Involving the **government** in the **implementation** of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6e)

\_\_\_\_\_ Involving **local communities** in the **implementation** of <<issue domain 4>> <<in.countryshort>> (6f)

Now we would like you to think about the major <<issue domain 20>> that the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempted between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

**Q18** To the best of your knowledge, how much <<issue domain 17>> did the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempt between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>?

- No reform at all (1)
- Minor reform (2)
- Substantial reform (3)
- Comprehensive reform (4)

**Q19** Given the political, economic, and social realities <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>, do you think the Government <<of.countryshort>> attempted too much <<issue domain 17>>, too little reform, or about the right amount?

- Too much reform (1)
- Too little reform (2)
- About the right amount (3)
- Don't know / Not sure (4)

**Q20** What specific <<issue domain 16>> did the reforms pursued by the Government <<of.countryshort>> try to solve?

*(Please list up to three problems.)*

Problem 1:

---

Problem 2:

---

Problem 3:

---

**Q21** To the best of your knowledge, how much influence did each of the following development partners have on the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s decision to pursue reforms focused on these particular <<issue domain 16>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+3)



**Q22** How much influence did each of the following development partners have on the design of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+3)

**Q23** How much progress did the reforms pursued between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>> make towards solving each of the following problems <<in.countryshort>>?

(1) <<Q20.Sub 1>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

(2) <<Q20.Sub 2>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

(3) <<Q20.Sub 3>>

- No progress at all (1)
- Only a little progress (2)
- A moderate amount of progress (3)
- A great deal of progress (4)

**Q24** To the best of your knowledge, which of the following development partners were involved in the implementation of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- <<Organization 1>> (1)
- <<Organization 2>> (2)
- ...
- <<Organization N>> (n+3)
- Other *(Please indicate):* (n+4 to n+6)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+4)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+5)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ (n+6)
- No development partners were involved in reform implementation efforts. (n+7)
- Don't know / Not sure (n+8)

**Q25** When involved, how helpful do you think each of the following development partners was to the implementation of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all helpful and 5 means extremely helpful. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Organization N>> (n+6)

Q26 In your opinion, did the reforms pursued between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>> focus on the most critical <<issue domain 16>> <<in.countryshort>>?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

**Q27** What critical <<issue domain 16>> did the government's reform efforts overlook?  
*(Please list up to three problems.)*

Problem 1:

---

Problem 2:

---

Problem 3:

---

**Q28** Why do you think the <<issue domain 20>> pursued by the Government <<of.countryshort>> were not focused on these problems?  
*(Please select any and all statements that apply.)*

- Development partners did not express support for the requisite reforms. (1)
- Development partners expressed support for the requisite reforms, but did not provide the assistance needed for implementation. (2)
- The government lacked the necessary technical expertise. (3)
- The government did not have enough time to design and implement the requisite reforms. (4)
- The national leadership <<of.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (5)
- Legislators <<in.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (6)
- Government staff responsible for execution of policies and programs did not support the requisite reforms. (7)
- Domestic stakeholders outside of the Government <<of.countryshort>> did not support the requisite reforms. (8)
- International best practices did not provide sufficient guidance for addressing these problems. (9)
- Issues of corruption or undue personal influence <<in.countryshort>> prevented these problems from being addressed. (10)
- Influential domestic political actors <<in.countryshort>> did not fully understand the critical nature of these problems. (11)
- Other problems were viewed by the Government <<of.countryshort>> as more important. (12)

Now we would like to ask you a few questions about external assessments of government performance and their influence on <<issue domain 18>> <<in.countryshort>>.

**Q29** Are you familiar with any of the following assessments of government performance?

*(Please select all that apply. Note that the list provided below may include performance-based aid, trade, or debt relief programs. All of these programs involve either explicit or implicit assessments of government performance.)*

- <<Assessment 1>> (1)
- <<Assessment 2>> (2)
- <<Assessment 3>> (3)
- <<Assessment 4>> (4)
- <<Assessment 5>> (5)
- <<Assessment 6>> (6)
  
- <<Assessment 7>> (7)
- <<Assessment 8>> (8)
- <<Assessment 9>> (9)
- <<Assessment 10>> (10)
- <<Assessment 11>> (11)
- <<Assessment 12>> (12)
  
- ...
  
- <<Assessment 31>> (31)
- <<Assessment 32>> (32)
- <<Assessment 33>> (33)
- <<Assessment 34>> (34)
- <<Assessment 35>> (35)
- <<Assessment 36>> (36)

**Q30** From your experience with <<Org.s.1>>, can you think of any other external assessments of government performance that may have informed the <<issue domain 18>> of the Government <<of.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>?

Yes *(Please list up to three assessments):* (1)

Assessment 1:

---

Assessment 2:

---

Assessment 3:

---

No (2)



Q31 Earlier you indicated that the Government <<of.countryshort>> undertook reforms to address these specific <<issue domain 16>>:

(1) <<Q20.Sub 1>>

(2) <<Q20.Sub 2>>

(3) <<Q20.Sub 3>>

How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s decision to pursue <<issue domain 20>> focused on solving these particular problems?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment N>> (n+3)

**Q32** How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the design of the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means no influence at all and 5 means a maximum influence. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 1>> (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment 2>> (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ ...

\_\_\_\_\_ <<Assessment N>> ( $n+3$ )

**Q33** You identified <<Assessment A>> as an assessment that influenced the Government <<of.countryshort>>'s <<issue domain 18>>. In your opinion, why was <<Assessment A>> influential?  
(Please select any and all statements that apply.)

- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to key development partners. (1)
- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to foreign investors. (2)
- It strengthened the government's legitimacy among key domestic political constituencies. (3)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of national leadership. (4)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of key legislators. (5)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential civil society organizations. (6)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential private sector groups. (7)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of technical advisors working for the government. (8)
- It helped the government clearly identify practical approaches for addressing critical <<issue domain 16>>. (9)
- It provided the government with a direct financial incentive to undertake specific <<issue domain 20>>. (10)
- It helped the authorities fully acknowledge the critical nature of <<issue domain 16>> that were not otherwise entirely understood or appreciated. (11)
- It provided the government with the flexibility needed to successfully adapt to changing circumstances during the design and implementation of <<issue domain 18>>. (12)
- It provided the government with access to the technical assistance of development partner staff. (13)
- It was seen as respecting the sovereign authority <<of.countryshort>> over final policy decisions. (14)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that complemented other existing reform efforts <<in.countryshort>>. (15)

Q34 Now, please select the one statement that you think best explains the influence of <<Assessment A>> on the government's <<issue domain 18>>.

*(Please select one statement.)*

- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to key development partners. (1)
- It created a way for the government to highlight its policy credentials to foreign investors. (2)
- It strengthened the government's legitimacy among key domestic political constituencies. (3)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of national leadership. (4)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of key legislators. (5)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential civil society organizations. (6)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of influential private sector groups. (7)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that aligned with the priorities of technical advisors working for the government. (8)
- It helped the government clearly identify practical approaches for addressing critical <<issue domain 16>>. (9)
- It provided the government with a direct financial incentive to undertake specific <<issue domain 20>>. (10)
- It helped the authorities fully acknowledge the critical nature of <<issue domain 16>> that were not otherwise entirely understood or appreciated. (11)
- It provided the government with the flexibility needed to successfully adapt to changing circumstances during the design and implementation of <<issue domain 18>>. (12)
- It provided the government with access to the technical assistance of development partner staff. (13)
- It was seen as respecting the sovereign authority <<of.countryshort>> over final policy decisions. (14)
- It promoted <<issue domain 20>> that complemented other existing reform efforts <<in.countryshort>>. (15)

**Q35** We would also like you to take a moment to reflect on the overall effects of <<Assessment A>> on the <<issue domain 15>> <<in.countryshort>>. To what extent do you feel that <<Assessment A>> had each of the following effects?

*(Please answer on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 means not at all and 5 means very strongly. You can use any number between 0 and 5.)*

- \_\_\_\_\_ It focused the government's attention on critical <<issue domain 16>>. (1)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It drew the government's attention away from important <<issue domain 16>>. (2)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It enabled civil society organizations and journalists to more effectively advocate for <<issue domain 20>>. (3)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It helped development partners coordinate their <<issue domain 10>> with that of the government. (4)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It helped the government measure its own <<issue domain 14>>. (5)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It limited the policy autonomy of the government in a negative manner. (6)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It strengthened the government's resolve to successfully implement its <<issue domain 18>>. (7)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It increased the likelihood that the government would build upon previously adopted <<issue domain 8>>. (8)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It helped reformers within the government weaken opposition to <<issue domain 17>>. (9)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It helped reformers within the government build domestic coalitions of support for <<issue domain 17>>. (10)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It helped the government to better monitor the implementation of development partner projects. (11)
- \_\_\_\_\_ It empowered the government to more effectively design and implement its own <<issue domain 20>>. (12)

Before we conclude, we would like to ask you a couple of questions about the domestic policy environment <<of.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

**Q36** Please indicate how often each of the following statements applied to the <<issue domain 15>> <<in.countryshort>> between <<startyear.Q7.2>> and <<endyear.Q7.2>> / in <<startyear.Q7.2>>.

	<u>Almost never</u> (1)	<u>Less than half the time</u> (2)	<u>About half the time</u> (3)	<u>More than half the time</u> (4)	<u>Almost always</u> (5)	<u>Don't know / Not sure</u> (6)
The government clearly defined its <<issue domain 13>> (1a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A majority of domestic political actors agreed with the government's <<issue domain 9>> (1b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government's <<issue domain 9>> were supported by sound empirical evidence (1c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
National leadership prevented differences of opinion on <<issue domain 12>> from becoming irreconcilable conflicts (1d)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government sought the input of <b>civil society organizations</b> (2a)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government sought the input of <b>private sector groups</b> (2b)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government sought the input of <b>development partners</b> (2c)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government sought the input of <b>local communities</b> (2d)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>





**Q37** To the best of your memory, which of the following groups expended substantial time, effort, or resources to promote <<issue domain 17>> <<in.countryshort>>?

*(Please select all that apply.)*

- Office of the President, King, etc. (1)
- Office of the Prime Minister (2)
- The legislature (3)
- The judiciary (i.e., the courts) (4)
- Specific government ministries, offices, or agencies *(Please indicate which ones):* (5)

—

- Think tanks, policy institutes, or research institutions *(Please indicate which ones):* (6)

—

- Non-governmental or civil society organizations *(Please indicate which ones):* (7)

—

- Specific businesses *(Please indicate which ones):* (8)

—

- Private sector councils, chambers, or associations *(Please indicate which ones):* (9)

—

- Labor unions or workers associations *(Please indicate which ones):* (10)

—

- The military (11)
- Specific political parties *(Please indicate which ones):* (12)

—

- Other *(Please indicate):* (13)

—

- None of these (14)
- Don't know / Not sure (15)

Q38 Which of the following groups expended substantial time, effort, or resources to obstruct <<issue domain 17>> <<in.countryshort>>?

(Please select all that apply.)

- Office of the President, King, etc. (1)
- Office of the Prime Minister (2)
- The legislature (3)
- The judiciary (i.e., the courts) (4)
- Specific government ministries, offices, or agencies (Please indicate which ones): (5)

---

- 
- Think tanks, policy institutes, or research institutions (Please indicate which ones): (6)

---

- 
- Non-governmental or civil society organizations (Please indicate which ones): (7)

---

- 
- Specific businesses (Please indicate which ones): (8)

---

- 
- Private sector councils, chambers, or associations (Please indicate which ones): (9)

---

- 
- Labor unions or workers associations (Please indicate which ones): (10)

---

- 
- The military (11)
- Specific political parties (Please indicate which ones): (12)

---

- 
- Other (Please indicate): (13)

---

- 
- None of these (14)
- Don't know / Not sure (15)

To close, we would like to learn a little bit more about your education and professional background.

Q42 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Primary (1)
- Secondary (2)
- Technical/Vocational (3)
- College/University (4)
- Postgraduate (5)
- Doctorate (6)

Q43 Please provide the following information about your most advanced degree:

(1) Name of degree (e.g., Bachelor of Arts in Economics):

---

—

(2) Year degree earned: <<Drop down list 1940 - 2014>>

(3) Name of university (e.g., University of London):

---

—

(4) Country of university: <<Global list of countries, sorted by continent, with headers by continent>>

**Q45** Do you currently work for any of the following organizations or groups, either <<in.countryshort>> or in another country?

*(Please check all boxes that apply, if any.)*

	<<in.countryshort>> (1)	In another country (2)
Government institution or program (1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Development partner (2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Civil society organization (3)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Non-governmental organization (4)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Private sector council, chamber, or association (5)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor union or workers association (6)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The media (7)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
University or think tank (8)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**Q46** About how long have you held your current position?

*(If you hold more than one position, please refer to your primary position in your response.)*

- 0-6 months (1)
- 7-12 months (2)
- 1-2 years (3)
- 3-4 years (4)
- 5 or more years (5)

**Q47** Have you ever worked as a full-time employee, part-time employee, or consultant or in any other capacity for any of the following international organizations or development partners?

*(Please check all boxes that apply, if any.)*

	Full-time (1)	Part-time (2)	Consultant (3)	Other (4)
<<Organization 1>> (1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<<Organization 2>> (2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<<Organization N>> (n)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Please indicate): (n+1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Please indicate): (n+2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Please indicate): (n+3)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this survey. We value your insights and opinions. Later this year we will send you a summary of our findings. We will also post the survey results at <http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/index.php>.

**Q48** In the future, would you be willing to consider participating in a follow-up survey or interview? We are interested in receiving your updated views about the role that development partners and external assessments play in the policy-making process of countries <<like.countryshort>>.

Yes, you can contact me at the following e-mail address: (1)

\_\_\_\_\_

No (2)



## Appendix F: External Assessment of Government Performance Inclusion Criteria

We used eight inclusion criteria to determine the initial list of external assessments of government performance that would be routed to participants, depending on their country, area of specialization (i.e. policy domain), and years of service in a given position:

- measured government performance in low income and lower middle income countries, as defined by the World Bank
- national in scope rather than specific to a project or program
- produced by some other entity than the government(s) being assessed<sup>14</sup>
- measured performance in one or more of our 23 specific policy domains
- in operation at some point during our 2004-2013 period of study
- undertaken in more than one country without necessarily involving cross-country benchmarking
- publicly available
- provided some measure of diagnostic and/or advisory content

This set of inclusion criteria yielded an initial list of 182 external assessments of government performance. However, after conducting survey pre-tests and cognitive interviews at the OpenGov Hub in Washington D.C., Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, AidData, and the College of William and Mary's Institute of the Theory and Practice of International Relations, we found that long lists of assessments overwhelmed participants, causing excessive levels of respondent burden without producing more detailed or accurate data. To reduce this burden, we established a maximum number of assessments (40) to be routed to any single respondent according to his or her country, policy domain, and years of service. We then pared down this initial list of assessments from 182 to 103—using the maximization of coverage across country-policy-domain-year triads as our guiding criterion—in order to stay within this maximum value of 40 assessments.

To mitigate any effects of bias introduced by this assessment selection method, we also allowed all participants to identify up to three “write-in” assessments not included in our final list, which each respondent was encouraged to identify and analyze on his or her own. The write-in assessments were then mapped back to our initial list of 182 assessments. This report includes findings on the following three write-in assessments, which met either our global sample size requirement of at 10 least participants or our sample size requirement for aggregation below the global level (e.g., region, policy domain, problem type, etc.) of at least five participants: The IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), The IMF's Article IV Consultations, and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. An alphabetized list of the remaining 103 assessments included in the survey questionnaire is supplied below:

1. The AsDB's Country Diagnostic Study
2. The AsDB's Country Economic Reviews
3. The AsDB's Country Environmental Analysis
4. The AsDB's Country Gender Assessments
5. The AsDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System
6. The AsDB's Country Poverty Analysis
7. The AsDB's Policy-Based Loans and Program Loans
8. The AsDB's Results-Based Lending

---

<sup>14</sup> While an eligible assessment had to be externally supplied, the government(s) being assessment could still have played some role in its production. For example, the assessment could have incorporated performance data supplied by the assessed government(s).

9. The AsDB's Transport Sector Assessment
10. The AfDB's Country Governance Profiles
11. The AfDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System
12. The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support
13. The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
14. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Eligibility Criteria
15. The African Peer Review Mechanism
16. The Assessment of Country Compliance with EITI Requirements
17. The CDB's Poverty Reduction Effectiveness Situation (PRES) Assessment and Performance-Based Allocation System
18. DFID's Resource Allocation Model
19. The EBRD's Country Law Assessment
20. The EBRD's Energy Sector Assessment
21. The EBRD's Public Procurement Sector Assessment
22. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units' Membership Requirements
23. The EU's "MDG Contracts" Program
24. The EU's Association Agenda
25. The EU's Association Agreements
26. The EU's Economic Partnership Agreements for ACP Countries
27. The EU's Governance Initiative and Governance Incentive Tranche
28. The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
29. The EU's Poverty Reduction Budget Support Program
30. The EU's Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance
31. The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements
32. The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports
33. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Blacklist
34. The GAVI Alliance's Health Systems Strengthening Window
35. The GAVI Alliance's Immunization Data Quality Assessment
36. The GAVI Alliance's Immunization Services Support (ISS) Window
37. The Global Environment Facility's Performance Index and Resource Allocation Framework
38. The Global Integrity Report
39. The Governance Facility of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
40. The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point"
41. The IADB's Citizen Security Sector Note
42. The IADB's Country Environmental Analysis
43. The IADB's Country Institutional and Policy Evaluation (CIPE) and Performance-Based Allocation System
44. The IADB's Debt Relief Initiative
45. The IADB's Education Sector Note
46. The IADB's Growth Diagnostics
47. The IADB's Performance-Driven Loans
48. The IADB's Policy-Based Loans
49. The IADB's Social Protection Sector Note
50. The IADB's Trade Sector Policy Note
51. The IADB's Transport Sector Note

52. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance
53. The IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and Performance-Based Allocation System
54. The ILO's Global Monitoring and Analysis of Conditions of Work and Employment
55. The IMF's Extended Credit Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
56. The IMF's Policy Support Instrument
57. The IMF's Rapid Credit Facility
58. The IMF's Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
59. The IMF's Standby Credit Facility
60. The International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index
61. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme
62. The Mechanism for the Review and Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption
63. The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards
64. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
65. NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report
66. The OECD's International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures
67. The OECD's Program for International Student Assessment
68. The Paris Declaration Indicators
69. Performance-Based Funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
70. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment (PEFA)
71. The U.S. State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices"
72. The U.S. State Department's "Trafficking in Persons" Report
73. The U.S. Trade Representative's "Special 301" Report
74. The UN's Millennium Development Goals
75. The UNESCO Education for All Development Index
76. The "Variable Tranche" of the EU's Budget Support Program
77. The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report
78. The World Bank and IFC's Enterprise Surveys
79. The World Bank's Bulletin Board on Statistical Capacity
80. The World Bank's Country Economic Memorandum
81. The World Bank's Country Environmental Analysis
82. The World Bank's Country Financial Accountability Assessment
83. The World Bank's Country Gender Assessment
84. The World Bank's Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies
85. The World Bank's Decentralization Indicators
86. The World Bank's Development Policy Loans Program
87. The World Bank's Development Policy Review
88. The World Bank's Education Management Information System Assessment Tool
89. The World Bank's Education Sector Review
90. The World Bank's Growth Diagnostic Studies
91. The World Bank's Health Sector Review
92. The World Bank's Logistics Performance Index
93. The World Bank's Poverty Assessment
94. The World Bank's Rural Access Index
95. The World Bank's Trade Competitiveness Diagnostic Toolkit
96. The World Bank's Women, Business, and the Law Assessment

- 97. The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
- 98. The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and Performance-Based Allocation System
- 99. The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report"
- 100. The WTO's Accession Working Party Reports and Accession Protocols
- 101. The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism
- 102. UNDP's Human Development Index
- 103. UNECA's African Gender and Development Index

## Appendix G: Codebook for the “Attributes of External Assessments of Government Performance” Dataset

The purpose of this codebook is to identify the variable definitions and decision rules that were used to collect data on the observable attributes of the 106 external assessments of government performance included in this study.

### AgendaSettingInfluence\_Q31

#### Weighted Average Influence at the Agenda-Setting Stage of the Policymaking Process

This variable measures the weighted average influence of each individual external assessment of government performance at the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process. The data are drawn from responses to Question 31 in the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*, which asks participants:

*“How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the Government of [Country X’s] decision to pursue [issue domain] reforms on solving these particular problems?”*

Participants were routed a list of assessments with which they stated they were familiar and then asked to rank the influence of those assessments—on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 indicating no influence at all and 5 indicating maximum influence—during the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process.

Using these data, we calculate the weighted average influence of each of the assessments based on the score the participants assigned to the assessments they chose. Each response is weighted by the country and policy area of the respondent to reduce bias.

### ReformDesignInfluence\_Q32

#### Weighted Average Influence at the Reform Design Stage of the Policymaking Process

This variable measure the weighted average influence of each individual external assessment of government performance at the reform design stage of the policymaking process. The data are drawn from responses to Question 32 in the *2014 Reform Efforts Survey*, which asks participants,

*“How much influence did each of the following assessments have on the design of the Government of [Country X’s] [issue domain] reforms?”*

Participants were routed a list of assessments with which they stated they were familiar and then asked to rank the influence of those assessments—on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 indicating no influence at all and 5 indicating maximum influence—during the reform design stage of the policymaking process.

Using these data, we can calculate the weighted average influence of each of the assessments based on the value the participants assigned to the assessments they chose. Each response is weighted by the country and policy area of the respondent to reduce bias.

### NatureofSupplier

#### Nature of the External Assessment Supplier

- [1] The supplier of the assessment is a host government attempting to assess its own performance.
- [2] The supplier of the assessment is a non-governmental sponsor (e.g., think tank, private foundation) headquartered in the country of study attempting to assess its own country's performance.
- [3] The supplier of the assessment is a private sector organization (e.g., business association, chamber, credit rating agency, etc.) headquartered in the country of study attempting to assess its own country's performance.
- [4] The supplier of the assessment is a *global* inter-governmental organization, development bank, partnership, or union.
- [5] The supplier of the assessment is a *regional* inter-governmental organization, development bank, partnership, or union.
- [6] The supplier of the assessment is a non-governmental sponsor (e.g., think tank, private foundation) headquartered outside the country of study.
- [7] The supplier of the assessment is a private sector organization (e.g., business association, chamber, credit rating agency, etc.) headquartered outside the country of study.

## NatureofSupplier\_V1

### Inter-governmental Organization Supplier of an External Assessment

Using the *NatureofSupplier* variable, this dummy variable measures whether or not the assessment is supplied by an inter-governmental organization.

- [1] The supplier of the assessment is a global or regional inter-governmental organization.
- [0] The supplier of the assessment is not an inter-governmental organization.

## CrossCountryNature

### The Cross-Country or Country-Specific Nature of an External Assessment

- [1] The assessment is country-specific. This means that the assessment is only carried out in one country.
- [2] The assessment is undertaken in multiple countries but does *not* involve cross-country benchmarking. This means that there is no explicit, numerical comparison or ranking across countries.
- [3] The assessment is part of a cross-country benchmarking exercise. This means that there is an explicit, numerical, comparison or ranking across countries

## CrossCountryNature\_V1

### Cross-Country Benchmarking

Using the original *CrossCountryNature* variable, this variable measures whether the assessment engages in cross-country benchmarking or not.

- [1] The assessment is part of a cross-country benchmarking exercise.
- [0] The assessment is not part of a cross-country benchmarking exercise.

## PrescriptiveDescriptive

### Nature of External Assessment Contents

This variable measures whether a given assessment provides specific guidance about how the government can improve its performance on the assessment.

- [1] The assessment is prescriptive in nature. It provides specific guidance to the government about how the government can improve its performance on the assessment.
- [2] The assessment is descriptive in nature. It does not provide the government with specific guidance about how the government can improve its performance on the assessment.

## PartyResponsible\_1

### Party Responsible: Supplier of External Assessment

This dummy variable measures whether the supplier of the assessment is involved in the collection and/or measurement of the data used to create the external assessment.

- [1] The party that provides/publishes the assessment is also responsible for measuring performance or compliance.
- [0] The party that provides/publishes the assessment is not responsible for measuring performance or compliance.

*Note: An external assessment can take the value of "1" for multiple PartyResponsible\_# variables.*

## PartyResponsible\_2

### Party Responsible: Target of the External Assessment

This dummy variable measures whether the target country of the assessment is involved in the collection and/or measurement of the data used to produce the assessment.

- [1] The party whose performance/compliance is being measured through the assessment (i.e. the target government) is also responsible for measuring the performance/compliance.
- [0] The party whose performance/compliance is being measured through the assessment (i.e. the target government) is not responsible for measuring the performance/compliance.

*Note: An external assessment can take the value of "1" for multiple PartyResponsible\_# variables.*

## PartyResponsible\_3

### Party Responsible: Third Party Involvement in the External Assessment

This dummy variable measures whether a third party (not the assessment supplier or the target country) is involved in the collection and/or measurement of the data used to produce the external assessment.

- [1] A party other than the supplier or the target of the assessment is responsible for measuring performance/compliance.

- [0] A party other than the supplier or the target of the assessment is not responsible for measuring performance/ compliance.

*Note: An external assessment can take the value of “1” for multiple PartyResponsible\_# variables.*

## **PartyResponsible\_V1**

### Collection and Measurement Exclusively Out-sourced to a Third Party

This dummy variable measures whether the collection and/or measurement of the data used to create the assessment was exclusively out-sourced to a third party.

- [1] The only party responsible for measurement is a third party.
- [0] A third party is not the only party responsible for measurement.

## **PartyResponsible\_V2**

### Involvement of the Assessment Supplier and Assessment Target in Measurement/Data Collection

This dummy variable measures whether *both* the supplier of the assessment and the target of the assessment are involved in measurement and/or collection of the data used for creating the assessment.

- [1] *Both* the supplier of the assessment and the target of the assessment are involved in performance measurement or data collection.
- [0] The supplier and the target of the assessment are not both involved in performance measurement or data collection.

*Note: A value of “1” can be applied in cases where the supplier of the assessment, the target of the assessment, and a third party were all involved in performance measurement and/or data collection.*

## **PositiveIncentive\_1**

### Positive Incentive: The Availability of a Direct Financial or Material Benefit

- [1] The assessment links the provision of a significant financial or material benefit to the target country’s performance on the assessment. This benefit is explicitly stated in official documentation or another authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.), and is linked to the target country’s performance on the assessment. The benefit can refer to an (a) actual payment, loan, assistance, trade, investment, etc., (b) the increased likelihood of a payment, loan, assistance, trade, investment, etc., and/or (c) eligibility for payment, loan, assistance, trade, investment, etc.
- [0] The assessment does not link the provision of a significant financial or material benefit to the target country’s performance on the assessment.

*Note: An external assessment can take the value of “1” for all multiple PositiveIncentive\_# variables.*



## PositiveIncentive\_2a

### Positive Incentive: Direct Reputational Benefit

- [1] The assessment links the provision of a direct reputational benefit to the target country's performance on the assessment; this benefit is explicitly stated as an official goal of the assessment in official assessment documentation or another authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.).
- [0] The assessment does not link the provision of a direct reputational benefit to the target country's performance on the assessment.

*Note: An assessment can take the value of "1" for all multiple PositiveIncentive\_# variables.*

## PositiveIncentive\_2b

### Positive Incentive: Indirect Reputational Benefit

- [1] The assessment links the provision of a significant reputational benefit to the target country's performance on the assessment; however, this benefit is not explicitly stated as an official goal of the assessment in official assessment documentation or any other authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.).
- [0] There is no known indirect reputational benefit.

*Note: An assessment can take the value of "1" for all multiple PositiveIncentive\_# variables.*

## PositiveIncentive\_3

### Positive Incentive: No Benefit

- [1] The assessment is not directly or indirectly linked to the provision of a significant financial/material or reputational benefit.
- [0] The assessment is directly or indirectly linked to the provision of a significant financial/material or reputational benefit.

*Note: If an assessment is directly or indirectly linked to the provision of a significant financial/material or reputational benefit it assumes a value of "1" for any of the variables PositiveIncentive\_1, PositiveIncentive\_2a, or PositiveIncentive\_2b.*

## PositiveIncentive\_V1

### Positive Incentive Potency (Financial Benefit > Reputational Benefit)

This variable seeks to provide an ordinal measure of the strength of the benefits linked to a given assessment. It assumes that assessments with certain types of benefits are more attractive to target countries. For *PositiveIncentive\_V1*, the underlying assumption is made that (a) assessments that are linked to more benefits will be more attractive, (b) financial/material benefits are more attractive than reputational benefits, and (c) direct benefits are more attractive than indirect benefits.

- [5] The assessment is linked to a direct financial/material benefit and a direct reputational benefit.
- [4] The assessment is linked to a direct financial/material benefit and an indirect reputational benefit.

- [3] The assessment is linked to a direct financial/material benefit.
- [2] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational benefit.
- [1] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational benefit.
- [0] The assessment is not linked to any known financial/material or reputational benefit.

Based upon these assumptions, assessments that assume a value of “5” represent those assessments that (in principle) provide the most attractive set of benefits. Assessments that assume a value of “0” represent those assessments that provide no known material/financial or reputational benefits.

## PositiveIncentive\_V2

### Positive Incentive Potency (Reputational Benefit > Financial Benefit)

This variable seeks to provide an ordinal measure of the strength of the benefits linked to a given assessment. It assumes that assessments with certain types of benefits are more attractive to target countries. For *PositiveIncentive\_V2*, the underlying assumption is made that (a) assessments that are linked to more benefits will be more attractive, (b) reputational benefits are more attractive than financial/material benefits, and (c) direct benefits are more attractive than indirect benefits.

- [5] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational benefit and a direct financial /material benefit.
- [4] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational benefit and a direct financial /material benefit.
- [3] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational benefit.
- [2] The assessment is linked to a direct financial /material benefit.
- [1] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational benefit.
- [0] The assessment is not linked to any known financial/material or reputational benefit.

*Note: Based upon these assumptions, assessments that assume a value of “5” represent those assessments that (in principle) provide the most attractive set of benefits. Assessments that assume a value of “0” represent those assessments that provide no known material/financial or reputational benefits.*

## NegativeIncentive\_1

### Negative Incentive: Direct Financial or Material Penalty

- [1] If the target of an assessment fails to meet specific policy conditions or performance standards, a guaranteed financial or material penalty is directly imposed by the assessment supplier (i.e. the organization responsible for administering an award, competition, loan, grant, disbursement, benchmarking exercise, or membership/accession procedures). This penalty must be stated in official documentation or another authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.).
- [0] If the target of an assessment does not meet specific policy conditions or particular performance standards, it will face no known direct financial or material penalties.

*Note: An external assessment can take the value of “1” for all multiple NegativeIncentive\_# variables.*

## NegativeIncentive\_2a

### NegativeIncentive: Direct Reputational Penalty

- [1] If the target of an assessment fails to meet specific policy conditions or performance standards, a guaranteed reputational penalty is directly imposed by the assessment supplier (i.e. the organization responsible for administering an award, competition, loan, grant, disbursement, benchmarking exercise, or membership/accession procedures). This penalty must be stated in official documentation or another authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.).
- [0] If the target of an assessment does not meet specific policy conditions or performance standards, it will face no known direct reputational penalties.

*Note: An assessment can take the value of “1” for all multiple NegativeIncentive\_# variables.*

## **NegativeIncentive\_2b**

### Negative Incentive: Indirect Reputational Penalty

- [1] If the target of an assessment fails to meet specific policy conditions or performance standards, it may incur significant and new/increased reputational costs. These costs are not guaranteed and they are not imposed by the assessment supplier (i.e. the organization responsible for administering an award, competition, loan, grant, disbursement, benchmarking exercise, or membership/accession procedures). References to the reputational penalties incurred due to non-compliance or inadequate performance must be stated in official documentation or another authoritative source of information (e.g., press materials, policy guidance, etc.).
- [0] If the target of an assessment does not meet specific policy conditions or performance standards, it will face no known indirect direct reputational penalties.

*Note: An assessment can take the value of “1” for all multiple NegativeIncentive\_# variables.*

## **NegativeIncentive\_3**

### Negative Incentive: No Penalty

- [1] An assessment has no significant link to a financial/material or reputational penalty.
- [0] The assessment has a significant link to a financial/material or reputational penalty.

*Note: If an assessment has a significant link to a financial/material or reputational penalty, the assessment takes a value of “1” for NegativeIncentive\_1, NegativeIncentive\_2a, or NegativeIncentive\_2b.*

## **NegativeIncentive\_V1**

### Negative Incentive Potency (Financial Penalty > Reputational Penalty)

This variable seeks to provide an ordinal measure of the strength of the penalties linked to a given assessment. It assumes that assessments with certain types of penalties impose large costs on target countries. For *NegativeIncentive\_V1*, the underlying assumption is made that (a) assessments that are linked to more penalties will impose greater costs, (b) financial/material penalties impose greater costs than reputational penalties, and (c) direct penalties impose greater costs than indirect penalties.

- [5] The assessment is linked to a direct financial penalty and a direct reputational penalty.
- [4] The assessment is linked to a direct financial penalty and an indirect reputational penalty.
- [3] The assessment is linked to a direct financial penalty.
- [2] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational penalty.
- [1] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational penalty.
- [0] The assessment is not linked any known penalties.

*Note: Based upon these assumptions, assessments that assume a value of “5” represent those assessments that (in principle) impose the most costly penalties. Assessments that assume value of “0” represent those assessments that impose no known penalties.*

## NegativeIncentive\_V2

### Negative Incentive Potency (Reputational Penalty > Financial Penalty)

This variable seeks to provide an ordinal measure of the strength of the penalties linked to a given assessment. It assumes that assessments with certain types of penalties impose large costs on target countries. For *NegativeIncentive\_V2*, the underlying assumption is made that (a) assessments that are linked to more penalties will impose greater costs, (b) reputational penalties impose greater costs than financial/material penalties, and (c) direct penalties impose greater costs than indirect penalties.

- [5] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational penalty and a direct financial penalty.
- [4] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational penalty and a direct financial penalty.
- [3] The assessment is linked to a direct reputational penalty.
- [2] The assessment is linked to a direct financial penalty.
- [1] The assessment is linked to an indirect reputational penalty.
- [0] The assessment is not linked any known penalties.

*Note: Based upon these assumptions, assessments that assume a value of “5” represent those assessments that (in principle) impose the most costly penalties. Assessments that assume value of “0” represent those assessments that impose no known penalties.*

## Blacklist

### Blacklist or Watch list

- [1] The external assessment includes a blacklist or watch list component.
- [0] The external assessment does not include a blacklist or watch list component.

## USG

### Sponsor: The United States Government

- [1] The United States Government sponsored the assessment.
- [2] The United States Government did not sponsor the assessment.

## ActiveYears

### Assessment Longevity

This variable counts the number of years a given assessment was in operation (between 2004 and 2013).

## PolicyDomainCount

### Number of Policy Domains Covered by the Assessment

All assessments were coded according to whether or not they evaluate performance in 24 different policy domains. This variable is a simple count of the number of policy domains evaluated by an assessment.

## CoverageThreshold\_5

### Scope of Policy Domains Covered by the Assessment (At Least 5)

Using the *PolicyDomainCount* variable, this is a dummy variable measuring whether an assessment evaluates performance in 5 or more policy domains.

- [1] The assessment evaluates performance in 5 or more policy domains.
- [0] The assessment evaluates performance in less than 5 policy domains.

## PolicyDomainScope

### Scope of Policy Domains Evaluated by Assessment

[1 – 24] Value corresponds to the number of policy domains included in external assessment.

*Note: This variable is computed as a sum of values for MacroeconomicManagement, FinanceCreditBanking, Trade, BusinessRegulatory, Investment, Health, Education, FamilyGender, SocialProtection, Labor, EnvironmentalProtection, Agriculture, EnergyMining, Land, Infrastructure, Decentralization, AnticorruptionTransparency, Democracy, CivilService, JusticeSecurity, Tax, Customs, PublicExpenditure, and ForeignPolicy.*

## MacroeconomicManagement

### Macroeconomic Management Policy Domain

Macroeconomic management includes any policy issue related to the quality of the monetary/exchange rate and aggregate demand policy framework. Critical components are: a monetary/exchange rate policy, aggregate demand policies that focus on short and medium-term external balance, and policies that seek to address the crowding out of private investment.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **FinanceCreditBanking**

### **Finance, Credit, and Banking Policy Domain**

Finance, credit, and banking include any policy issue related to the financial sector, and the policies and regulations that affect it. Dimensions of finance, credit, and banking include financial stability; the sector's efficiency, depth, and resource mobilization strength; and access to financial services. Finance credit, and banking impacts banking and financial services, financial policy and administrative management, monetary institutions, formal sector financial intermediaries, informal and semi-formal financial intermediaries (including microfinance), and education and/or training in banking and financial services.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Trade**

### **Trade Policy Domain**

Trade includes any policy issue related to how the policy framework impact trade in goods. Trade focuses on the height of trade barriers, the extent to which non-tariff barriers are used, the transparency and predictability of the trade regime, and customs and trade facilitation.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **BusinessRegulatory**

### **Business Regulatory Environment Policy Domain**

Business regulatory environment includes any policy issue related to the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environments help or hinder private businesses in investing, creating jobs, and becoming more productive. Sub-components include regulations affecting entry, exit, and competition; regulations of ongoing business operations; and regulation of factor markets (labor and land).

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Investment**

### **Investment Policy Domain**

Investment includes any policy issue related to direct investment and foreign direct investment. Direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Health**

### **Health Policy Domain**

Health includes any policy issue related to the promotion, restoration, or maintenance of public health. Health may include policies impacting basic health services and nutrition, as well as the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, among other diseases.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Education**

### **Education Policy Domain**

Education includes any policy issue related to any and all types and levels of education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of education, and/or the conditions under which it is given. Education may relate to any of the following: primary education, basic life skills for youth and adults, early childhood education, secondary education, vocational training, higher education, and advanced technical and managerial training.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **FamilyGender**

### **Family and Gender Policy Domain**

Family and gender includes any policy issue related to family, marriage and other intimacy-based relationships, sexualities, and/or gender in society and/or the economy. As for family, family and gender includes policies related to population and reproductive health. As for gender, family and gender includes policies that promote equal access of men and women to human capital development, promote equal access of men and women to productive and economic resources, and give men and women equal status and protection under the law.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **SocialProtection**

### **Social Protection and Welfare Policy Domain**

Social protection and welfare includes any policy issue related to the reduction of poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people's exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income. Specific interventions may include social safety net programs, pension and old age savings programs, and even community-driven programs.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Labor**

### **Labor Policy Domain**

Labor includes any policy issue related to labor markets, the participants in these labor markets and their decisions, and government policies that affect the employment and compensation of labor resources. Specifically, labor may refer to employment policy and planning, labor law, labor unions, institution capacity building and advice, employment creation and income generation programs, occupational safety and health, and combating child labor. Interventions may include protection of basic labor standards regulations to reduce segmentation and inequity in labor markets and active labor market programs, such as public works or job training.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **EnvironmentalProtection**

### **Environmental Protection Policy Domain**

Environmental protection includes any policy issue related to environmental conservation and sustainability. Specifically, environmental protection programs target deforestation, carbon emissions, biodiversity, biosphere protection, fishery depletion, water use efficiency, water pollution, protection of terrestrial and marine areas, biodiversity, access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities, site preservation, price adjustments to reflect environmental externalities, and environmental education/training/research.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Agriculture**

### **Agriculture and Rural Development Policy Domain**

Agriculture and rural development includes any policy issue related to the welfare of rural populations through improvements in agricultural, forestry, and fishery production. Agriculture and rural development focuses on reducing food insecurity, raising rural productivity, promoting community-based development, and supporting rural infrastructure.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **EnergyMining**

### **Energy and Mining Policy Domain**



Energy and mining includes any policy issue related to mineral resources, energy production, use, dependency, and efficiency. Purposes related to mineral resources may include mineral/mining policy and administrative management, mineral/metal prospection and exploration, and mining education and training.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Land**

### **Land Policy Domain**

Land administration includes an policy issue related to providing secure land tenure, facilitating land exchange and distribution, and promoting government activism in farm restructuring and post conflict land reform.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Infrastructure**

### **Infrastructure Policy Domain**

Infrastructure includes any policy issue related to the basic physical systems of a nation, region, district or locality. Transportation, communication, sewage, water and electric systems are all examples of infrastructure.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Decentralization**

### **Decentralization Policy Domain**

Decentralization includes any policy issue related to the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **AnticorruptionTransparency**

### **Anti-Corruption and Transparency Policy Domain**

Anti-corruption and transparency includes any policy issue related to the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate, the legislature, and the judiciary and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. Specific dimensions include

the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Democracy**

### **Democracy Policy Domain**

Democracy includes any policy issue related to community participation and development; the competitiveness of executive, legislative and judicial recruitment; openness of executive, legislative and judicial recruitment; constraints that exist on public officials; regulation of political participation; and the competitiveness of political participation.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **CivilService**

### **Civil Service Policy Domain**

Civil service includes any policy issue relate related to extent to which civilian central government staff (including teachers, health workers, and police) are structured to design and implement government policies and deliver services effectively. The civil service generally includes officials, other than holders of political or judicial office, who are employed and paid by wholly and directly by the government. The civil service also generally includes all civilian officials who work in government departments or executive agencies.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **JusticeSecurity**

### **Justice and Security Policy Domain**

Justice and security includes any policy issue related to the review and reform of the justice and security system, democratic governance and civilian control and the improvement of civilian oversight and democratic control of security expenditure, and military, judicial, and police budgets.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## **Tax**

### **Tax Policy Domain**

Tax includes any policy issue related to the construction of effective and fair tax systems. Tax reform programs generally aim to build effective revenue administrations; embody taxpayer protection in the legal

code; eliminate wasteful tax exemptions; implement broad-based, simple, and coherent taxes; and develop the capacity for tax expenditure and wider policy analysis.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## Customs

### Customs Policy Domain

Customs includes any policy issue related to trade facilitation; anti-smuggling activities; risk analysis and physical inspection activities; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; and legal, policy, institutional, and regulatory changes related to the customs code.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## PublicExpenditure

### Public Expenditure Management Policy Domain

Revenue mobilization includes any policy issue related to allocating resources from the economy in a responsible, efficient, and effective manner. Three objectives of public expenditure management are fiscal discipline, the allocation of resources consistent with policy priorities, and good operational management.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## ForeignPolicy

### Foreign Policy Domain

Foreign policy includes any policy issue related to the activities and relationships of the state in its interactions with other, foreign states.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this policy domain.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this policy domain.

## EconomicPolicyBroad

### Economic Policy Area

The broadly defined “economic policy” area encompasses *MacroeconomicManagement*, *FinanceCreditBanking*, *Trade*, *BusinessRegulatory*, *Investment*, *Labor*, *EnergyMining*, and *Infrastructure*.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this broad policy area.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this broad policy area.

## **GovernancePolicyBroad**

### **Broad Governance Policy**

The broadly defined “governance policy” area encompasses *Land, Decentralization, Anti-Corruption, Democracy, CivilService, JusticeSecurity, Tax, Customs, and PublicExpenditure*.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this broad policy area.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this broad policy area.

## **SocialPolicyBroad**

### **Social Policy Area**

The broadly defined “social policy” area encompasses *Health, Education, FamilyGender, SocialProtection, EnvironmentalProtection, and Agriculture*.

- [1] Assessment evaluates performance in this broad policy area.
- [0] Assessment does not evaluate performance in this broad policy area.

## Appendix H: Supplemental Information

<b>Table H.1: The 10 Assessments with the Greatest Increases in Influence between Agenda Setting and Reform Design</b>						
	Participants	Countries	Influence in Agenda Setting	Influence in Reform Design	Δ in Influence	p-value (one-tail)
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic	16	14	2.607	3.000	+0.393	0.197
The IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)	15	13	3.115	3.233	+0.118	0.419
The IADB's Debt Relief Initiative	82	15	1.800	1.917	+0.117	0.335
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Blacklist	110	66	2.171	2.26	+0.089	0.346
The EBRD's Public Procurement Sector Assessment	23	17	1.363	1.441	+0.078	0.422
The IADB's Growth Diagnostics	101	15	2.353	2.431	+0.078	0.366
The World Bank's Education Management Information System Assessment Tool	32	25	2.367	2.440	+0.073	0.413
The OECD's International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures	43	25	1.883	1.952	+0.068	0.414
The World Bank's Women, Business, and the Law Assessment	28	22	1.455	1.523	+0.068	0.413
The AsDB's Country Environmental Analysis	38	21	2.056	2.119	+0.063	0.418

<b>Table H.2: Respondent Familiarity with Assessments: The 10 Most Recognized Assessments</b>		
Assessment	Number of Participants Asked about Familiarity with Assessment	Weighted Percentage of Familiar Participants
The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements	268	75.34%
The UN's Millennium Development Goals	2388	73.62%
UNDP's Human Development Index	616	71.03%
Performance-Based Funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	272	69.83%
The World Bank's Education Sector Review	189	63.33%
The UNESCO Education for All Development Index	238	59.40%
The World Bank's and IFC's Doing Business Report	2033	59.05%
The World Bank's Health Sector Review	271	58.58%
The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements	330	55.59%
The EU's Economic Partnership Agreements for ACP Countries	233	55.31%

<b>Table H.3: Respondent Familiarity with Assessments: The 10 Least Recognized Assessments</b>		
Assessment	Number of Participants Asked about Familiarity with Assessment	Weighted Percentage of Familiar Participants
The IADB's Social Protection Sector Note	19	0.00%
The IADB's Citizen Security Sector Note	25	0.00%
The IADB's Trade Sector Policy Note	22	4.55%
DFID's Resource Allocation Model	3819	8.54%
The World Bank's Women, Business, and the Law Assessment	309	9.25%
The IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment and Performance-Based Allocation System	2392	9.64%
The U.S. Trade Representative's "Special 301" Report	286	10.43%
The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units' Membership Requirements	512	10.62%
The "Variable Tranche" of the EU's Budget Support Program	1121	11.82%
The IMF's Rapid Credit Facility	2459	12.05%

Macroeconomic Management (Average assessment familiarity = 45%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (100%, <i>n</i> =7)	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (92%, <i>n</i> =9)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (97%, <i>n</i> =84)
Investment (39%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (100%, <i>n</i> =9)	NATO's Membership Action Plan (100%, <i>n</i> =5)	The EU's Economic Partnership Agreements for ACP Countries (68%, <i>n</i> =39)
Democracy (38%)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (77%, <i>n</i> =47)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (76%, <i>n</i> =23)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (70%, <i>n</i> =85)
Trade (35%)	The EU's Association Agreements (90%, <i>n</i> =6)	The EU's Economic Partnership Agreements for ACP Countries (83%, <i>n</i> =42)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (78%, <i>n</i> =95)
Finance, Credit, and Banking (34%)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (67%, <i>n</i> =94)	The IADB's Policy-Based Loans (60%, <i>n</i> =16)	The IMF's Extended Credit Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (60%, <i>n</i> =64)
Social Protection and Welfare (31%)	The EU's Association Agreements (80%, <i>n</i> =13)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (78%, <i>n</i> =116)	UNDP's Human Development Index (76%, <i>n</i> =113)

<sup>15</sup> Unlike the other analyses conducted in this report and given the complex relationship between sample size and percentages, we used an inclusion criteria threshold here of an assessment being recognized by at least five participants, rather than being simply asked about to five participants. In this table, however, *n* indicates the number of participants from each policy domain routed to the indicated assessment.

Energy and Mining (29%)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (68%, <i>n</i> =59)	The EU's Association Agreements (58%, <i>n</i> =7)	The EBRD's Energy Sector Assessment (56%, <i>n</i> =11)
Decentralization (29%)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (42%, <i>n</i> =20)	The World Bank's Decentralization Indicators (41%, <i>n</i> =60)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (40%, <i>n</i> =61)
Business Regulatory Environment (29%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (82%, <i>n</i> =16)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (80%, <i>n</i> =130)	The EU's Association Agenda (72%, <i>n</i> =7)
Public Expenditure Management (28%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (90%, <i>n</i> =8)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (76%, <i>n</i> =58)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (68%, <i>n</i> =16)
Agriculture and Rural Development (27%)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (70%, <i>n</i> =164)	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (67%, <i>n</i> =7)	The World Bank's Poverty Assessment (50%, <i>n</i> =163)
Health (27%)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (80%, <i>n</i> =272)	UNDP's Human Development Index (72%, <i>n</i> =267)	Performance-Based Funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (70%, <i>n</i> =272)
Education (27%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (81%, <i>n</i> =11)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (78%, <i>n</i> =191)	UNDP's Human Development Index (70%, <i>n</i> =188)



Tax (26%)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (68%, <i>n</i> =19)	The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Eligibility Criteria (45%, <i>n</i> =15)	The IMF's Policy Support Instrument (42%, <i>n</i> =33)
Infrastructure (25%)	The EU's Association Agreements (67%, <i>n</i> =16)	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (67%, <i>n</i> =11)	The AsDB's Country Diagnostic Study (56%, <i>n</i> =49)
Labor (24%)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (72%, <i>n</i> =13)	The ILO's Global Monitoring and Analysis of Conditions of Work and Employment (68%, <i>n</i> =49)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (50%, <i>n</i> =16)
Civil Service (23%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (73%, <i>n</i> =11)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (71%, <i>n</i> =15)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (57%, <i>n</i> =51)
Family and Gender (23%)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (81%, <i>n</i> =48)	UNDP's Human Development Index (78%, <i>n</i> =48)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (58%, <i>n</i> =14)
Environmental Protection (22%)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (84%, <i>n</i> =154)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (78%, <i>n</i> =9)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (67%, <i>n</i> =12)

Anti-Corruption and Transparency (21%)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (69%, <i>n</i> =11)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (68%, <i>n</i> =74)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (67%, <i>n</i> =12)
Customs (20%)	The EU's Economic Partnership Agreements for ACP Countries (74%, <i>n</i> =18)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (63%, <i>n</i> =32)	The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Eligibility Criteria (60%, <i>n</i> =19)
Justice and Security (17%)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (88%, <i>n</i> =16)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (74%, <i>n</i> =17)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (55%, <i>n</i> =52)
Land (17%)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (63%, <i>n</i> =37)	The African Peer Review Mechanism (43%, <i>n</i> =24)	The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards (37%, <i>n</i> =36)

Macroeconomic management	The IMF's Article IV Consultations (4.09, <i>n</i> =17)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (3.83, <i>n</i> =69)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.70, <i>n</i> =6)
Finance, credit, and banking	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (3.42, <i>n</i> =5)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (3.25, <i>n</i> =5)	The IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) (3.17, <i>n</i> =9)
Trade	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.30, <i>n</i> =73)	The AsDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.29, <i>n</i> =8)	The AfDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.25, <i>n</i> =7)
Business regulatory environment	The EU's Association Agenda (4.50, <i>n</i> =6)	The EBRD's Country Law Assessment (3.88, <i>n</i> =7)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.84, <i>n</i> =124)
Investment	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (4.43, <i>n</i> =17)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (3.71, <i>n</i> =18)	The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (3.41, <i>n</i> =12)
Health	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (3.70, <i>n</i> =6)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.67, <i>n</i> =203)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.38, <i>n</i> =5)
Education	The OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (3.70, <i>n</i> =17)	The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (3.32, <i>n</i> =12)	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.29, <i>n</i> =135)
Family and gender	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.81, <i>n</i> =33)	The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards (3.73, <i>n</i> =7)	The US State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" (3.46, <i>n</i> =13)
Social protection and welfare	The IADB's Policy-Based Loans (3.88, <i>n</i> =5)	The IADB's Country Institutional and Policy Evaluation (CIPE) and Performance-Based Allocation System	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.25, <i>n</i> =80)

<sup>16</sup> As expected, the number of participants (*n*) evaluating the influence of a given assessment within a specific policy domain can be low. For this reason, we have limited our presentation and analysis to those assessments with at least 5 participants. We assume that, given the specialized knowledge of our survey participants, the narrow scope of some assessments, and our tailored survey design (see Appendix D), a high average influence score as reported by at least 5 policy experts indicates, at least to some degree, consensus about a relatively high level of assessment influence. We urge readers, however, not to treat the listed scores as precise estimates.

		(3.60, <i>n</i> =6)	
Labor	The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" (3.06, <i>n</i> =14)	The ILO's Global Monitoring and Analysis of Conditions of Work and Employment (3.01, <i>n</i> =33)	DFID's Resource Allocation Model (2.80, <i>n</i> =5)
Environmental protection	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (4.58, <i>n</i> =6)	The IADB's Country Environmental Analysis (3.71, <i>n</i> =9)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.33, <i>n</i> =7)
Agriculture and rural development	The IMF's Rapid Credit Facility (3.67, <i>n</i> =9)	The World Bank's Development Policy Loans Program (3.25, <i>n</i> =9)	The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (3.23, <i>n</i> =18)
Energy and mining	The World Bank's Country Economic Memorandum (3.57, <i>n</i> =14)	The EBRD's Energy Sector Assessment (3.4, <i>n</i> =5)	The Global Environmental Facility's Performance Index and Resource Allocation Framework (3.25, <i>n</i> =8)
Land	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.29, <i>n</i> =20)	The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards (2.89, <i>n</i> =12)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (2.69, <i>n</i> =9)
Infrastructure	The AfDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.42, <i>n</i> =12)	The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards (3.21, <i>n</i> =42)	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support (3.18, <i>n</i> =11)
Decentralization	The EU's Poverty Reduction Budget Support Program (2.37, <i>n</i> =16)	The World Bank's Decentralization Indicators (2.26, <i>n</i> =26)	The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (2.22, <i>n</i> =11)
Anti-corruption and transparency	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (4.50, <i>n</i> =15)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (4.17, <i>n</i> =6)	The EU's Association Agreements (4.00, <i>n</i> =10)
Democracy	The EU's Association Agenda (4.20, <i>n</i> =9)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (4.17, <i>n</i> =7)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.77, <i>n</i> =19)
Civil Service	The EU's Association Agreements (3.87,	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and	The EU's Governance Initiative


	<i>n</i> =8)	Budget Support (3.81, <i>n</i> =9)	and Governance Incentive Tranche (3.50, <i>n</i> =6)
Justice and security	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (4.22, <i>n</i> =5)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.33, <i>n</i> =10)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (2.83, <i>n</i> =10)
Tax	The EU's Governance Initiative and Governance Incentive Tranche (3.50, <i>n</i> =6)	The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (3.36, <i>n</i> =8)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (3.25, <i>n</i> =10)
Customs	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.68, <i>n</i> =22)	The World Bank's Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (3.50, <i>n</i> =5)	The WTO's Accession Working Party Reports and Accession Protocols (3.18, <i>n</i> =10)
Public expenditure management	The IADB's Policy-Based Loans (4.24, <i>n</i> =9)	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (4.22, <i>n</i> =6)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (4.10, <i>n</i> =6)

Macroeconomic management	The IMF's Article IV Consultations (3.65, <i>n</i> =17)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.60, <i>n</i> =5)	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (3.56, <i>n</i> =70)
Finance, credit, and banking	The IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) (4.12, <i>n</i> =9)	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (3.75, <i>n</i> =5)	The IMF's Policy Support Instrument (2.92, <i>n</i> =29)
Trade	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.45, <i>n</i> =72)	The AfDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.33, <i>n</i> =7)	The AsDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.29, <i>n</i> =8)
Business regulatory environment	The EU's Association Agenda (4.33, <i>n</i> =5)	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.76, <i>n</i> =120)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.57, <i>n</i> =15)
Investment	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (4.17, <i>n</i> =17)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.43, <i>n</i> =7)	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support (3.36, <i>n</i> =14)
Health	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.44, <i>n</i> =201)	Performance-Based Funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (3.26, <i>n</i> =187)	The World Bank Health Sector Review (3.15, <i>n</i> =155)
Education	The OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (3.48, <i>n</i> =15)	The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (3.41, <i>n</i> =12)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.33, <i>n</i> =7)
Family and gender	The UN's Millennium Development Goals (3.81, <i>n</i> =32)	The U.S. State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" (3.58, <i>n</i> =13)	The World Bank Country Gender Assessment (3.40, <i>n</i> =18)
Social protection and welfare	The IADB's Growth Diagnostics (3.75, <i>n</i> =5)	The IADB's Policy-Based Loans (3.50, <i>n</i> =5)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.40, <i>n</i> =5)
Labor	The ILO's Global Monitoring and Analysis of Conditions of Work and Employment (3.10, <i>n</i> =33)	The World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness Report" (3.08, <i>n</i> =14)	The World Bank's Poverty Assessment (2.58, <i>n</i> =20)
Environmental protection	The EU's Stabilization	The World Bank's	The IADB's Country

	and Association Agreements (4.83, <i>n</i> =6)	Development Policy Loans Program (3.67, <i>n</i> =6)	Environmental Analysis (3.29, <i>n</i> =9)
Agriculture and rural development	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support (3.27, <i>n</i> =11)	The World Bank's Development Policy Loans Program (3.25, <i>n</i> =9)	The IMF's Rapid Credit Facility (3.11, <i>n</i> =9)
Energy and mining	The EBRD's Energy Sector Assessment (3.40, <i>n</i> =5)	The World Bank's Country Environmental Analysis (2.93, <i>n</i> =8)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (2.77, <i>n</i> =21)
Land	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (2.76, <i>n</i> =21)	The Millennium Challenge Corporation's Eligibility Criteria and Country Scorecards (2.48, <i>n</i> =14)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (2.19, <i>n</i> =10)
Infrastructure	The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (3.40, <i>n</i> =10)	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support (3.36, <i>n</i> =11)	The AfDB's Country Performance Assessment (CPA) and Performance-Based Allocation System (3.25, <i>n</i> =12)
Decentralization	The EU's Poverty Reduction Budget Support Program (2.16, <i>n</i> =17)	The World Bank's Decentralization Indicators (1.86, <i>n</i> =26)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (1.78, <i>n</i> =23)
Anti-corruption and transparency	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (4.40, <i>n</i> =6)	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (4.20, <i>n</i> =5)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.83, <i>n</i> =11)
Democracy	NATO's Membership Action Plan and Annual Progress Report (4.17, <i>n</i> =7)	The EU's Association Agenda (4.17, <i>n</i> =9)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.82, <i>n</i> =18)
Civil Service	The EU's Association Agreements (3.70, <i>n</i> =8)	The AfDB's Policy-Based Loans and Budget Support (3.56, <i>n</i> =9)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.44, <i>n</i> =8)
Justice and security	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (4.56, <i>n</i> =5)	The EU's Association Agreements (3.67, <i>n</i> =10)	The EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (3.13, <i>n</i> =14)
Tax	The HIPC Initiative's "Decision Point" and "Completion Point" (4.50, <i>n</i> =5)	The WTO's Accession Working Party Reports and Accession Protocols (3.20, <i>n</i> =11)	The World Bank's Development Policy Review (3.11, <i>n</i> =5)
Customs	The World Bank and IFC's Doing Business Report (3.46, <i>n</i> =21)	The World Bank's Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies	The WTO's Accession Working Party Reports and

		(3.00, n=5)	Accession Protocols (2.77, n=12)
Public expenditure management	The EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (4.22, n=6)	The IADB's Policy-Based Loans (3.95, n=9)	The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans and Country Reports (3.63, n=10)


**Figure H.1 Survey-Based Measure of Success in Reform Implementation and Assessment Influence**



Note: The survey-based "Success in Reform Implementation" estimates progress made toward solving specific problems and is on a scale of 1-4, where 1 = "No progress at all", 2 = "Only a little progress", 3 = "A moderate amount of progress", and 4 = "A great deal of progress". Both agenda-setting and reform design influence are on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means "No influence at all" and 5 means "Maximum influence". The R values of 0.415 and 0.439 indicate positive relationships between an average country's success in reform implementation and the agenda-setting and reform design influence in of external assessments in that country.



**Figure H.2 Track Record of Success in Reform Implementation in Four Policy Areas and Assessment Influence**



Note: Each dimension of the CPIA presented here is drawn from a sub-indicator used in the IDA Resource Allocation Index: Public Sector Management and Institutions (Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance; Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization; Quality of Public Administration; and Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector), Social Inclusion and Equity (Gender Equality, Equity of Public Resource Use, Building Human Resources, Social Protection and Labor, and Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability), Economic Management (Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies, Fiscal Policy, Debt Policy and Management), and Structural Policies (Trade, Financial Sector, and Business Regulatory Environment). Both agenda-setting and reform design influence are on a scale of 0-5, where 0 means "No influence at all" and 5 means "Maximum influence".

## Appendix I: References

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2000. Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development. *American Economic Review* 90: 126-130.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, Pablo Querubin, and James A. Robinson. 2008. When Does Policy Reform Work: The Case of Central Bank Independence. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (1): 351-418.

Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen. 1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? *American Economic Review* 81(5): 1170-1188.

Aklin, Michaël and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. The Global Spread of Environmental Ministries: Domestic–International Interactions. *International Studies Quarterly* 58: 764–780.

Amin, Mohammad, and Simeon Djankov. 2009. Democracy and Reforms. World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 4835. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Andersson, Staffan, and Paul Heywood. 2009. The politics of perception: Use and abuse of Transparency International’s approach to measuring corruption. *Political Studies* 57 (4): 746–767.

Andrews, Matt. 2009. Isomorphism and the Limits to African Public Financial Management Reform. Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP09-012. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Andrews, Matt. 2010. How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa? Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, FRW 10-018. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Andrews, Matt. 2011. Which Organizational Attributes Are Amenable to External Reform? An Empirical Study of African Public Financial Management. *International Public Management Journal* 14(2): 131–56.

Andrews, Matt. 2013. *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. 2013. Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). *World Development* 51(C): 234-244.

Arndt, C. 2008. The politics of governance ratings. *International Public Management Journal* 11 (3): 1-23

Arruñada, Benito, 2007. Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business? *Journal of Comparative Economics* 35(4): 729-747.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2005. Multilateral Development Bank Technical Meeting on Performance Based Allocation Methods. Meeting at AsDB Headquarters on 24-25 January 2005. Manila: ADB.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2009. *ADB Perceptions Survey: Multinational Survey of Stakeholders 2009*. Manila: ADB.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2010. Georgia: A Country at an Ancient Crossroads Looks to the Future. Development Effectiveness Brief. Manila: ADB.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2013. *ADB Perceptions Survey: Multinational Survey of Stakeholders 2012*. Manila: ADB.

Atkinson, Carol. 2010. Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2006. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (1): 1-22.

Avey, Paul C. and Michael C. Desch. 2014. What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers. *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (2): 227-246.

Bagaudinova, Svetlana, Dana Omran and Umar Shavurov. 2007. "Georgia: Licensing 159 activities—not 909." In *Celebrating Reform 2007*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Ban, C. and W. Vandenabeele. W. 2009. Motivation and Values of European Commission Staff. Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, Marina del Rey, CA.

Barder, Owen. 2010. Can aid create incentives for politicians in developing countries? 27 April 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.owen.org/blog/3275>.

Betley, Mary. 2008. Assessing Impact of the PEFA Framework. Manuscript produced for PEFA Steering Committee.

Brown, Keith and Jill Tirnauer. 2009. Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance over the Past Decade. Washington D.C.: USAID/Management Systems International.

Birdsall, Nancy and Rita Perakis. 2012. Cash on Delivery Aid: Implementation of a Pilot in Ethiopia. April 27, 2012. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Biron, Carey L. 2013. World Bank Formally Urged to Overhaul 'Doing Business' Report. *Inter Press Service*. 24 June 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/world-bank-formally-urged-to-overhaul-doing-business-report/>

Bishin, Benjamin G., Robert R. Barr, and Matthew J. Lebo. 2006. The Impact of Economic Versus Institutional Factors in Elite Evaluations of Presidential Progress Toward Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (10): 1-26.

Bjuremalm, H. 2006. Power Analysis: Experiences and Challenges. Concept Note. Department for Democracy and Social Development. Stockholm: SIDA.

Blum, Jürgen René. 2014. What Factors Predict How Public Sector Projects Perform? A Review of the World Bank's Public Sector Management Portfolio. Policy Research Working Paper 6798. Washington DC: World Bank.

Böhmelt, Tobias and Tina Freyburg. 2013. The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states' compliance with the *acquis communautaire*, 1998-2009. *European Union Politics* 14 (2): 1-23.

Böhmelt, Tobias and Tina Freyburg. 2015. Diffusion of Compliance in the 'Race towards Brussels?' A Spatial Approach to EU Accession Conditionality. *West European Politics* 38(3): 601-626.

Booth, David. 2011. Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have We Learned? *Development Policy Review* 29 (s1): s5-s26.

Bor, J. 2007. The Political Economy of AIDS Leadership in Developing Countries: An Exploratory Analysis. *Social Science and Medicine* 64 (8): 1585-1599.

Borrman, Axel and Matthias Busse. 2007. The Institutional Challenge of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements. *Development Policy Review* 25 (4): 403-16.

Bourguignon, François and Jean-Philippe Platteau. Forthcoming. The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination. *World Development*.

Buch, Benjamin P., Mark T. Buntaine, and Bradley C. Parks. 2014. Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Difficulty of Improving Domestic Institutions with International Aid. AidData Working Paper #4. Williamsburg, VA: AidData.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2009. Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change. *Comparative Political Studies* 42(2): 167-197.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2010. Leader Survival, Revolutions and the Nature of Government Finance. *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 936-950.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2011. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Buntaine, Mark T., and Bradley C. Parks. 2013. When Do Environmentally-Focused Assistance Projects Achieve their Objectives? Evidence from World Bank Post-Project Evaluations. *Global Environmental Politics* 13(2): 65-88.

Busia, Kojo. 2014. "The Search for Domestic Accountability in Development Aid: What Role for the APRM in Reshaping Governance in Africa?" *Problems, Promises, and Paradoxes of Aid: Africa's Experience*, edited by Muna Ndulo and Nicolas van de Walle. Pp. 171-210. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing/Institute for African Development.

Butts, Cassandra. 2011. Deepening MCC's Commitment to Gender Equality. MCC's Poverty Reduction Blog. 18 November 2011. Retrieved from <https://www.mcc.gov/pages/povertyreductionblog/entry/deepening-mccs-commitment-to-gender-equality>.

Cadier, David. 2013. "Is the European Neighbourhood Policy a Substitute for Enlargement?" in *The Crisis of EU Enlargement*, LSE IDEAS Special Report. London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 2008. Progress Report on Implementation of the Caribbean Development Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy. Barbados: CDB. Retrieved from [http://www.caribank.org/uploads/projects-programmes/special-development-fund/sdf-meetings/negotiation-meetings/CDB%20PRS\\_Progress%20\\_Report.pdf](http://www.caribank.org/uploads/projects-programmes/special-development-fund/sdf-meetings/negotiation-meetings/CDB%20PRS_Progress%20_Report.pdf)

Center for Global Development (CGD) and the African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC). 2014. Delivering on the Data Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Final Report of the Data for African Development Working Group. Washington DC: CGD. Retrieved from <http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD14-01%20complete%20for%20web%200710.pdf>

Cerny, Philip G. 1997. Paradoxes of the “Competition State”: The Dynamics of Political Globalisation. *Government and Opposition* 32 (2): 251-274.

Charron, Nicholas. 2009. The Impact of Socio-Political Integration and Press Freedom on Corruption. *Journal of Development Studies* 45 (9): 1472-1493.

Chee, Grace, Natasha Hsi, Kenneth Carlson, Slavea Chankova and Patricia Taylor. 2007. Evaluation of the First Five Years’ of GAVI Immunization Services Support Funding. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates Inc.

Chhotray, Vasudha and David Hulme. 2009. Contrasting Visions for Aid and Governance in the 21st Century: The White House Millennium Challenge Account and DFID's Drivers of Change. *World Development* 37(1): 36-49.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2007. Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets. *International Organization* 61 (2): 443-463.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2008. Cheerleading for Policy Goals: The International Monetary Fund and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets. Paper presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Centro Stefano Franscini, Monte Verità, Switzerland, 3 – 8 February 2008.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2009a. *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2009b. ‘The Silent Revolution’: Professional Characteristics, Sympathetic Interlocutors and IMF Lending. LSE Working Paper.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2010. How Do Crises Lead to Change? Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia. *World Politics* 62 (3): 496-527.

Cho, Seo-Young, Axel Dreher and Eric Neumayer. 2014. The Determinants of Anti-trafficking Policies: Evidence from a New Index. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 116 (2): 429– 454.

Clist, Paul, Alessia Isopi, and Oliver Morrissey. 2012. Selectivity on Aid Modality: Determinants of Budget Support from Multilateral Donors. *The Review of International Organizations* 7 (3): 267-284.

Cobham, Alex. 2013. Corrupting Perceptions: Why Transparency International’s flagship corruption index falls short. *Foreign Policy*. 22 July 2013. Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/22/corrupting-perceptions/>

Cook, Nicolas. 2010. Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Corrales, Javier. 2006. “Political Obstacles to Expanding and Improving Schooling in Developing Countries.” In *Global Educational Expansion: Historical Legacies and Political Obstacles*, edited by Aaron Benavot, Julia Resnik and Javier Corrales. Cambridge, MA: Academy of Arts and Sciences. Pp. 91-148.

Couper, Mick P. 2000. Web Surveys: A Review of Issues and Approaches. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64: 464-494.

Couper, Mick P. 2008. *Designing Effective Web Surveys*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Dahl-Østergaard, Tom, Sue Unsworth, Mark Robinson, and Rikke Ingrid Jensen. 2005. Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of Change Analyses in Development Cooperation. Review commissioned by the OECD DAC Network on Governance.

David-Barrett, Elizabeth, and Ken Okamura. 2013. The Transparency Paradox: Why Corrupt Countries Join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Paper presented at 2013 APSA Annual Conference, Chicago, Illinois.

Davis, Kevin, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry. 2012. Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance. *Law & Society Review* 46 (1): 71-104.

Davison, William. 2012. As Ethiopia looks beyond strongman Meles, fears of instability (+video). *The Christian Science Monitor*. 22 August 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0822/As-Ethiopia-looks-beyond-strongman-Meles-fears-of-instability-video>

de Almeida, Paulo Roberto. 2013. Sovereignty and Regional Integration in Latin America: a political conundrum? *Contexto Internacional* 35 (2): 471-495.

De Bruyn, Tom. 2015. "New Friends", "Easier Partners" and "Bigger Brothers": The Influence of the Rising Powers on Agriculture and Food Security in Malawi. Paper presented at the Chinese Overseas Finance Conference 2015, Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, April, 10, 2015.

de Renzio, Paolo. 2009. Taking Stock: What do PEFA Assessments tell us about PFM systems across countries? ODI Working Paper 302. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

de Renzio, Paolo and Harika Masud. 2011. Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency: The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 24 (3): 607–616.

de Renzio, Paolo and Ngaire Woods. 2008. The Trouble with Cash on Delivery Aid: A note on its potential effects on recipient country institutions. Note prepared for the CGD Initiative on 'Cash on delivery Aid'. Mimeo. Oxford: University of Oxford. Accessed at <http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Cash%20on%20Delivery%20AID/DeRenzio%20Woods.pdf>

de Sherbinin, Alex, Aaron Reuben, Macy Levy, and Laura Johnson. 2013. Indicators in Practice: How Indicators are Being Used in Policy and Management Contexts. Palisades, NY and New Haven, CT: CIESIN, Columbia University and YCELP.

Del Biondo, Karen. forthcoming. Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*.

Del Biondo, Karen and Jan Orbie. 2014. The European Commission's implementation of budget support and the Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia: democracy promoter or developmental donor? *Third World Quarterly* 35 (3): 411-427.

Dervis, Kemal, Homi Kharas, and Noam Unger. 2010. Aiding Development: Assistance Reform for the 21st century. Brookings Blum Roundtable Report. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.



Devarajan, S., D. Dollar, and T. Holmgren. 2001. *Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland. 1992. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints. *Review of Economic Studies* 59 (4): 703-730.

Dharmasaputra, Metta and Abe Wahyudi. 2014. The Impact of Payment-for-Performance Finance on the Political Economy of Deforestation of Indonesia. *Center for Global Development*. Climate and Forest Paper Series #9: 1-55. <http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Climate-Forest-Series-9-Dharmasaputra-Wahyudi-Indonesia.pdf>

Diamond, Larry, 2008. The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2): 36-48.

Diamond, Jack. 2013. Background Paper 1: Sequencing PFM Reforms. January 2013. Washington DC: PEFA Secretariat.

Dillman, Don A., Jolene D. Smyth, and Leah Melani Christian. 2009. *Internet, Mail, and Mixed-Mode Surveys: The Tailored Design Method* (3rd Ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Dinmore, Guy. 2005. Georgia calls on Europe for coherent policy. *The Financial Times*. September 25, 2005.

Diofasi, Anna and Nancy Birdsall. 2015. Three Comments on the Proposed SDGs. CGD Blog Post. 26 January 2015. Accessed at <http://www.cgdev.org/blog/three-comments-proposed-sdgs>

Director General for External Policies of the European Union. 2011. The Future of EU Budget Support in Developing Countries. Brussels: European Parliament. Retrieved from [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/433769/EXPO-DEVE\\_NT\(2011\)433769\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/433769/EXPO-DEVE_NT(2011)433769_EN.pdf)

Djankov, Simeon. 2009. The Regulation of Entry: A Survey. *World Bank Research Observer* 24 (2): 183–203.

Doemeland, Doerte and James Trevino. 2014. Which World Bank Reports Are Widely Read? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6851. Washington DC: World Bank.

Doig, Alan and David Norris. 2012. Improving anti-corruption agencies as organisations. *Journal of Financial Crime* 19 (3): 255 – 273.

Dong, Lili and David W. Chapman. 2008. The Chinese Government Scholarship Program: An Effective Form of Foreign Assistance? *International Review of Education* 54 (2): 155-173.

Dreher, Axel, Silvia Marchesi, and James Vreeland. 2008. The political economy of IMF forecasts. *Public Choice* 137(1): 145–171

Easterly, William. 2014. *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. New York NY: Basic Books.

Eaton, Kent, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke. 2010. *The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 2007. Country Report: Liberia. September 2007. London, UK: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Edwards, Martin S. 2011. Under the Microscope: Some Findings from the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review. Written for the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition, December 1, 2011.

Edwards Jr. D. Brent. 2012. Small states and big institutions: USAID and education policy formation in El Salvador, *Current Issues in Comparative Education* 15 (1): 82-98.

Efird, Cythnia. 2007a. Angola Decides Not to Seek IMF Agreement. 14 March 2007. Retrieved at [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LUANDA250\\_a.html](http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LUANDA250_a.html)

Efird, Cythnia. 2007b. IMF Article IV Team Gives Angola High Marks. 7 June 2007. Retrieved at [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LUANDA564\\_a.html](http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LUANDA564_a.html)

Ellinas, Antonis A. and Ezra Suleiman. 2012. *The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Europe's Custodians*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission (EC). 2008. The "MDG Contract": An Approach for Longer-Term and More Predictable General Budget Support. Brussels. European Commission. Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/MDG-Contract-Paper-0608\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/MDG-Contract-Paper-0608_en.pdf)  
[http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/MDG-Contract-Paper-0608\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/MDG-Contract-Paper-0608_en.pdf)

European Stability Initiative (ESI). 2010. Reinventing Georgia: The Story of a Libertarian Revolution. April 2010. Berlin: European Stability Initiative. Retrieved at [www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate\\_ID=3](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=3)

Fan, Victoria, Denizhan Duran, Rachel Silverman, and Amanda Glassman. 2013. Performance-based financing at the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: an analysis of grant ratings and funding, 2003-2012. *Lancet Global Health* 1(3): e161-68.

Fang, Songying, and Randall Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66(4): 537-71.

Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik. 1991. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty. *American Economic Review* 81(5): 1146-1155.

Flores, Thomas Edward, Gabriella Lloyd, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2013. The Technocratic Advantage? Leadership and IMF Programs. Paper presented at the 2013 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA.

Fox, William, Sayeed Bayat, and Naas Ferreira. 2007. *A Guide to Managing Public Policy*. Cape Town, South Africa: Juta Academic.

Gabre-Madhin, Eleni Z., and Steven Haggblade, S. 2001. *Successes in African Agriculture: Results of an Expert Survey*. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from [http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/syn04\\_survey.pdf](http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/syn04_survey.pdf)

Gamurari, Ludmila and Cristian Ghinea. 2014. It has only just begun: EU and anticorruption institutions in Moldova. 1 August 2014. Brussels, Belgium: European Policy Centre.

Ganster, D. C., H. W. Hennessey, and F. Luthans. 1982. The role of social desirability in organizational behavior research. *Academy of Management Proceedings* 1: 141-145.



Gavrillis, George. 2014. Forging a National Strategy Through EU Accession: Serbia, 2007–2012. *Innovations for Successful Societies Case Study*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Geertson, Michael. 2010. Achieving Quick Impact in Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Projects. *Yale Journal of International Affairs* Winter 2010: 34-48.

Gilbert, C., A. Powell and D. Vines. 1999. Positioning The World Bank. *The Economic Journal* 109(459): 598-633.

Girod, Desha M. and Jennifer Tobin. 2011. Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Seattle, Washington.

Girod, Desha and Meir Walters. 2012. Elite-Led Democratization in Aid-Dependent States: The Case of Mauritania. *Journal of North African Studies* 17 (2): 181-193.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2013. Mid-Term Evaluation of the System of Transparent Allocation of Resources. Prepared by the GEF Evaluation Office. Washington DC: GEF. [http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.ME\\_C.45.04%20MTE%20of%20STAR%20\(EO\).pdf](http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.ME_C.45.04%20MTE%20of%20STAR%20(EO).pdf)

Global Integrity. 2008a. Cameroon's War on Corruption: Reality or Good PR? 03 July 2008. Retrieved on 20 January 2012 at <http://www.globalintegrity.org/node/226>

Global Integrity. 2008b. Cameroon's War on Corruption: Probably Good PR. Retrieved on 20 January 2012 at <http://www.globalintegrity.org/node/224>

Goldsmith, Arthur A. 2011. No Country Left Behind? Performance Standards and Accountability in US Foreign Assistance. *Development Policy Review* 29: s157–s176.

Grabbe, H. 2002. European Union conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire. *International Political Science Review* 23 (3): 249-268.

Gray, Julia and Jonathan Slapin. 2012. How Effective Are Preferential Trade Agreements? Ask the Experts. *Review of International Organizations* 7(3): 309-333.

Grek, Sotiria. 2009. Governing by numbers: The PISA 'effect' in Europe. *Journal of Education Policy* 24 (1): 23-37.

Grindle, Merilee. 2004. *Despite the Odds: The Contentious Politics of Education Reform*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grossman, Herschel I. 1980. "Rational Expectations, Business Cycles, and Government Behavior." In *Rational Expectations and Economic Policy*. Edited by Stanley Fischer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hackenesch, Christine. 2013. Aid Donor Meets Strategic Partner? The European Union's and China's Relations with Ethiopia. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 42 (1): 7–36.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Brad L. LeVeck, David G. Victor, and James H. Fowler. 2014. Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation. *International Organization* 68: 845–876.

Hagen, Rune Jansen. 2009. Basic Analytics of Multilateral Lending and Surveillance. *Journal of International Economics* 79 (2009):126-13

Hallward-Driemeier, Mary, Gita Khun-Jush, and Lant Pritchett. 2010. Deals versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It. NBER Working Paper 16001. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Hallward-Driemeier, Mary and Lant Pritchett. 2011. How Business is Done and the ‘Doing Business’ Indicators: The Investment Climate when Firms have Climate Control. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5563. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Hamilton, Kirk and Michael Clemens. 1999. Genuine savings rates in developing countries. *World Bank Economic Review* 13:333–356.

Hartwig, K., J. Pashman, E. Cherlin, M. Dale, and M. Callaway. 2008. Hospital management in the context of health sector reform: a planning model in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Health Planning and Management* 23: 203–218.

Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hedger, Edward and Zainab Kizilbash Agha. 2007. Reforming Public Financial Management When the Politics Aren’t Right: A Proposal. ODI Opinion Paper No. 89. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

Hedger, Edward and Paulo de Renzio. 2010. What do Public Financial Management assessments tell us about PFM reform? ODI Background Note. July 2010. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

Heilbrunn, John R. 2004. Anti-corruption commissions: panacea or real medicine to fight corruption? Working Paper Series 37234. Washington DC: World Bank Institute.

Helleiner, Eric and Bessma Momani. 2008. “Slipping Into Obscurity: Crisis and Institutional Reform as the IMF,” in *Can the World Be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism*, edited by Alan Alexandroff. Wilfred Laurier University Press. pp. 353-388.

Herbert, R., and S. Gruzd. 2008. The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers. Johannesburg: SAIIA.

Hicks, Robert, Bradley Parks, Timmons Roberts and Michael Tierney. 2008. *Greening Aid? Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hille, Peter, and Christoph Knill. 2006. It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid: The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries, 1999-2003. *European Union Politics* 7 (4): 531-52.

Hoey, Lesli. 2015. “Show me the Numbers”: Examining the Dynamics Between Evaluation and Government Performance in Developing Countries. *World Development* 70: 1–12.

Holder, William E. 2003. The International Monetary Fund’s Involvement in Combating Money

- Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 6 (4): 383–87.
- Hood, Christopher. 2006. Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services. *Public Administration Review* 66 (4): 515-521.
- Hood, Christopher. 2012. Public management by numbers as a performance-enhancing drug: two hypotheses. *Public Administration Review* 72(1): S85–S92.
- Honig, Dan. 2014. Navigation by Judgment: Organizational Autonomy in the Delivery of Foreign Aid. Paper presented at the 2014 Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference in Boston, Massachusetts.
- Hovi, Jon, Robert Huseby, and Detlef F. Sprinz. 2005. When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work? *World Politics* 57(4): 479-499.
- Hout, Wil. 2007. *The Politics of Aid Selectivity Good Governance Criteria in World Bank, U.S. and Dutch Development Assistance*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Hout, Wil. 2012. The anti-politics of development: Donor agencies and the political economy of governance. *Third World Quarterly* 33(3): 405–422.
- Hyden, Goran. 2008. After the Paris declaration: Taking on the issue of power. *Development Policy Review* 26 (3): 259–74.
- Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2007. "Methods of Elite Research." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by Russell J. Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Pp. 910-927. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Høyland, Bjørn, Karl Moene, and Fredrik Willumsen. 2012. The tyranny of international index rankings. *Journal of Development Economics* 97:1–14.
- Human Rights Watch. 2009. *World Report 2009*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Ibrahim, Hadeel. 2012. Fertilizing the Fields for Honest Government: Reflections on leaders, leadership and Africa's challenges: Interview with Hadeel Ibrahim. *Development* 55 (4): 453-457.
- Independent Evaluation Group of The World Bank (IEG). 2008. *Doing Business: An Independent Evaluation. Taking the Measure of The World Bank-IFC Doing Business Indicators*. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOIBUS/Resources/db\\_evaluation](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOIBUS/Resources/db_evaluation)
- Independent Evaluation Group of The World Bank (IEG). 2008. *Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why? An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 2012. *The Matrix System at Work: An Evaluation of The World Bank's Organizational Effectiveness*. Washington. DC: World Bank.
- Innes, Abby. 2013. The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe. *Journal Of Common Market Studies* Volume 52 (1): 88-104.
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 2010. Evaluation of the Fund for Special Operations during the Eighth Replenishment (1994-2010) -- Part I. Office of Evaluation and Oversight. Washington DC: IADB. Retrieved from <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=38027222>

International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). 2013. Country Survey - IATI Data and Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS). Presented at a 2014 Meeting of IATI Steering Committee Members and Observers. Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved from <http://www.aidtransparency.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Paper-4a-Country-Survey-of-AIMS.pdf>

International Budget Partnership (IBP) and ONE. 2013. How Can Donors Promote Budget Transparency and Accountability? The Use of Benchmarks and Incentives for Budget Transparency in Foreign Aid Programs. Retrieved from [http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Donor-benchmarks-paper\\_Sept2013.pdf](http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Donor-benchmarks-paper_Sept2013.pdf) on 25 February 2015.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2013. Leading the pack: Rwanda is Africa's best reformer in Doing Business 2014. Retrieved on 26 February 2015 at [http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region\\_ext\\_content/regions/sub-saharan+africa/news/za\\_ifc\\_as\\_rwanda\\_doing\\_business\\_2014](http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region_ext_content/regions/sub-saharan+africa/news/za_ifc_as_rwanda_doing_business_2014)

International Labour Office (ILO). 2007. World Bank Doing Business report: The employing workers indicator. November 2007. Geneva: International Labour Office. Retrieved from [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms\\_085125.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_085125.pdf)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank (WB). 2009. The Financial Sector Assessment Program After Ten Years: Experience and Reforms for the Next Decade. Washington DC: IMF and World Bank. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf>  
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf>

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2006a. Evaluation Report: Financial Sector Assessment Program. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from [http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/FSAP\\_Main\\_Report.pdf](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/FSAP_Main_Report.pdf)

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2006b. Evaluation Report: Multilateral Surveillance. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from <http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/09012006report.pdf>

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2006c. Liberia: First Review of Performance Under the Staff-Monitored Program—Staff Report. IMF Country Report No. 06/412. Washington DC: IMF.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2009. *An IEO Evaluation of IMF Interactions with its Member Countries*. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from <http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/A.%20%20Full%20Text%20of%20Main%20Report.pdf>

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2007. Evaluation Report: IMF Exchange Rate Policy. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from [http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05172007exrate\\_full.pdf](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05172007exrate_full.pdf)

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2013. Evaluation Report: The Role of the IMF as Trusted Advisor. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from [http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/RITA\\_-\\_Main\\_Report.pdf](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/RITA_-_Main_Report.pdf)

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2014. Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program—Further Adaptation to the Post-Crisis Era. SM/14/249. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf>

IREX. 2014. Media Sustainability Index 2014: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia. Washington DC: IREX. Retrieved from [http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE\\_MSI\\_2014\\_Turkmenistan.pdf](http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2014_Turkmenistan.pdf)

Jacob, Brian A. 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools." *Journal of Public Economics* 89 (5): 761-796.

Jacoby, Wade. 2006. Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations. *World Politics* 58 (4): 623-651.

Jennings Jr., Edward T. and Jeremy L. Hall. 2011. Evidence-Based Practice and the Use of Information in State Agency Decision Making. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22: 2245-266.

Johnson, Juliet. 2008. "Two-Track Diffusion and Central Bank Embeddedness: The Politics of Euro Adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic," in *Transnational Actors in Central and Eastern European Transitions*, edited by Mitchell A. Orenstein, Stephen Bloom, and Nicole Lindstrom. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pg. 77-97.

Jones, Nicola, Harry Jones, and Cora Walsh. 2008. Political science? Strengthening science–policy dialogue in developing countries. ODI Working Paper 294. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

Joyce, Joseph P. 2006. Promises made, promises broken: A model of IMF program implementation. *Economics and Politics* 18 (3): 339–365.

Kahler, Miles. 1992. "External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment." in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pp. 89-133.

Kapstein, Ethan B. and Nathan Converse. 2008. *The Fate of Young Democracies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2005. Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630. Washington, D.C.

Keefer, Philip. 2007. Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 804-821.

Kelley, Judith and Beth Simmons. 2014a. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Kelley, Judith G. and Beth A. Simmons. 2014b. The Power of Performance Indicators: Rankings, Ratings and Reactivity in International Relations. Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 27-September 1, 2014, Washington DC.

Kelley, Judith. 2004. International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. *International Organization* 58(3): 425-45.

Kelley, Judith. 2006. New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaption in The new European Neighborhood Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(1): 29-55.

Kelsall, Tim. 2011. Going with the Grain in African Development? *Development Policy Review* 29 (S1): s223–s251.

Kelsall, Tim. 2012. Neo-Patrimonialism, Rent-Seeking and Development: Going with the Grain? *New Political Economy* 17 (5): 677-682.

Kikeri, Sunita, Thomas Kenyon, and Vincent Palmade. 2006 *Reforming the Investment Climate: Lessons for Practitioners*. Washington DC: International Finance Corporation.

Kinzer, Stephen. 2009. His country's saved, but he can't go back. *The Washington Post*. November 22, 2009.

Kleeman, Kristof. 2010. European Neighbourhood Policy: A Reality Check. How effective is the European Neighbourhood Policy in promoting good governance? Berlin, Germany: Hertie School of Governance.

Konneh, Amara and Steve Radelet. 2008. Liberia Shows Dramatic Improvement in Controlling Corruption. June 2008. Monrovia, Liberia: Executive Mansion. [http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Liberia\\_Corruption.pdf](http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Liberia_Corruption.pdf)

Knack, Stephen. 2007. Measuring Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. *Journal of Public Policy* 27 (3): 255-291.

Knack, Stephen and Aminur Rahman. 2007. Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients. *Journal of Development Economics* 83(1): 176-197.

Knack, Stephen. 2014. Building or Bypassing Recipient Country Systems: Are Donors Defying the Paris Declaration? *The Journal of Development Studies* 50 (6): 839-854.

Krampe, Eva, and Christian Henning. 2011, May. Implementing the Common Africa Agricultural Development Programme in Malawi: Conflicts and Communication among Stakeholders. Paper prepared for the 4th European Conference on African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. Retrieved from <http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/121-140/panel-132/Eva-Krampe-full-paper.pdf>

Krasner, Stephen. 2011. Foreign Aid: Competing Paradigms. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 5 (2): 123-149.

Krasner, Stephen D. and Thomas Risse. 2014. External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction. *Governance* 27 (4): 545–567.

Krever, Tor. 2013. Quantifying Law: legal indicator projects and the reproduction of neoliberal common sense. *Third World Quarterly* 34(1): 131–150.

Khwaja, Asim. 2008. Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? *Journal of Public Economics* 93(7): 899-916.

Lake, David, and Christopher J. Farris. 2014. Why International Trusteeship Fails: The Politics of External Authority in Areas of Limited Statehood. *Governance*. 27 (4): 569–587.

Laurance W.F. 2007. A new initiative to use carbon trading for tropical forest conservation. *Biotropica* 39: 20–24.

Lawson, Andrew, Richard Gerster, and David Hoole. 2005. Learning from Experience with Performance Assessment Frameworks for General Budget Support. November 2005. Synthesis Report. Swiss State



Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Retrieved from [http://www.gersterconsulting.ch/docs/synthesis\\_paf\\_report.pdf](http://www.gersterconsulting.ch/docs/synthesis_paf_report.pdf)

Levy, Brian. 2014. *Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, Peter. 1996. Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa: The Quest for a Politics of Development. *World Politics* 49(1): 92-129.

Liefferink, Duncan, Bas Arts, Jelmer Kamstra and Jeroen Ooijevaar. 2009. Leaders and laggards in environmental policy: A quantitative analysis of domestic policy outputs. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(5): 677-700.

Lim, S.S., D.B. Stein, A. Charrow, and C.J.L. Murray. 2008. Tracking progress towards universal childhood immunisation and the impact of global initiatives: a systematic analysis of three-dose diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis immunisation coverage. *Lancet* 372 (9655): 2013-2046.

Lin, Min-Wei and Chilik Yu. 2014. Can Corruption Be Measured? Comparing Global Versus Local Perceptions of Corruption in East and Southeast Asia. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16 (2): 140-157.

Litzenberger, Lee. 2007. IMF/WB “Not Optimistic” As Kyrgyz HIPC Decision Nears. 08 February 2007. Retrieved at <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07BISHKEK143.html>

Loayza, Norman, Jamele Rigolini, and Gonzalo Llorente. 2012. Do Middle Classes Bring Institutional Reforms? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6015. Washington DC: World Bank.

Lombardi, Domenico and Ngaire Woods. 2008. The Politics of Influence: An Analysis of IMF Surveillance. *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (5): 709–737.

Lu, Chunling, Catherine M Michaud, Emmanuela Gakidou, Kashif Khan, Christopher J. L. Murray. 2006. Effect of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation on diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine coverage: An independent assessment. *Lancet* 368: 1088–1095.

Mackie, Andrew and Giovanni Caprio. 2011. Assessing the Impact of the PEFA Framework A Study for the PEFA Steering Committee. Volume 1: Main Report. PEFA. Retrieved from <http://www.pefa.org/sites/pefa.org/files/attachments/Assessing%20the%20Impact%20of%20PEFA%20Framework%20Vol%201%20Final%20JUNE%202011%20220611.pdf>

Martin, Lisa. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McArthur, John W. 2013. Own the goals: What the Millennium Development Goals have established. *Foreign Affairs* 92 (2): 152-162.

Meagher, Patrick. 2005. Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric versus reality. *The Journal of Policy Reform* 8 (1): 69-103.

Meessen, Bruno, Agnès Soucat, and Claude Sekabaraga. 2011. Performance-based financing: just a donor fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive health-care reform? *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 89: 153-156.

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). 2013a. The MCC Effect. Issue Brief. Washington D.C.: MCC. <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/reports/issuebrief-2013002131301-mcc-effect.pdf>

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). 2013b. The MCC Effect: The Prospect of Compact Eligibility is Incentivizing Policy Reform. February 2013 Fact Sheet. Washington D.C.: MCC. Retrieved from [https://assets.mcc.gov/press/factsheet-2012002115602-mcc-effect-compact-eligibility\\_1.pdf](https://assets.mcc.gov/press/factsheet-2012002115602-mcc-effect-compact-eligibility_1.pdf)

Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley 2013. The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy. *Review of International Organizations* 8(3): 313-341.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 2013. Guidelines for development contracts. June 2013. Retrieved from <http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20for%20Development%20Contracts/Guidelines%20for%20development%20contracts%20final%20June%202013.pdf>[http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical\\_Guidelines/Guidelines\\_for\\_Development\\_Contracts/Guidelines\\_for\\_development\\_contracts\\_final\\_June\\_2013.pdf](http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical_Guidelines/Guidelines_for_Development_Contracts/Guidelines_for_development_contracts_final_June_2013.pdf)

Mitchell, Lincoln. 2009. Compromising democracy: state building in Saakashvili's Georgia. *Central Asian Survey* 28(2): 171-183.

Molenaers, Nadia. 2012. The Great Divide? Donor perceptions of budget support, eligibility and policy dialogue. *Third World Quarterly* 33 (5): 791-806.

Molenaers, Nadia and Leen Nijs. 2011. Why the European Commission Fails to Adhere to the Principles of Good Donorship: The Case of the Governance Incentive Tranche. *European Journal of Development Research* 23: 409-425.

Molenaers, Nadia, Anna Gagiano, Lode Smets, and Sebastian Dellepiane. Forthcoming. What determines the suspension of budget support? *World Development*.

Molina-Gallart, Nuria. 2008. Outcome-based conditionality: Too good to be true? Brussels: EURODAD. [http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats\\_new/reports/outcome\\_based\\_conditionality\\_final\\_august\\_2010.pdf](http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/outcome_based_conditionality_final_august_2010.pdf)

Momani, Bessma. 2005. Recruiting and Diversifying IMF Technocrats. *Global Society* 19(2): 167- 187.

Momani, Bessma. 2007. IMF Surveillance and America's Turkish Delight. *Central European Review of International Affairs* 27: 5–24.

Montinola, Gabriella R. 2010. When Does Aid Conditionality Work? *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45: 358–382.

Mumssen, Christian, Yasemin Bal Gündüz, Christian Ebeke, and Linda Kaltani. 2013. IMF-Supported Programs in Low Income Countries: Economic Impact over the Short and Longer Term. IMF Working Paper WP/13/273. Washington DC: IMF.

Muth, John F. 1961. Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements. *Econometrica* 29 (3): 315-35.

Naimoli, J. and P. Vergeer, eds. 2010. Verification at a Glance: A Series of Snapshots of Experiences Verifying Performance Linked to Financial Incentives for Results-Based Financing (RBF) Programs from Selected Countries. Washington DC: The World Bank.



Natsios, Andrew. 2010. *The clash of the counter-bureaucracy and development*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Noland, Marcus. 1997. Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR. *International Organization* 51: 365-87.

Norad. 2008. Norway's provision of budget support to developing countries -- guidelines. Oslo, Norway: NORAD.

North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast. 2007. *Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4359. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Nsouli, Saleh M. 2006. *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten Years On: Reassessing Readiness and Prospects*. Statement by Director of the IMF Offices in Europe at Crans-Montana Forum, Monaco. June 23, 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2>

Odell, John S. and Dustin H. Tingley. 2013. "Negotiating Agreements in International Relations." In *Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin. Washington DC: American Political Science Association.

OECD. 2015. *Making Development Co-operation Fit for the Future: A Survey of Partner Countries*. OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 20. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js6b25hzv7h-en>

OECD and German Development Institute (DIE). 2014. *Technical workshop on results-based funding*. 19-20 May 2014. Paris, France: OECD. Retrieved from [http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/tx\\_veranstaltung/20140519\\_Results\\_based\\_Funding\\_Workshop\\_Report.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/tx_veranstaltung/20140519_Results_based_Funding_Workshop_Report.pdf)

Öhler, Hannes, Axel Dreher, and Peter Nunnenkamp. 2012. Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme. *European Economic Review* 56: 138-153.

Orbie, Jan and Lisa Tortell. 2009. The New GSP + Beneficiaries: Ticking the Box or really Consistent with ILO Findings? *European Foreign Affairs Review* 14 (5): 663–681.

Parks, Bradley C. 2014. *Brokering Development Policy Change: The Parallel Pursuit of Millennium Challenge Account Resources and Reform*. Ph.D. Dissertation. London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Parks, Bradley C. and Michael Tierney. 2004. *Cooperation or Collusion: Explaining Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Aid to Developing Countries*. Paper presented at the 2004 American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, September 1-5, 2004. [http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/documents/aiddata/cooperation\\_collusion\\_2004.pdf](http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/documents/aiddata/cooperation_collusion_2004.pdf)

Parks, Bradley C., Taylor Wilson, Diana Winter, Michael Testa, and Torey Beth Jackson. 2014. *Expanding the Policy Influence of the State Department's Investment Climate Statements*. A Diplomacy Lab Report Prepared by the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations. Williamsburg, VA: The College of William and Mary.

Parks, Bradley C. and Zachary J. Rice. 2013. Measuring the Policy Influence of the Millennium Challenge Corporation: A Survey-Based Approach. Working Paper. Williamsburg, VA: The College of William and Mary.

Parks, Bradley C. and Zachary J. Rice. 2014. Buying Influence in a Crowded Market: Aid Policy in the Post- DAC World. Presentation delivered at the “South-South Development Cooperation: Chances and Challenges for the International Aid Architecture” Workshop at Heidelberg University, September 26-27, 2014.

Perakis, Rita and William Savedoff. 2015. Does Results-Based Aid Change Anything? Pecuniary Interests, Attention, Accountability and Discretion in Four Case Studies. CGD Policy Paper 053. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.

Perrin, Burt. 2002. Implementing the vision: Addressing challenges to results-focused management and budgeting. Paris: OECD. <http://www.seachangecop.org/sites/default/files/documents/2002%20Results-focused%20managing%20and%20budgeting.pdf>

Persson, Anna, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell. 2013. Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem. *Governance* 26 (3): 449–471.

Pew Research Center. 2012. *U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies*. Washington DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/09/US-Public-and-Elite-Report-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-September-18-2012.pdf>

Pham, J. Peter. 2009. Behind the Curve: Corrupt governments cash in on the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s outdated metrics. *Stanford Social Innovation Review* Fall 2009.

Phillips, David A. 2009. *Reforming The World Bank: Twenty Years of Trial —and Error*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Phillips, Michael. 2007. Bush's Aid Policy Prods Countries: Yemen and Lesotho Embrace Overhauls; The Gambia Balks. *The Wall Street Journal*. March 14, 2007; Page A6.

Piot, Peter, Sarah Russell, and Heidi Larson. 2007. Good Politics, Bad Politics: The Experience of AIDS. *American Journal of Public Health* 97 (11): 1934–1936.

Pitlik, Hans, Björn Frank, and Mathias Firchow. 2010. The demand for transparency: An empirical note. *Review of International Organizations* 5: 177-195.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin American and Eastern Europe*. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.

Pritchett, Lant, and Michael Woolcock. 2004. Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development. *World Development* 32 (2): 191-212.

Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews. 2013. Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation. *Journal of Development Studies* 49 (1): 1-18.

Pritchett, Lant, Salimah Samji and Jeffrey Hammer. 2012. “It’s All About MeE: Using Structured Experiential Learning (‘e’) to Crawl the Design Space. UNU-WIDER Working Paper 012/104. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Pritchett, Lant. 2013. *Folk and Formula: Fact and Fiction in Development*. Annual UNU Wider Lecture #16, Helsinki, Finland: UNU-WIDER.

Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews. 2014. *Capability Traps in Development: How Initiatives to Improve Administrative Systems Succeed at Failing*. *Prism* 3 (3): 63-74.

Radelet, Steve. 2003. *Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account*. Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development.

Radelet, Steve. 2006. "Pulling not Pushing Reforms: Delivering Aid through Challenge Grants." in *The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges*, edited by Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceicao. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Radelet, Steve. 2007. *The Millennium Challenge Account in Africa: Testimony Before the House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health*. June 28, 2007.

Rajan, Raghuram, 2004. *Why Are Structural Reforms So Difficult?* *Finance and Development* 41 (2): 56–57.

Rajan, Raghuram G. 2009. *Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment*. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(1): 178-218.

Ravallion, Martin. 2011. *Knowledgeable Bankers? The Demand for Research in World Bank Operations*. World Bank Policy Research Paper 5892. Washington DC: World Bank.

Reitmaier, Angela. 2014. *Funding African Governance Institutions and Processes: Insights and Lessons*. SAIIA Occasional Paper #117. Johannesburg, South Africa: SAIIA.

Remmer, Karen L. 1986. *The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984*. *Comparative Politics* 19: 1-24.

Rheault, Magali and Bob Tortora. 2011. *Confidence in Institutions: Africans Speak on the Meaning of Being Well Governed*. *Harvard International Review* 32 (4): 72-77.

Ribadu, Nuhu. 2010. *Show Me the Money: Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Tools to Fight Corruption in Nigeria*. Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development.

Rieff, David. 2005. *Che's Second Coming?* *New York Times* 20 November 2005. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/20/magazine/20bolivia.html?pagewanted=print&r=0>

Robinson, Brooks. 2008a. *Liberia: 21 Reforms to Improve the Business Climate May Boost MCC Score*. 5 May 2008. Retrieved from <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08MONROVIA336.html>

Robinson, Brooks. 2008b. *Liberia: President Turns To Young Technocrats For New Economic Team*. 7 August 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MONROVIA612>

Rodrik, Dani. 1996. "Why Is there Multilateral Lending?" In *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995*, edited by M. Bruno, and B. Pleskovic. Washington DC: the World Bank.

Rodrik, Dani. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rogelberg, S. G. and J.M. Stanton. 2007. Understanding and dealing with organizational survey nonresponse. *Organizational Research Methods* 10: 195-209.

Rosenberg, Tina. 2006. To Fight Corruption, One African Offers Presidents Cash. *The New York Times*. November 24, 2006. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/opinion/24fri4.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/opinion/24fri4.html?_r=0)

Rosenzweig, Mark R. and K.I. Wolpin. 1982. Governmental Interventions and Household Behavior in a Developing Country: Anticipated and Unanticipated Consequences of Social Programs. *Journal of Development Economics* 10: 209-225.

Routley, Laura. 2014. Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and Buzzwords. *Development Policy Review* 32 (2): 159–177.

Rotberg, Robert. 2009. Governance and Leadership in Africa: Measures, Methods, and Results. *Journal of International Affairs* 62 (2): 113-126.

Samuel, Boris. 2013. Economic Calculations, Instability, and (In)formalization of the State in Mauritania, 2003-2011, Conference on African Economic Development: Measuring Success And Failure. April 18 – 20, 2013, Simon Fraser University.

Santiso, Carlos. 2003. The Gordian Knot of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Promoting democracy while respecting sovereignty. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16 (2): 343-358.

Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2008. The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours. *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (2): 295-316.

Savedoff, William. 2011. Incentive Proliferation? Making Sense of a New Wave of Development Programs. Center for Global Development Essay. Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development.

Schäferhoff, Marco. 2014. External Actors and the Provision of Public Health Services in Somalia. *Governance* 27 (4): 675–695.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(4): 669–687.

Schueth, Samuel J. 2011. Assembling International Competitiveness: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and the Doing Business Project. *Economic Geography* 37(1): 51-77.

Shafer, D. Michael. 1994. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

Sharman, Jason. 2008. Power, Discourse and Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States. *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 635-656.

Sharman, Jason. 2009. The Bark is the Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting. *Review of International Political Economy* 16: 573-596.

Sharman, Jason. 2011. Small is Beautiful: The Perils of Gigantism and the Pay-offs of Studying Small International Organisations. Presented at the AGORA Workshop on Institutional Diversity in Governance of the Global Economy, Brisbane, Australia, January 11-12, 2011.

Sheehan, Kim B. 2006. E-mail Survey Response Rates: A Review. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 6 (2).

Sherr, James. 2013. Ukraine and Europe: Final Decision? London, UK: Chatham House.

Sherry, James, Sangeeta Mookherji, and Leo Ryan. 2009. The Five-Year Evaluation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Synthesis of Study Areas 1, 2 and 3. Macro International Inc.

Shih, Tse-Hua, and Xitao Fan. 2008. Comparing Response Rates from Web and Mail Surveys: A Meta-Analysis. *Field Methods* 20: 249-271.

Simmons, Beth A. 2000. The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs. *International Organization* 54: 573-602.

Sjöstedt, M. 2013. Aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration: A mismatch between ownership and results-based management? *Public Administration and Development* 33: 143–155.

Smets, Lodewijk. 2014. World Bank Policy Lending for Public Sector Reform. Paper presented at CESifo Reforming the Public Sector Workshop. 25-26 July 2014. Bay of Venice, Italy.

Smith, Wellington Geevon. 2007. Prez Johnson-Sirleaf, MCC hold discussion. STAR Radio. February 12, 2007. <http://www.starradio.org.lr/latest-news/prez-Johnson-Sirleaf-mcc-hold-discussion.html>

Smith, Alastair and James Raymond Vreeland. 2006. "The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs." in *Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and The World Bank*, edited by G. Ranis, J. R. Vreeland and S. Kosack. New York: Routledge. Pp. 263- 289.

Soederberg, Susanne. 2004. American empire and 'excluded states': the millennium challenge account and the shift to pre-emptive development. *Third World Quarterly* 25 (2): 279-302.

Soeters R, Habineza C, Peerenboom PB. 2006. Performance-based financing and changing the district health system: experience from Rwanda. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 84: 884-889.

Spitzmüller, C., D. Glenn, M. Sutton, C. Barr, and S. Rogelberg. 2007. Survey nonrespondents as bad soldiers: Examining the relationship between organizational citizenship and survey response behavior. *International Journal of Selection & Assessment* 15(4): 449-59.

Srivastava, Vivek and Marco Larizza. 2013. Working with the Grain for Reforming the Public Service: A Live Example from Sierra Leone. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 76 (3): 458–85.

Stahl, Bernhard. 2011. Perverted Conditionality: The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Serbia. *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16 (4): 465–487.

Stecklov, Guy, and Alexander Weinreb. 2010. Improving the Quality of Data and Impact Evaluation Studies in Developing Countries. Impact Evaluation Guidelines No. 1: Strategy Development Division. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Steen, Anton. 2003. *Political Elites and the New Russia: The Power Basis of Yeltsin's and Putin's Regimes*. London, UK: Routledge.

Stewart, Susan. 2013. Public Procurement Reform in Ukraine: The Implications of Neopatrimonialism for External Actors. *Demokratizatsiya* 21 (2): 197-214.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 577-591.

Stone, Randall. 2002. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post- Communist Transition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sutherland, Peter D. 2008. Transforming Nations: How the WTO Boosts Economies and Opens Societies. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2): 125-136.

Swedlund, Haley. 2013. The domestication of governance assessments: Evidence from the Rwandan Joint Governance Assessment. *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (4): 449–470.

Swift-Morgan, Jennifer. 2014. Confronting the Informal in Good Governance: The Case of Decentralised Education-System Reform in Guinea. *Development Policy Review* 32 (4): 399–425.

Tang, Man-Keung and Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. Does WTO Accession Raise Income? When External Commitments Create Value. NBER Working Paper.

Tavakoli, Heidi, Ismaila Cessay, and Winston Cole. 2014. Success when stars align: Public financial management reforms in Sierra Leone. WIDER Working Paper 2014/081. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Taylor, Jeannette. 2011. Factors Influencing the Use of Performance Information for Decision Making in Australian State Agencies. *Public Administration* 89(4): 1316-1334.

Taylor, John B. 2004. Economic Freedom and Georgia's Rose Revolution. Remarks at the Caucasus Business School, Tbilisi, Georgia. November 22, 2004.

The Economist. 2000. Dancing in Kenya to the donors' tune. 3 August 2000. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/28457>

The Economist. 2003. Dirt out, cash in. 27 November 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/2249436>

The Economist. 2005. Unblocking business. 17 September 2005.

The Economist. 2014. The final frontier: Fixing dreadful sanitation in India requires not just building lavatories but also changing habits. 19 July 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21607837-fixing-dreadful-sanitation-india-requires-not-just-building-lavatories-also-changing>

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview. Retrieved from <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>

Trapnell, Stephanie E. 2011. Actionable Governance Indicators: Turning Measurement into Reform. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 3 (22): 317-348.

UNDP and Global Integrity 2008. A User's Guide to Measuring Corruption. Oslo, Norway: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre. Retrieved from [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/a-users-guide-to-measuring-corruption/users\\_guide\\_measuring\\_corruption.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/a-users-guide-to-measuring-corruption/users_guide_measuring_corruption.pdf)



United Nations (UN). 2013. A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development. New York, NY: UN. Retrieved from <http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf>

Unsworth, Sue. 2009. What's Politics Got to Do With It? Why Donors Find it So Hard to Come to Terms with Politics, and Why this Matters. *Journal of International Development* 21(6): 883-894.

Vachudova, Milada Anna. 2013. EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (1): 1-17.

Van De Walle, Nick. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Volcker, Paul. 2009. The Changing Nature of Government Service. Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wallander, Celeste. 2002. NATO's Price: Shape up or Ship out. *Foreign Affairs* 81 (6): 2-8.

Ward, Hugh, and Peter John. 2013. Competitive Learning in Yardstick Competition: Testing Models of Policy Diffusion With Performance Data. *Political Science Research and Methods* 1 (1): 3-25.

Warren, Rick. 2009. Paul Kagame. *Time Magazine*. April 30, 2009. [http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1894410\\_1893847\\_1893843,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1894410_1893847_1893843,00.html). Retrieved on March 7, 2010.

Watson, Kenneth. 2008. Mid-Term Review of the GEF Resource Allocation Framework: Comparison of the GEF RAF with other Performance-Based Allocation Systems. Technical Paper #8. Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office. Washington DC: GEF. Retrieved from [https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/RAF\\_MTR-TECH\\_Paper\\_8.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/RAF_MTR-TECH_Paper_8.pdf)

Weisberg, Herbert F. 2005. *The Total Survey Error Approach: A Guide to the New Science of Survey Research*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 2007. *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Weymouth, Stephen and J. Muir Macpherson. 2012. The Social Construction of Policy Reform: Economists and Trade Liberalization around the World. *International Interactions* 38 (5): 670-702.

Whitfield, Lindsay (ed.). 2009. *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Wolff, Hendrik, Howard Chong, and Maximilian Auffhammer. 2011. Classification, Detection and Consequences of Data Error: Evidence from the Human Development Index. *Economic Journal* 121: 843-870.

World Bank (WB). 2006a. *Global Monitoring Report 2006*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2006b. *Governance and Anti-Corruption: Ways to Enhance the World Bank's Impact*. Washington DC: Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2007. *Celebrating Reform 2007: Doing Business Case Studies*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2009. *Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

World Bank (WB). 2010. *World Bank Economic Reports on Growth Diagnostics in Four African Countries: Ghana, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Uganda. Performance Assessment Review. Report No.: 55404*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2011. *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2013. *Rwanda Economic Update. Fourth Edition. Maintaining the Momentum – With a Special Focus on Rwanda's Pathway out of Poverty*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (WB). 2014. *Client Feedback Survey of FY13 Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA): Summary Results*. Washington DC: World Bank. Retrieved at [http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/ProductsandServices/CFI%20FY13%20Summary%2009\\_04\\_2014.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/ProductsandServices/CFI%20FY13%20Summary%2009_04_2014.pdf)

World Bank (WB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2013. *Women, Business and the Law 2014: Removing Restrictions to Enhance Gender Equality*. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Wynia, Matthew K., Deborah S. Cummins, Jonathan B. VanGeest, and Ira B. Wilson. 2000. Physician manipulation of reimbursement rules for patients: between a rock and a hard place. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 283 (14): 1858–1865.

Yovanovitch, Marie. 2006a. *Kyrgyz HIPC Debate Becomes Political Hot Potato*. 30 November 2006. Retrieved at [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BISHKEK1692\\_a.html](http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BISHKEK1692_a.html)

Yovanovitch, Marie. 2006b. *Kyrgyz Parliament Confirms New Prime Minister*. 29 January 2007. Retrieved at <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07BISHKEK87.html>

Zimelis, Andris. 2011. *Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership: A Misguided Approach to Development?* *Australian Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 389–406.

Zwane, Alix Peterson and Kremer, Michael. 2007. *What works in fighting diarrheal diseases in developing countries? A critical review*. *The World Bank Research Observer* 22 (1): 1–24.